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INTRODUCTION

The enactment of workmen's compensation legislation in the
early part of this century was a revolutionary development in
American law. With this legislation, the common law tort cause of
action by employees for work-related injuries was abolished, and
the employer lost the right to assert the affirmative defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant
rule.' That such a regime was revolutionary is reflected in the fact
that in many states, including Pennsylvania, a constitutional
amendment was required-in order to legitimate the system.' So
foreign was the substance and procedure of the new law that many
lawyers of the time were unwilling to undertake its practice.3
Accompanying this revolutionary enactment, however, were incidental features of the most ancient character-statutes of limitations4 and other time restrictions demanding that the litigant as1. Accounts of the historical development of workmen's compensation systems
abound. See, e.g., Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's
Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 349, 349-61 (1976).
2. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18. See 1 W. SKINNER, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 4-10 (3d ed. 1938). See also A.F. BARBIERI, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE § 2.01, at 4 (1975).
3. See SKINNER, supra note 2, Preface (1st ed. 1924).
4. The antiquity of statutes of limitations is well attested to in Kenyon v. Stewart,
44 Pa. 179 (1863):
Limitations of actions, either by prescription or by statute, are older than any of our
constitutions or common law ....
[TIraces of them [may be found] in the Levitical
law, and express recognitions of them in the codes of ancient Greece and Rome;
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sert rights or perform procedural acts within a certain defined time
frame. The existence of such requirements in workmen's compensation is not, of course, a particularly exceptional phenomenon;
there is as much a natural demand in this statutory scheme as
under the common law that "where there are wrongs to be redressed . . . and . . . rights to be enforced, they should be enforced without unreasonable delay."' Still, the presence of absolute
time limitation bars may seem anomalous in the context of legislation which provides, as one of its principal purposes, the enhanced
possibility of recovery for injured workers,6 those traditionally
thought to be the most unlikely to be able to vindicate their rights
through operation of the legal system. Once having granted this
enhanced possibility, it perhaps appears inappropriate to limit the
right altogether by way of "technicalities," 7 especially if applied
strictly.
The answer to this apparent contradiction lies at least in part in
the very "bargain" which employer and employee enter into under
workmen's compensation.8 Having sacrificed its common law defenses, the employer faces increased and almost certain liabilities;
it is thus reasonable that at least the time frame within which such
liability may accrue is established clearly. Likewise, notwithstandwhilst among the modern nations of continental Europe, some term of time has invariably been observed as the ne plus ultra beyond which a possession will not be disturbed, and at the end of which a party shall in all cases be completely exonerated
from all judicial interpellation.
Id. at 191. See also Strimpfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. 283, 299 (1852) ("[E]very civilized society
has fixed a limited time, within which all rights must be prosecuted.").
5. Ulakovic v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 399 Pa. 571, 576, 16 A.2d 41, 42 (1940).
6. Jester v. Electric Power Constr. Co. (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.), 113
Pa. Super. 177, 180-81, 172 A.2d 154, 156 (1934).
7. Cf. Katz v. Evening Bulletin, 485 Pa. 536, 541, 403 A.2d 518, 520 (1979) ("a meritorious claim ought not, if possible be defeated for technical reasons and . . . technicalities
are not looked upon with favor in compensation cases .... ") (quoting Wilkinson v. United
Parcel Service, 158 Pa. Super. 22, 31, 43 A.2d 408, 412 (1945)).
8. Cf. Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 591, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916):
Both had suffered under the old system, the employers by heavy judgmerits of which
half was- opposing lawyers' booty, the workmen through the old defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The master in exchange for limited
liability was willing to pay on some claims in [the] future where in the past there had
been no liability at all. The servant was willing not only to give up trial by jury but to
accept far less than he had often won in court, provided he was sure to get the small
sum without having to fight for it.
Id. Cf. BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 2.06, at 8-9.
9. See, e.g., Note, Time Limit on Medical Examinations Cannot Bar Recovery
Under Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Law, 26 Lov. L. REV. 681 (1980). The cited
article discusses the case of Freechou v. Thomas W. Hooley, Inc., 383 So. 2d 337 (La. 1980),
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed a claimant recovery of compensation not-
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ing the "remedial" character of the legislation, 0 workmen's compensation was never intended to constitute absolute social insurance," with payments made for injuries regardless of cause.
Indeed, the constitutional proviso itself authorizes the system only
to the extent that it makes employers liable for work-related injuries. 2 Statutes of limitations within the act vindicate this principle
by helping to ensure that claims based upon stale evidence, the
work-related origins of which are difficult to ascertain, will be precluded.' 3 Viewed in this light, procedural limitation statutes clearly
transcend the level of "technicalities."' 4
These comments address the concern which underlies a key purpose for limitation provisions in the nature of commonly regarded
statutes of limitations-the desire to grant repose at some point to
the potential defendant as against future liability for harms it may
have committed.'1 Numerous other forms of time limitations, however, exist in the workmen's compensation scheme governing difwithstanding the fact that he had not complied with the special statutory time limitation for
giving notice of sustaining a work-related hernia. Critical of the ruling, the author
complains:
The statement that the purpose of workmen's compensation is the protection of the
worker . . . cannot be stretched to overrule particular standards of proof in difficult
etiological contexts. . . . [T]he general aim of workmen's compensation is to strike a
bargain between competing interests of employer and employee. Having been relieved
of. . .proving . . . negligence, the employee thereby incurs a basal responsibility to
establish the credibility of his claim ....
Note, supra, at 691.
10. See, e.g., Reed v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 499 Pa. 177, 185-86, 452
A.2d 997, 1001 (1982) (citing "remedial" nature of act and consequent requirement of liberal
construction, held, employee's right, after loss of multiple appendages, to receive specific
loss compensation rather than total disability, survives claimant's death and may be asserted by widow).
11. See, e.g., L.G. KNOLL, FORWARD TO TITLE 77, PA. STAT. ANN. xii (Purdon 1952)
(discussing purposes of act, "[workmen's compensation] is definitely distinguished from accident, health, life insurance, old age pensions and other social reforms."). See also Bohlen,
Some Recent Decisions Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts of Massachusetts and
Michigan, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 569 (1914) (rejecting notion that diseases should be compensable under adversarial system of workmen's compensation, writer asserts as alternative
that "they should be covered . . . by an act providing a general pension fund for all illness,
whether contracted within or without the employment .. ").Cf. Billick v. Republic Steel
Corp., 214 Pa. Super. 267, 270, 257 A.2d 589, 591 (1969) (allocatur denied) ("While the
Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed, its purpose is to compensate for
accidental injuries and not to insure the life and health of an employe[.]").
12. See supra note 2. See also Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 458, 7 A.2d
302, 307 (1939).
13. The prevention of claims based upon stale evidence is, of course, a key purpose of
statutes of limitations. See infra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
14. See generally infra notes 242-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
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ferent aspects of procedure and thus possessing policy concerns of
their own. Nevertheless, at least in Pennsylvania law, all of these
provisions possess a kinship due to their shared procedural character and essential attribute of limiting, by time restriction, the ability to recover an award of workmen's compensation. This article
examines the theoretical doctrine and current application of this
related group of time restrictions found in the Pennsylvania Work7
men's Compensation"6 and Occupational Disease Acts.'
Many of the legal concepts discussed in this article are of a settled nature, due in large part to the maturity of the Pennsylvania
legislation and the frequent interpretation it has received. As an
incidental procedural feature to the substantive aspects of the acts,
much of the law of workmen's compensation limitations remains as
it did in the early days of the system. Nevertheless, perhaps due to
this peripheral character, a complete doctrinal cohesiveness may
be said to be lacking in judicial construction of this group of time
restrictions. In response to this lack of cohesiveness, the first part
of this article investigates the theoretical bases of the various time
limitations and attempts to establish a rational classification
scheme. The second part of this article examines in greater detail
the actual operation of the limitations in light of these different
theoretical bases.
The primary thesis of the first part of this article is that the
"statute of repose" theory of workmen's compensation limitations
does no more than indicate the effect of the expiration of the time
period.' 8 The time-honored conclusion reached by Pennsylvania
courts that application of the "discovery rule" to indicate the commencement point of a limitation provision does away with the
statute of repose theory 9 is thus challenged. Under this same thesis, it is posited that the statute of repose notion does nothing to
prevent the suspension of the limitations in cases of disabilities of
imprisonment, minority, and incompetency.2" Another thesis of
this first part is that while the discovery rule may well have appli16. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 11065.1 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1985)).
17. Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§
1201-1601.1 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1985)).
18. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text (discussion of Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956); Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 496 A.2d 412
(1985)).
20. See infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
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cation to the statutes of repose, it would be doctrinally incongruous to permit its application to the disease manifestation "limitations" of the two acts,"1 provisions which are not "statutes of
limitations" in the first place. Finally, this first part notes and discusses the recent judicial treatment of statutes of repose as quasijurisdictional limitations, capable of being raised for the first time
22
on appeal.
In the second part of this article, the most recent developments
in the limitations law are reviewed in addition to its settled aspects. The issue of when the limitations periods commence in
claims alleging aggravation of injury is discussed, in acknowledgement of the increasing availability and popularity of such claims.23
In addition, the impact of the commonwealth court's decision in
Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Township of
Marple),24 which establishes the discovery rule as applicable in
cases of tolling of limitations due to employer fraud,2 5 is assessed
in an attempt to predict the scope of the new rule. 26 Also included
in the second part of this article is an examination of the doctrine
of tolling of limitation statutes when payments "in lieu" of compensation have been made by an employer, 27 an examination undertaken in light of the commonwealth court's rulings in its consecutive considerations of Marshall v. Workmen's Compensation
28
Appeal Board (Gulf & Western Industrial Products Co.).
Part I
SUBSTANCE AND TERMINOLOGY: THE NATURE OF THE TIME

LIMITATIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA ACTS

Four different types of time limitations are easily discernible in
21. See infra notes 197-220 and accompanying text (discussion of Kilvady v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 90 Pa. Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985)).
22. See infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text (discussion of Gnall v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Mines Corp.), 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 462 A.2d 930
(1983)).
23. See infra notes 235-41, 504-06; infra note 334.
24. 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169 (1984), aff'd per curiam, __
Pa. -, 507
A.2d 388 (1986).
25. Id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173.
26. See infra notes 706-17 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 776-807 and accompanying text.
28. 43 Pa. Commw. 426, 418 A.2d 769 (1979) (Marshall I), after remand, 79 Pa.
Commw. 128, 468 A.2d 1164 (1983) (Marshall II), dismissed as improvidently granted, 505
Pa. 504, 481 A.2d 609 (1984).
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the Pennsylvania acts: statutes of repose," mandatory express limitations,3" jurisdictional limitations, 3' and disease manifestation
time restrictions.3 2 To a great extent these limitation types have
shared a common construction, since, for the most part, they serve
similar purposes, and in any case, all originate in the same unique
statutory scheme. Still, each class of these restrictive provisions
possesses its own theoretical basis which should be recognized and
considered in the course of their construction. The ensuing portion
of this article attempts to elucidate these theoretical bases.
A.

Statutes of Repose

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, three limitations have
been explicitly denominated by the courts as "statutes of repose":
section 315,1s governing the claim petition, 34 section 413,15 governing, among others, petitions for reinstatement, 3 and section
426, 3 governing the time allowed for petitioning for rehearing.3 8 In
addition, though no case has specifically so labeled section 434,39
governing the time allowed for setting aside the final receipt, it is
clear that the latter section is also a statute of repose, and indeed
it has received precisely the same interpretation as those above.4 0
As establishing the time within which an action may be brought,
all of these provisions are in the nature of a statute of limitations.4 1
Courts, however, have rejected the notion that the workmen's compensation provisions are "pure" statutes of limitations such as
those governing contract or personal injury actions. Instead, Pennsylvania courts explain, "statutes of repose" qualify "the granting
29. See infra notes 33-159 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
34. See Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242, 245, 156 A. 749, 750
(1931). See also Segal v. Segal, 201 Pa. Super. 367, 370, 191 A.2d 858, 860 (1963).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
36. See Harrington v. Mayflower Mfg. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 130, 132, 96 A.2d 180, 181
(1953).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
38. Cosenza v. General Baking Co., 147 Pa. Super. 591, 596, 24 A.2d 735, 737 (1942).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1001 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
40. See Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 201 A.2d 276, 277
(1964) (allocatur denied).
41. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979) (defining statute of limitations as
a "declaration that no suit shall be maintained on [a] cause[] of action... unless brought
within a specified period of time after the right accrue[s].").
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of a substantive right by condition as to the time within which
action to enforce it may be maintained. 4'

2

This is in contrast to

traditional or "pure" limitation statutes, which merely limit the
particular remedy pursued, and which thus have no substantive effect on the cause of action sued upon.43 While this distinction may
appear highly conceptual, it has proved to have had a real effect on
the ability of a claimant to recover under the workmen's compen44
sation act.

42. Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 228, 48 A.2d 120, 122
(1946) (emphasis added). See also Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State
Corr. Inst. at Graterford), Pa. Commw. -,
.
499 A.2d 694, 696 (1985) ("The
workmen's compensation injury statute of limitations ... has been held to be a statute of
repose, extinguishing the right when the time expires ....
").
43. See In re Philadelphia Electric Co., 352 Pa. 457, 463-64, 43 A.2d 116, 119 (1945)
("A statute of limitations provides a procedural limitation but does not deal with substantive rights."). See also Comment, Pleading the Statute of Frauds or Statute of Limitations
in Pennsylvania: A Need for Reform, 14 DuQ. L. REV. 399, 400 & n.8 (1976).
This judicial bifurcation has generated significant confusion over whether the statutes of
repose under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and in other contexts as well, are to be
categorized as "substantive" or "procedural." This general issue most often arises in two
situations: (1) in the conflict of laws realm, wherein the common wisdom dictates that the

procedural statutes of the forum are always to govern, cf.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF

§ 603 (1934); and (2) when amendment is made to a limitation increasing the period of
time within which an action is to be brought-in such instances retroactive application
would seem to be called for if the limitation is merely procedural, but only prospective
treatment if it is substantive.
It is in the latter situation that a Pennsylvania court essentially settled the substance/
procedure issue with respect to the workmen's compensation statutes of repose. In Seneca v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 142 Pa. Super. 470, 16 A.2d 754 (1940), the superior court held that
while the section 315 limitation was "by origin, an incident of a new substantive right created by statute," it nonetheless dealt "merely with the exercise" of the right. Id. at 476, 16
A.2d at 757 (emphasis in original). Retroactive application of an amendment to the statute
was thus allowed. See also infra notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
Statutes of repose, then, have been very correctly construed by the Pennsylvania courts to
be dual-natured: substantive to the extent that they are undebatedly integral parts of the
statutorily-created cause of action, but procedural in many aspects of their operation. Recognizing this dual-natured identity, this article will, when appropriate, refer to the statute of
repose theory as one defining a "substantive time limitation." At the same time, it should be
recognized that under Seneca these limitations have been acknowledged as procedural in a
practical sense. This construction, it is posited, is entirely correct, as these statutes do in
fact operate "procedurally," directing the potential claimant as to the period of time within
which an act must be performed. This role is especially important in light of other time
"limitations" in the act which are totally non-procedural. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text (discussion of disease manifestation time restrictions).
44. A distinction is to be drawn between the Pennsylvania-developed "statutes of
repose" under the workmen's compensation law and newer limitation statutes which are
also popularly referred to as statutes of repose. These newer time restrictions have been
enacted by legislatures eager to place some maximum limitation on the period of potential
liability of certain individuals or groups. This trend has developed in response to the increasing willingness of courts to apply the discovery rule to existing traditional statutes of
limitations, thereby creating situations in which "repose" can never be achieved. See generLAWS
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1. Pre-Workmen's Compensation Development
Statutes of repose in Pennsylvania workmen's compensation,
and in other contexts as well,"' find their earliest heritage in legislatively-enacted, "pure" statutes of limitations, which generally received relaxed treatment by early English and American courts.
Early courts were anxious to avoid harsh results through application of statutes of limitations in cases where a defendant, after the
limitation period had run, acknowledged the existence of the debt
underlying the presumptively barred action, or made a promise to
pay the same.4 By characterizing such statutes as mere procedural
devices, the courts could allow the lifting of the bar in such cases
ally McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product
Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416 (1980). See also Freezer Storage, Inc.
v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978) (declaring as constitutional a
twelve-year limitation on actions "in contract, tort or otherwise" against engineers, architects, builders and building contractors; see Act of December 22, 1965, P.L. 1138, § 1, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon 1981)).
These statutes, like the workmen's compensation limitations, are often said to affect the
right to compensation. See, e.g. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 199-200,
293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972) ("The function of the statute [of repose] is. . . to define substantive rights ... , [and not] to alter or modify a remedy." (emphasis added)). Nevertheless,
the archaic roots of the workmen's compensation statutes of repose demonstrate that the
two groups of limitations-both of which are essentially procedural in operation-are clearly
distinguishable.
Also to be distinguished from the workmen's compensation statutes of repose are the disease manifestation restrictions, a type of time restriction also dealt with in this article.
These provisions demand that, for a disabling disease to be compensable, it need manifest
itself through a claimant's total disability within a certain time period measured from the
claimant's last exposure to the disease hazard. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying
text. These restrictions do not control the time within which a claim must be filed, and are
thus wholly different from both the traditional workmen's compensation statutes of repose
and the modern, "reactionary" statutes of repose as well. Nevertheless, these provisions are
occasionally referred to, erroneously, as statutes of repose. See, e.g., I. STANDER, GUIDE TO
PENNSYLVANIA

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (SECOND

SEalus) 237 (1984). See also infra note

217.
45. See, e.g., Ross v. Suburban Counties Realty Corp., 356 Pa. 126, 129, 51 A.2d 700,
701 (1947) (five-year limitation of Act of 1856 governing ejectment actions was statute of
repose). See also Swartz v. Great American Ins. Co., 78 Pa. D. & C. 376, 378-80 (1951) (York
Co. Ct. Common Pleas) (discussing theory and various limitations to which applicable).
46. Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1187
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See also Kyle v. Wells, 17 Pa. 286, 289-90
(1851):
When a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, it ceases to be a legal, and
becomes a mere moral right. The duty is not discharged; but the remedy is transferred from the forum of the law to the forum of the conscience. But because, in some
hard cases, the latter forum refused relief, the law was stretched and the province of
morality invaded, by deciding that a moral duty, followed by a promise, became a
legal duty; and now such is the law, though the reasoning is unconsequential.
Id. See Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311 (1826) (rule stated).
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by viewing the limitation as only limiting the ability to seek a particular remedy, and not the very right to recovery itself. The particular theory applied was that by acknowledging or renewing a
promise the defendant had thereby waived the statute of limitations, which was, after all, a mere procedural matter, "so that the
right, which had never been impaired by the running of the stat47
ute, could now be directly enforced.
No such waiver theory applied, however, in certain property actions, such as those for seeking ejectment against an adverse possessor.48 It was clear under adverse possession statutes that the
running of the period extinguished the claim itself, and not merely
the remedy. 49 As advanced by one treatise writer, the "right-rem47. Developments, supra note 46, at 1187 (footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, Barney v. Smith, 4 Harris & J. 485 (Md. 1819)).
The rule is, perhaps, somewhat anachronistic since formulated under a displaced strict
interpretation of contractual consideration:
Justification for calling statutes of limitation procedural is usually derived from the
well-known rule that a simple promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations is enforceable without additional consideration; and since new contractual rights
may not be created without consideration, it is concluded that statutes of limitation
affect only the remedy and leave the right in abeyance. This conceptual argument is a
nonsequitur. In the first place, if it is the new promise which is enforceable, it is
difficult to see how the old right can still be said to exist. Secondly, even if the old
promise were enforceable on the basis of the new one, the argument fails to explain
how a defendant can bind himself to release his bar to the remedy without new
consideration.
Recent Case, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 725 (1942). The author of the foregoing comments goes
on to assert that the "better" explanation for allowing "revival" of the right is not that the
statute of limitations has been waived, but merely that an exception to the doctrine of consideration exists. See id. See also Note, Suit on Indebtedness Formerly Barred by Limitations, 25 VA. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1939) (criticizing notion as an "ancient legal fiction").
Under this exception, which is probably now the rule, the promise to pay is considered new,
"moral" consideration sufficient to support the promise. This is, in fact, the view adopted in
Pennsylvania:
Appellee argued in the court below. . . that the judgment note was not supported by
consideration because the debts for which it had been given were barred by the statute of limitations. The law is clear, however, that a moral obligation founded upon
antecedent valuable consideration will support an express promise to pay. . . . A
moral obligation to pay constitutes sufficient consideration to sustain a new promise
to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations.
Young v. Pileggi, 309 Pa. Super. 565, 572, 455 A.2d 1228, 1231-32 (1983) (citations omitted).
48. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1187.
49. See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 1171-72 (3d ed. 1975) (noting that while adverse possession limitations are "almost invariably" phrased in such a way as to "bar the
remedy merely," the longstanding rule is that "[w ]here the period of limitations has run, the
statute, by forbidding exercise of the right, virtually annihilates it, and the imperfect title
thereupon becomes perfect.") (footnote omitted).
The authors of the first Restatement of Property (1936), however, considered limitations
on ejectment actions against adverse possessors not to be bona fide statutes of limitations

1986

Statutes of Limitation

edy" distinction perhaps failed to obtain in the latter context since
it involved a considerably more important need for repose on the
part of the potential defendant, and on the part of society, than
was the case in the contract or tort contexts. 50 Conceivably pursuant to this same heightened sense of importance, one notes the apparent rejection of the procedure theory of limitations in the early
United States Supreme Court ruling that "five years' possession of
a slave constitutes a title by the laws of Virginia," 51 with the ultimate result that the Virginia limitation was held to be invokable in
a Tennessee court to establish ownership of a slave. 2 This was so
held notwithstanding the common wisdom that the limitation of
3
the forum, as a procedural statute, would presumably govern.
(or "of repose") at all:
It is an anomaly of the law that a doctrine whose chief importance is the creation of
interests by adverse possession should be couched in terms of extinguishment of remedies. Without the aid of statute the common law courts developed a doctrine by
which prescriptive easements could be obtained by long use, but they never developed any similar method of acquiring estates in land by adverse possession. Beginning in the thirteenth century a series of Acts of Parliament limited the time within
which actions to recover possession of land could be brought. One of this series...
has been copied in essentials in most of the United States. But only in form are these
truly statutes of limitations. The time restrictions which they contain are treated
less as ends in themselves than as means for permitting the acquisition of estates in
land.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§ 220 (Introductory Note) (1936) (emphasis added).

In Pennsylvania, actions for ejectment became codified in 1856. See Act of April 22, 1856,
P.L. 533. The statute of repose nomenclature has thereafter been applied to the provision.
See, e.g., First Pool Gas Co. v. Wheeler Run Coal Co., 301 Pa. 485, 489, 152 A. 685, 687
(1930) ("[under the personal injury statute of limitations] the statute merely applies to the
remedy [and] the claim remains and may be renewed by a new promise. [Under the Act of
1856] there is no right of action unless asserted in accordance with the provisions of the
statute.").
50. Developments, supra note 46, at 1187.
51. Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361, 371 (1826) (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 372:
To preclude the defendant from availing himself of the benefit of that evidence which
would have sustained an action for the same property by the person from whom he
purchased it, would be to convert a good and valid title in Virginia, into a defeasible
title in Tennessee; a sufficient title in a vendor, into a defeasible title in his vendee;
and, by indirect operation, to make the seller liable, where a direct action could not
have been maintained against him to recover the property sold.
Id.
53. See H.G. WooD, THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 17-23 (1882):
[Courts of law are] not obliged to depart from [their] own notions of judicial order
from mere comity to any foreign nation. As a rule statutes of limitation are to be
considered to fall within these remarks. They go ad litis ordinationem, not ad litis
decisionem. In cases, therefore (except where provision is otherwise made by statute),
where an action is brought in one country or State upon a contract made in another,
a plea of the statute of limitations existing in the place of contracts is not a good bar,
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As long as most causes of action sued upon were common-law
originated, thorny conflicts of law questions such as that encountered in the slave ownership case were relatively rare, and the
"right-remedy" distinction as a judicial phenomenon coextensively
limited. The "age of statutes," however, was soon to change that
situation. Increasing legislative action creating new statutory rights
inspired the courts to conceive of a second group of limitations
which were held to define the right to recovery. These limitations
were likewise not subject to the "waiver" theory and the revival of
the cause of action.
The precise underlying reason for this development is difficult to
pinpoint. Common law courts, however, possessed an inarguable
suspicion of the role and power of legislatures in changing judgemade law. 5" Not surprisingly, then, when a statute was enacted creating new rights and liabilities it was subject to strict construction;
the legislature was "thought to lack intent (or even competence) to
make . . . fundamental changes in the common law."' 55 This attitude was reflected in judicial treatment of limitations which came
included in the legislation creating the new right. Bound by strict
construction, such limitations were construed as right-limiting time
restrictions; because such legislation governed a cause of action in
derogation of the common law,56 the right created was held to be
absolutely unpursuable outside the limited confines of its own
provisions.
The rule was, in any case, clearly articulated at an early point by
57
the Supreme Court in The Harrisburg.
In that case, an action
was brought under the 1856 Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act,
which included a one-year statute of limitation. 8 The death had
occurred on the high seas, and the action was brought in admiralty, in a Pennsylvania federal court some five years after the
death, by the deceased's widow.5 9 The trial court acknowledged the
one-year limitation, but held that "the admiralty is not bound
thereby, and in this case will not follow the period of limitation
but a plea of the statute existing in the country or State where the action is brought,
is.

Id. at 17
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

(footnote omitted) (quoting In Le Roy v. Crowningshield, 2 Mas. (U.S.) 151).
G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 & n.15 (1982).
Id. at n.15.
Developments, supra note 46, at 1188.
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
Id. at 200. See Act of April 15, 1851, § 18.
119 U.S. at 204.
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therein provided and prescribed."6 Instead, maritime law was invoked to allow recovery. The court's refusal to apply the time limitation, however, was renounced by the Supreme Court, which held
the action barred. 1 The Court's articulation of the "statute of repose" theory remains discernible in modern workmen's compensation decisions:
The statute creates a new legal liability, with a right to a suit for its enforcement, provided the suit is brought within twelve months, and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone. It is a
condition attached to the right to sue at all. [If the suit is to be allowed at
all in admiralty], it must take the right subject to the limitations which
have been made part of its existence. It matters not that no rights of innocent parties have attached during the delay. Time has been made of the
essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is disregarded.The
liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right.2

Several effects of The Harrisburg's extension of the "substantive" time limitation concept from the property realm to limitations in derogation of the common law were immediately felt.
First, as has been discussed, conventional statutes of limitations
had been considered procedural devices, and whenever a cause of
action accruing in one jurisdiction was brought in another, the limitation of the forum would almost inevitably apply. 3 With certain
limitations now considered substantive, courts began to apply the
limitation of the jurisdiction creating the sued-upon right."
Another effect of the conceptualization, strongly felt in Pennsylvania, was to relieve the defendant from the requirement of pleading the limitation in its initial answer at the risk of its total waiver.
Because the limitation was conceived as limiting the very right to
60. Id. at 201.
61. Id. at 214.
62. Id. (emphasis added). Pennsylvania courts were soon to echo The Harrisburg
Court's language in the course of construing the wrongful death act. See, e.g., Martin v.
Pittsburgh Rys., 227 Pa. 18, 21, 75 A. 837, 838 (1910) (at any point during trial defendant
could show that expressly provided time limitation had not been satisfied, since "right to
recover is defeated" by such failure).
63. See WooD, supra note 53.
64. That this was in contrast to the usual nineteenth century practice is discernible
in WOOD (1882), supra note 53:
There is a distinction as suggested by Story, J., in his Conflicts of Laws . . . in
cases where the right as well as the remedy of the claimant is barred by the law
existing at the place of contract. This, however, is not perhaps a frequent case in
regard to personal actions. In all cases touching realty the lex rei sitae prevails.
Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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recovery, a burden was in effect placed upon the plaintiff pursuing
the action to demonstrate that it had been brought in a timely
fashion. 5 The rule thus developed that the limitation could be
raised by the defendant at any time during the trial."6 A "pure"
statute of limitations, in contrast, was required, as is still the case,
to be pleaded in the defendant's answer, with the failure to do so
at that early point constituting a total waiver of the defense. 7
A further result of application of the substantive time limitation
doctrine to statutorily-created rights was occasional judicial treatment of these limitations as absolute jurisdictional bars. Such
treatment was evident until recently, for example, in the workmen's compensation law of Arizona and West Virginia. In Arizona,
under this doctrinal notion, it was held for many years that the
limitations of the act could not be extended or tolled even in cases
where the intentional fraud of the employer defendant had been
the acknowledged animus for the claimant's failure to satisfy the
strictures of the limitation.6 8 In West Virginia, meanwhile, that
limitations were deemed jurisdictional was thought to prevent any
retroactive application of amended, enlarged limitations to accrued
but unasserted claims. 9 The rule with respect to estoppel was likewise often said to be the same as in Arizona. 70 This jurisdictional
65. See Comment, supra note 43, at 400.
66. See id. at 403 n.25.
67. See id. at 400 & n.9 ("a true statute of limitations did not of itself limit the
plaintiff's right to bring the action within the prescribed period. Such statutes could only be
availed of when pleaded.") (citing Barclay v. Barclay, 206 Pa. 307, 310, 55 A. 985, 986
(1903)). See also Thompson v. Cortese, 41 Pa. Commw. 174, 179 & n.5, 398 A.2d 1079, 1082
& n.5 (1979) ("it is clear that the bar of the statute of limitations is a matter to be raised by
way of preliminary objection or new matter and is waived if not raised.") (trespass action)
(citing Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1017(b)(4), 1030, 1031 [42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp.
Pamph. 1985)]).
68. See Collins v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Ariz. 509, 511, 433 P.2d 801, 803 (1967).
The doctrine was, however, rejected in a series of cases in the early 1970's. See Note, Workmen's Compensation-Failure to Timely File Workmen's Compensation Claim Transformed from JurisdictionalBar to Affirmative Defense, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 447, 447-49.
69. See Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 161 W. Va. 299, 302, 242
S.E.2d 443, 445 (1978). To achieve its result, the court explicitly overruled the case expounding the substantive time limit/"statute of repose" theory, and declared the claim petition limitation to be merely procedural, thus presumptively receptive to retroactive application to accrued but unasserted claims. Id. at 305, 242 S.E.2d at 447. The court likewise
explicitly dispelled the notion that equitable estoppel or waiver could not be imputed to the
operation of the limitation. Id.
70. See Young v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 121 W. Va. 126, 132-33, 3
S.E.2d 517, 518-20 (1939) (unintentional neglect of employer's agent to file claim for employee held insufficient to toll limitation). But see France v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 117 W. Va. 612, 186 S.E. 601 (1936) (held, workmen's compensation commissioner
estopped from asserting limitation where statements had been made by commissioner's
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theory was never developed by Pennsylvania courts in the course
of their interpretation of the time limitations of the workmen's
compensation act, although in one area, as discussed below, they
have come surprisingly close.71
2. Development of the Statute of Repose Theory in Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation
If there were ever a statutory scheme granting a cause of action
in derogation of the common law, it was workmen's compensation,
with its abolition of common law defenses and creation of what is
essentially strict employer liability.7 2 Not surprisingly, then, the
theory enunciated in The Harrisburgwith respect to the wrongful
death act 7s has been applied to those limitations of the workmen's
compensation act which operate in a procedural manner to limit
the time within which a claim for compensation may be pursued.
As in other fields of Pennsylvania law, the term applied for these
limitations has been the "statute of repose." The theory as applied
in the early years of the acts has survived to the present, as has the
statute of repose designation. 4
During the first sixteen years of interpretation of Pennsylvania's
act, the "substantive" time limitation theory was rarely voiced 5
and seemingly never applied. This is not to say that the limitations
agents leading claimant to believe that claim had been filed). See also Lester, 161 W. Va. at
299, 242 S.E.2d at 446.
71. See infra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and
Constitutionality,25 HARV. L. REv. 129, 129 (1911) ("The question [with respect to compensation of work-related injuries] has been active for about seventy-five years. For the first
sixty years there was heard in countries using the Anglo-American system of law practically
only one answer--one based on decisions.").
73. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State Corr. Inst. at
Graterford), Pa. Commw. , , 499 A.2d 694, 696 (1985).
75. The statute of repose theory was not established until the superior court's ruling
in Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931). But see Siplyak v.
Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 58, 119 A. 745, 747-48 (1924). In Siplyak the supreme court made reference to the theory but declined to announce a clear-cut rule:
In view of the conclusion we have reached in this case that the existence of war was
an implied exception to the limitation provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act,
we deem it unnecessary to consider the further question discussed by counsel and
made the basis of the opinion of the court below, whether the limitation of time fixed
by the Workmen's Compensation Act was a limitation of the liability, and not merely
a limitation of the remedy under the act, because in either view of that question the
same result must be reached. Both the right and the remedy were suspended until
the war ended[.]
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of the act were not held to be mandatory in operation; indeed they
were, and claims were strictly barred if not brought within the applicable limitation periods. This construction, however, was not
undertaken pursuant to any notion of extinguishment of the right
to compensation, but only because of the clearly mandatory language of the claim petition limitation, 76 which provided (as it still
does) that "all claims shall be forever barred" unless asserted
within the prescribed limitation.7
In lieu of recognition of the theory, the early interpreters of the
act viewed and treated the claim petition limitation provision as a
"pure" limitation, demanding, for example, that the limitation be
pleaded in the employer's answer, with the penalty for not doing so
a total waiver. 78 Numerous other examples exist as well in which
possible implications of the theory are disregarded. Multiple cases,
for instance, held that the limitation would be tolled when the injury, most often a death, occurred during the First World War,
with the claimant at the time or immediately thereafter residing in
hostile territory.7 9 In such instances, the limitation was held to run
only from the time when peace was fully established.80 Likewise, it
was held that disabilities such as minority or mental incompetency
would not toll the limitation period, not because the limitation inevitability extinguished the very right to compensation at its expiration, but because this was the rule at common law."' Similarly,
76. See, e.g., Horn v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 274 Pa. 42, 44, 117 A. 409, 410 (1922) (citing Wise v. Borough of Cambridge Springs, 262 Pa. 139, 104 A. 863 (1918) (case construing
jurisdictional appeal provision of workmen's compensation act)).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1985) (section 315 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act) (reproduced in its entirety, infra note 227).
78. See Falaski v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 5 W.C.B. 435, 436 (1918). See also
Searfoss v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 12 W.C.B. 254, 255 (1927) ("We know of nothing in
the compensation act which prevents an employer or his insurance carrier from waiving the
statute of limitations. In other words, it is an affirmative defense and may be waived.")
(emphasis added). See generally SKINNER, supra note 2, at 410 & n.96 (2d ed. 1930).
79. See, e.g., Zeliznik v. Lytle Coal Co., 82 Pa. Super. 489, 491 (1924) ("The period
covered by war with Austria-Hungary is to be excluded in calculating the time within which
subjects of that country should file claims for workmen's compensation"). See also Vitkovic
v. Pennsylvania Clay Co., 278 Pa. 474, 477-78, 123 A. 469, 470 (1924); Siplyak v. Davis, 276
Pa. 49, 58, 119 A. 745, 747-48 (1924); Obeszki v. Pennsylvania R.R., 12 W.C.B. 158, 159
(1927) (claim barred); Lovric v. Bessemer Coal Co., 9 W.C.B. 319, 321 (1924). The claimant
was required in all cases to have been a citizen or subject of a nation at war against the
United States. See, e.g., Kormorowski v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 11 W.C.B. 420, 420 (1926)
(widow in country merely occupied by Germany but not at war with United States not permitted to file late claim).
80. See Zeliznik, 82 Pa. Super. at 492. See also Friedrich v. Etna Connellsville Coke
Co., 7 Dept. Rep. 1373, 1380 (1921) ("When peace is restored the statute begins to run.").
81. See Ellington v. Carnegie Steel Co., 11 W.C.B. 576, 577 (1926) (claim petition
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when the court in these early days held that a late filing would be
excused due to the unintentional negligence (constructive fraud) of
a compensation official, 82 it ignored any effect a substantive time
limitation would have on the matter, permitting the claim on the
grounds that an appeal nunc pro tunc would be allowed under
such circumstances.8 3
The first judicial acknowledgement of the statute of repose character of the workmen's compensation limitations came in 1931
with Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.84 In Ratto, the employer had
failed to plead in its answer that the claimant's petition was untimely. The limitation was, however, brought up eventually before
the referee, who thereupon denied benefits on the grounds of untimely filing.8 The claimant appealed, maintaining that the limitation of section 315 was one in the nature of those governing tort
and assumpsit actions,86 and citing the rule applied in such suits,
that failure to plead the limitation would result in a waiver of the
defense.8
Rejecting the claimant's argument, the court held that the section 315 limitation "extinguishes the right [to recovery] and not
merely the remedy, and may be invoked without being specially
pleaded." 88 The court also adopted the employer's designation of a
provision with such an effect as a "statute of repose." 8 Explaining
the difference between such statutes in the pleading realm, the
court's reasoning and language is properly reminiscent of that of
previous courts establishing the rule in similar contexts:
limitation was not tolled where claimant had gone insane within period of original limitation) (citing Marstellar v. Marstellar, 93 Pa. 350, 354-55 (1880) ("The statute of limitations
begins to run when the right of action is complete. The rule is that the statute begins to run
at the date the suit may be commenced and once begun it is not stayed by the party's death
or disability."). See also McHale v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 7 W.C.B. 300, 302 (1922) (claim
petition limitation not tolled where claimant was a minor) (quoting Peterson v. Delaware
River Ferry Co., 190 Pa. 364, 365 (1899) ("The settled rule is that infants as well as all
others are barred by the provisions of such Statutes.")).
82. Horn v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 274 Pa. 42, 45, 117 A. 409, 410 (1922).
83. Id. at 45, 117 A. at 410.
84. 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931).
85. Id. at 245, 156 A. at 750.
86. Brief for Appellant at 13-18, Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242,
156 A. 749 (1931).
87. 102 Pa. Super. at 245, 156 A. at 750.
88. Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 10-13, Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa.
Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931).
89. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 88, at 23 (analogizing workmen's compensation
limitation to limitation of action in ejectment, designated in First Pool Gas Coal Co. v.
Wheeler Run Coal Co., 301 Pa. 485, 152 A. 685 (1930) as a statute of repose).
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The reason for this rule lies in the fact that statutes of limitation presuppose an established substantive right, but forbid a plaintiff from enforcing it
by the customary remedies. Therefore, the statute is a weapon of defense,
and ordinarily must be pleaded and relied on by the defendant. Yet the
necessity of pleading the statute of limitations applies only to cases where
the remedy alone is taken away, and in which the defense is by way of confession and avoidance and does not apply where the right and title to the
thing is extinguished and gone, and the defense is by denial of that right."'

Quite appropriately,"' support for the Ratto court's holding came
from post-The Harrisburg cases construing the Pennsylvania
92
Wrongful Death Act.
Articulation of the doctrine was soon to have repercussions. For
example, although the claim petition period had been held to be
tolled in cases of fraud or its equivalent,"3 this was before the statute of repose theory had been established. When .the issue arose
again, the theory had to be dealt with.
Ultimately, however, the doctrine proved to have no effect on
94
court treatment of the statutes of repose in such circumstances.
Indeed, in Guy v. Stoecklien Baking Co., 9 5 the court concluded
that, although the section 315 limitation "extinguished both right
as well as remedy" and could not be extended as a matter of the
court's indulgence," a "pure" statute of limitations rule regarding
90. 102 Pa. Super. at 246-47, 156 A. at 751 (emphasis added).
91. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
92. 102 Pa. Super. at 246, 156 A. at 751 (citing Martin v. Pittsburgh Rys., 277 Pa. 18,
75 A. 837 (1910)):
In the Martin case, it was held that the rule requiring the pleading of the statute of
limitations as a defense had no application in an action of trespass brought by a
widow to recover for the death of her husband because she had no such right of action at common law ....
Id.

The Workmen's Compensation Board was quick to apply the rule. See Callahan v. Lehigh
& Wilkes-Barie Coal Co., 14 W.C.B. 299, 302 (1931):
[The limitation] becomes an express condition of the right to obtain compensation
...and when this has not been done, it becomes our duty to say as a matter of law
that the statute has not been complied with ....
In the present case the statute has
not been specially pleaded, but we are of the opinion that upon the ascertainment of
the fact that the statute has: run, it is a defense absolute and bars the claim.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ratto).
93. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
94. The possible effect was that which actually obtained in Arizona and West Virginia. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. Under the longstanding law of those
states, since the statute was considered to extinguish the very right to compensation, no act
was considered sufficient to stop the running of the limitation.
95. 133 Pa. Super. 38, 1 A.2d 839 (1938).
96. Id. at 46, 1 A.2d at 842-43.
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the effect of fraud would apply to the statute of repose.9 7 In Guy,
the employer had first promised to pay compensation and advised
the claimant that it would take care of processing the entitlement.
After failing to do so, the employer attempted to set up the bar of
the limitation to preclude the claimant's tardy, self-initiated
claim. e The court, however, found the statute to be tolled and of
no avail to the employer:
The conversation referred to occurred before the statute had run, and it was
a direct promise to pay .... If, therefore, she relied upon this promise; if
she was thereby lulled into a false sense of security, and thus allowed [the
statute to run]-with what grace can the defendant now set up the statute?
The promise operated not to revive a dead tort, but as by way of estoppel.
It has all the elements of an estoppel. The plaintiff relied and acted upon it;
she has been misled to her injury .... 99

In the shadow of Ratto, however, the court felt the need to justify
application of this equitable doctrine and to draw upon non-statute of repose authority: 10 0
It is true that the plea entered in [Armstrong v. Levan, the case relied
upon] was under a pure statute of limitations as opposed to a condition and
the statute affected the remedy alone, but if the plaintiff could be said to
have been deceived and lulled into a sense of security in the [latter] case, so
was the claimant here .... We cannot distinguish that situation from the
present one. 10 '

Is the application of this notion of estoppel consistent with the
statute of repose theory? It is submitted that it is. As one treatise
writer has correctly posited, the theory "describe[s] only the effect
of the expiration of the time limit and not the moment at which it
expires. ' 02 Therefore, the theory likewise does not describe or establish the moment at which the time period begins. The Guy
court established that point as the last date of misleading conver97. Id. at 49, 1 A.2d at 844.
98. Id. at 44, 1 A.2d at 843-44.
99. Id. at 49, 1 A.2d at 844 (quoting Armstrong v. Levan, 109 Pa. 177, 1 A. 204
(1885)) (emphasis added).

100. The effect of Ratto in this regard was likewise felt by the compensation board,
which had reached the same conclusion as the court on appeal. Having been presented by
the employer with the strict language of Ratto, the board stated that the case could not be
read literally to prevent operation of the limited equitable relief that had traditionally been
applied in Pennsylvania in cases of fraud or its equivalent, even when the limitation provision involved was one governing the right to recovery. Workmen's Compensation Board Decision, reproduced in Brief for Petitioner, Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 1
A.2d 839 (1938).
101. 133 Pa. Super. at 49, 1 A.2d at 844.
102. Developments, supra note 46, at 1188 (emphasis added).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:975

sation between the claimant and the employer; 10 3 there is nothing
in Guy, furthermore, which would suggest that the court was
changing the effect of the period's lapse after its running. The statute of repose conceptualization was not affected by the application
of the estoppel theory, and the Guy court need not have excused
itself for its reliance on precedent outside the statute of. repose

realm. 104
3.

Rejection of the Theory Under the Occupational Disease Act

A further repercussion of the adoption of the statute of repose
theory was to evolve not long after Guy. That development came
with Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co.,10 5 in
which the supreme court held that the "discovery rule" would apply to the claim petition limitation of the occupational disease
act."0 6 The discovery rule, as applied in Ciabattoni, embraces the
notion that a limitation period should not begin to run until the
possessor of the cause of action becomes aware ("knew or should
have known") of the harm received which is the basis for the action.107 The need for the rule is, of course, most evident in cases
where the harm is of a gradual or insidious nature, such as lung
08
disease.1
When the disease act was promulgated in 1939, however, the
claim petition limitation lacked any discovery rule appended to its
one-year limitation period, which provided only that "all claims for
compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within one year after
disability begins [an agreement is reached or a claim petition is
filed]."109 The early construction of "disability" under the act was
103. This rule became known as the "last misleading act" doctrine, ultimately to be
abrogated recently in Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Twp. of Marple), 80
Pa. Commw. 233, 241, 471 A.2d 169, 173 (1984), aff'd per curiam, Pa. -, 507 A.2d
388 (1986). See also infra notes 703-17 and accompanying text.
104. All the statute of repose theory demands in such instances is that the fraudulent
or constructively fraudulent conduct occur within the period of the original limitation. The
rule is the same under Dudley, 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169.
105. 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956).
106. Id. at 183-85, 125 A.2d at 368-69.
107. See Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury
Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 501, 502-05, 515-23 (1982).
108. See generally id. See also BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 7.32, at 90. For a recent
philosophical objection to refusal to apply the discovery rule, see Note, The Fairnessand
Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1683
(1983).
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1415 (Purdon 1952) (Section 315 of the Occupational
Disease Act).
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the point of first objective disability, that is, when, as a matter of
fact, the claimant was first totally disabled due to the workplace
hazard and deprived of earning power as a result.1 1 ° The one-year
limitation period ran from this point, regardless of the time at
which the claimant actually learned of the existence and work-related nature of the disease. It may be noted, however, that the discovery rule had been applied at an early point to the ninety-day
notice of disability requirement, another time restriction which
could preclude a claim.'
-In Ciabattoni,however, the employee had given a timely notice
of disability, but the "discovery" itself had come more than one
year after the date of objective disability. The claimant admitted
that he had become totally disabled on December 22, 1952, but
only gave notice and filed the claim petition on January 4, 1954,
immediately after learning from his physician of the work-related
character of the disability. 112 In allowing recovery, the court acknowledged that the statute provided that the limitation was to
run from the date of disability, but concluded that such date was
"necessarily a variable one depending upon when the pertinent
medical diagnosis is completely established to the knowledge of the
claimant.""' The court further declared that the limitation was
hence not a legislatively intended statute of repose. This was so
declared because the court viewed its own designation of the claimant's discovery of disability as the commencement point as allowing an extension of that point beyond what would be, under the
statute of repose theory, the moment of total extinguishment of
4
the right to bring a claim at all."
110. See, e.g., Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 179 Pa. Super. 538,
542, 118 A.2d 229, 230-31 (1955), rev'd, 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956). See also Agostin v.
Pittsburgh Steel Foundry, 354 Pa. 543, 550-51, 47 A.2d 680, 684 (1946) (limitation ran not
necessarily from last day of work, but from when total disability occurs) (non-discovery rule
case). Cf. McIntyre v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 344 Pa. 163, 165-66, 25 A.2d 163, 164-65 (1942)
(defining date of compensable disability as date when claimant became totally disabled).
111. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1411 (Purdon 1952) (Section 311 of the Occupational
Disease Act). This worked to prohibit the barring of some claims because of failure to communicate a timely notice-any disease disability claim discovered and pursued within the
one-year period commencing at the date of objective disability could thus be successful. See
Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 42 A.2d 280 (1945).
112. 386 Pa. at 184, 125 A.2d at 367.
113. Id. at 182, 125 A.2d at 367. In applying the rule, the court reasoned that the
limitation should only run from the date the employee "definitely knows" of the occupational disease since "[an occupational disease is latent and insidious and the resultant disability is often difficult to determine." Id. at 184, 125 A.2d at 368.
114. Although this is clearly evident in the opinion, see 386 Pa. at 183, 125 A.2d at
368, the superior court decision which was reversed is the best evidence that both courts
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Application of the discovery rule may have been laudable
enough on grounds of policy, but was its application in this context
inconsistent with the statute of repose theory? It is again submitted that it was not. After all, the original conception of such a statute was one limiting a right granted statutorily by the legislature
in derogation of the common law." 5 Obviously, the right to recover
for occupational disease falls within such a category. More importantly, however, it is to be recalled that the statute of repose theory voices only the effect of the expiration of the time restriction,
and does not define its commencement point."" In Ciabattoni (as
in Guy), the court was simply establishing this point, determining
as a matter of law when the limitation was to commence. There is
no suggestion in the case that the court intended to change the
effect of the final expiration of the limitation period; as a practical
matter, then, the statute of repose theory remained unaffected.
In support of the foregoing assertion, it is worthy to note that
although courts have continued to reaffirm that application of the
discovery rule vitiates the statute of repose character of a limitation period,' 1 7 they have continued to attribute to such limitations
statute of repose characteristics.In Commonwealth v. Brown,""
for example, the court declared that the occupational disease act
limitation "need not be specially pleaded,"' " 9 adding, in a rather
telling judicial slip, that the limitation "is not a mere technical
statute of limitation, but is a statute of repose intended to bar the
. . . right to compensation, unless its provisions are complied with
viewed application of the discovery rule to be in conflict with the statute of repose theory.
After declaring that the trial court's remand order, directing the board to make a finding as
to the date of the claimant's discovery of disability, was "clearly erroneous," the court
explained:
The statutory limitation upon the time within which a petition may be filed imposes
a condition upon the right created by the Act, and makes the filing of the petition
within such period mandatory. . . . The time when [objective] disability occurs is the
date which begins the running of the period of limitation. . . . The [limitation]...
may not be extended nunc pro tunc as a matter of indulgence or because of hardship. . . . [The limitation] is a statute of repose which extinguishes the right, and
not merely the remedy.
179 Pa. Super. at 542, 118 A.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
115. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 578, 496 A.2d 412, 418 (1985) (court extending rejection of
statute of repose theory under disease act to workmen's compensation act disease claim
limitation provision).
118. 16 Pa. Commw. 148, 329 A.2d 541 (1974).
119. Id. at 154, 329 A.2d at 544.
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.. . 2 In addition, courts have continued to construe the dis-

ease act provision as strictly and mandatorily as ever, 12 although,
as has been noted, such construction stems as much from the simple language of the statute as from the underlying statute of repose
theory.

22

The conclusion to be drawn is that the Ciabattonicourt failed to
perceive the true nature of the statute of repose theory, and improperly rejected it in the context of the claim petition limitation
period of the Occupational Disease Act. The limitations of the dual
sections 315 of both the Occupational Disease Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act, with or without a discovery rule applied
to indicate their commencement points, are statutes of repose, not1 23
withstanding judicial pronouncements to the contrary.
120. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting a pre-Ciabattonicase, Reichert v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 156 Pa. Super. 213, 221, 40 A.2d 158, 161 (1944)).
121. See, e.g., Dillon v. Philadelphia Fire Dept., 25 Pa. Commw. 125, 128-29, 358 A.2d
765, 766 (1976):
Recognizing that Section 315 of the [disease act] is a statute of limitations, not one of
repose like its counterpart [in the workmen's compensation act] . . . we are nevertheless unable to find that the words "[i]n cases of disability all claims . . . shall be
forever barred. . ." means other than what it plainly says-that all claims for disability . . are barred unless the claimant shall have filed a petition within sixteen
months from the time he definitely knew he was disabled ....
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
122. See especially id.
123. There is not, it is submitted, any way to reconcile (1) judicial rejection of the
statute of repose theory whenever the discovery rule is applied (Ciabattoni Feiertag,90 Pa.
Commw. 567, 496 A.2d 412 (1985)), and (2) continued judicial acknowledgment of the attributes of the theory (see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text)..
Underlying the irreconcilability is a paradox created by the Ciabattoni court's failure to
perceive the full implications of the statute of repose theory. The "statute of repose" designation, as has been seen, was given to any statute of limitations controlling a cause of action
in derogation of the common law. The right to recover for an occupational disease under the
act is, of course, immutably in such a category. But see infra note 275. The running of the
statute thus necessarily extinguishes the right to compensation. By viewing its application
of the discovery rule as allowing an extension of the limitation commencement point beyond
what would be the moment of total extinguishment, however, the Ciabattonicourt felt compelled to declare that the limitation was not a legislatively-intended statute of repose. That
declaration itself was not unreasonable, because the court accepted the statutory term "disability" as meaning objective disability. Therefore, ifthe limitation period commenced more
than one year beyond that point, a situation contrary to the statute of repose theory would
appear to have been created. Judge Barbieri is in accord. See BAuwRIuR, supra note 2, § 7.32,
at 90.
What, however, did the court contemplate as the effect of expiration of the limitation
after its discovery-rule commencement? Surely a new promise to pay, or its workmen's compensation equivalent, see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text, was not contemplated
as renewing the right to compensation. Nor can it be imagined that the court viewed itself
as converting the limitation to a mere affirmative defense. In this respect, President Judge
Crumlish was entirely correct in declaring that section 315 is a statute of repose, "bar[ring]
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Current Implications of the Doctrine

Present day treatment of the statute of repose theory demonstrates, in general, a consistent judicial interpretation. Ratto is
cited for the proposition that the limitations of the workmen's
compensation act extinguish both right and remedy; 2 4 Ciabattoni,
meanwhile, is advanced for the contention that when the discovery
rule is applied to a limitation it becomes a mere statute of limita12 5
tions, and not a statute of repose.
Judicial inconsistencies occasionally occur, however, which
demonstrate that total clarity is not always attendant to the theory's application, or at least to its terminological use. In one recent
case, for example, both sections 311 and 301(c) of the Occupational
1 26
Section 311,127
Disease Act were referred to as statutes of repose.
which requires notice of injury within 120 days, however, constitutes no more than a mere affirmative defense, and, of course, is
not a statute of limitations of any character. 28 Section 301(c), 2 9
which makes compensable only diseases manifesting themselves
within four years of the claimant's last exposure to a workplace
the .. right to compensation," and that it need not be specially pleaded. Commonwealth
v. Brown, 16 Pa. Commw. 148, 154, 329 A.2d 541, 544 (1974). See supra notes 118-20 and
accompanying text. Hence the paradox: while the discovery rule "extension" may have appeared at odds with the statute of repose theory, the limitation, once commenced, had to
end at some point. And, because the limitation affects a cause of action in derogation of the
common law, that point necessarily marked the extinguishment of the cause of action.
The paradox can only be resolved by recognizing that the statute of repose theory voices
only the effect of the running of the limitation, thus embracing a concept independent of
the decision of when the limitation commences. With this notion in mind, the designation of
this point as when the claimant "knew or should have known" of the disability may be
viewed as the statutory interpretation of "disability," "compensable disability," or, for that
matter, "injury" under the workmen's compensation act. Adopting this view eliminates the
paradox, because the notion is thereby eliminated that application of the discovery rule
constitutes an extension of the commencement point beyond the presumed moment of
extinguishment.
124. See, e.g, Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State Corr. Inst. at
, 499 A.2d 694, 696 (1985); Palm v. Workmen's
- Pa. Commw. -, Graterford),
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cluett, Peabody & Co.), 78 Pa. Commw. 63, 66, 466 A.2d 1108,
1110 (1983); Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 113, 116,
401 A.2d 882, 884 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 578, 496 A.2d 412, 418 (1985); Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
90 Pa. Commw. 586, 595, 496 A.2d 116, 121 (1985) (Kalish, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 119 (superior court had recognized that section 311 "had been held to
be a statute of repose") (dicta); id. at 120 ("Section 301(c) must be interpreted . . . as a
statute of repose .... ").
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1411 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
128. See supra note 41.
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(c) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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hazard, is likewise not a statute of limitations, but rather a substantive provision and an affirmative defense.1 30 In addition, as
noted above, one court some twenty years after Ciabattoni issued
the rather surprising (but indeed correct) declaration that the
claim petition limitation of the Occupational Disease Act is a stat13
ute of repose.

1

a. Post-Limitation Payments of Compensation
Notwithstanding this apparent doctrinal inconsistency, conclusions may be drawn with respect to the theory in its practical application which demonstrate a judicial faithfulness to its tenets.
First, returning to the origins of the theory, it is to be recalled that
general or "pure" statutes of limitations did not bar a cause of action when the limitation was "waived" by an acknowledgement of
or promise to pay the underlying debt. 32 This, of course, lay at the
very heart of the original distinction; statutes of repose were not
subject to the waiver theory, and barred absolutely any revival of a
cause of action. In the workmen's compensation context this conceptual notion is perhaps out of place, since insurance carriers and
employers are not in the practice of renewing assurances of payments of compensation years after an injury has occurred and the
limitation on the right to recover has expired.
Nevertheless, an unstrained analogy exists between an acknowledgement sufficient to waive the mere affirmative defense of a pure
statute of limitations and payments made "in lieu of compensation," which are often made by employers or their insurance carriers. 3 Such payments actually embrace, under their traditional
definition,13 4 an acknowledgement by the employer of a work-re130. See infra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
131. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 16 Pa. Commw. 148, 154, 329 A.2d 541, 544 (1974).
See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 749-807 and accompanying text.
134. See Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co., 271 Pa. 265, 268-69, 113 A. 840, 841 (1921):
[A payment of compensation sufficient to toll the limitation must be] an amount received and paid as compensation for injury or death of an employee, occurring in the
course of employment. It must clearly appear the amounts were so paid and received as compensation under the act [i.e., meant to compensate for work-related

loss of earning power], and not as wages for employment, and the disability or further disability must be attributable to an injury for which such compensation had
been paid.
Id. (emphasis added).
Payments "in lieu" of compensation are discussed further, infra notes 776-807 and accompanying text.
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lated disability for which it would normally be liable under the act.
Under the three principal statutes of repose, it has been held that
such payments will work to toll the period, but only if the payment
or payments are made within the period of the original limitation. 135 Faithful to the statute of repose extinguishment theory,
when concededly "in lieu" payments have been made after the
running of the original limitation, courts have held them insufficient to revive the claim and then immediately toll the limitation
period in order to facilitate a claim.' 3 While the courts in so ruling
have not explicitly articulated the distinction between statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose, it is clear that this treatment is
dependent upon the statute of repose theory, and is in fact de137
manded thereby.
b.

"Pleading"the Statute of Repose

It is to be recalled that a principal consequence of the substantive time limitation notion was to excuse the defendant from the
mandatory requirement of specially pleading such a limitation in
its original answer. 38 It was this characteristic of such limitations
which prompted establishment of the statute of repose theory and
nomenclature under the workmen's compensation act. With respect to this attribute of statutes of repose, courts have gone beyond Ratto and significantly enhanced the operation of the limitations in the waiver realm.
Indeed, in Gnall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
3 9 the court
(Bethlehem Mines Corp.),1
held that the setting aside
of the final receipt limitation-a statute of repose"-not only
135. See Palm v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cluett, Peabody & Co.), 78
Pa. Commw. 63, 66, 466 A.2d 1108, 1109-10 (1983) (unnecessary to reach issue of whether
certain payments were received in lieu of compensation, since received more than one year
after last payment of compensation under formal agreement or award, and limitation had in
the meantime extinguished right to as well as remedy of compensation) (relying on Ratto,
102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931)); Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
43 Pa. Commw. 113, 114-16, 401 A.2d 882, 883-84 (1979) (although claimant almost inarguably received payments in lieu of compensation-full wages while in a hospital for surgery stemming from work-related injury-claim barred by extinguishment of remedy of and
right to compensation, since payments were received more than two years from date of
injury).
136. See supra note 135.
137. See generally supra note 42 and accompanying text.
138. See Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931). See
also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
139. 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 462 A.2d 930 (1983).
140. See Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 201 A.2d 276, 277
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need not have been pleaded in the employer's answer, but that it
could be raised for the first time on appeal from the decision of the
referee."" This treatment, of course, is usually reserved for limitations governing appeal periods, which are jurisdictional.42 Nevertheless, the court accepted the employer's argument that the limi'14 3
tation was "an absolute bar to . . . additional compensation
and dismissed the claimant's appeal.
The Gnall proposition had actually been advanced earlier, 4 4 but
it may be pointed out that in adopting the rule that the limitation
can never be waived, the statute of repose is being treated as a
(1964) (allocatur denied).
141. 75 Pa. Commw. at 527, 462 A.2d at 931. In the court's words, "[claimant] argues
here, essentially, that because his employer did not raise the [section] 434 time limit before
the referee, it waived the right to do so on appeal. . . . [W]e must reject [his] contention
..... " Id. In so ruling, neither the court nor the appeal board, which had also allowed the
delayed assertion of untimeliness, relied specifically on the statute of repose theory, but only
on language from Stewart v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 50 Pa. Commw. 479,
481, 413 A.2d 437, 439 (1980), to the effect that the limitation constituted "an absolute bar
to the right to obtain additional compensation." Id. Stewart, however, drew this language
from Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 201 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 201 A.2d 276, 277 (1964) (allocatur denied), which in turn relied on a case construing an established statute of repose. There
is, in any case, no question that the final receipt limitation is a statute of repose-the Stewart court's language is merely an alternative statement of the statute of repose notion.
142. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
143. 75 Pa. Commw. at 257, 462 A.2d at 931. See also Brief for Respondent at 8, Gnall
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Mines Corp.), 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 462
A.2d 930 (1983). As stated in the preceding note, the decision was decided on the grounds
that the limitation was an "absolute bar." The employer had argued, however, in addition to
the latter point, that the limitation need not have been specially pleaded since it was a
"[statute] of repose, which completely extinguish[es] the right and not merely the remedy
and [which] may be invoked even though. . . not pleaded." Id. at 10. The difficult, specific
issue of whether this pleading dispensation extended so far as to relieve the defendant of
raising the issue at any time (the real issue in the case), however, went unaddressed.
The claimant, meanwhile, had echoed the failed assertion of the claimant in Ratto, arguing that the employer's "failure to plead the defense . . . constitutes a waiver of that defense which could not thereafter be adopted by the. . .Board. See Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1030,
1032, 42 Pa. C.S.A." Brief for Petitioner at 6, Gnall, 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 462 A.2d 930
(1983).
144. See B.ARIERI, supra note 2, § 6.16(1), at 50: "It has been held that the Statutes of
Limitations in workmen's compensation cases need not be pleaded, but may be raised effectively at any time." Id. (emphasis added). The case cited, however, includes no such broad
rule. See id. (citing Harrington v. Mayflower Mfg. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 130, 96 A.2d 180
(1953)). But see Layton v. General State Auth., 94 Dauph. 211, 212-13 (Ct. Common Pleas
Dauphin Co. 1971) (although defendant employer failed to raise defense of section 315 claim
petition limitation in answer or before referee, and appeal board thereafter "ignored [the]
issue," claimant's "manifest failure to comply with the statute of limitations [held] dispositive of . . .appeal.").
Professor Larson, in any case, possesses a general hostility for viewing limitations in such

a jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional sense. See 3 A. LARSON,
LAW, § 78.73 (1983).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
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quasi-jurisdictional limitation, a course of construction perhaps at
odds with prior understanding of the effect of "defenses" which
were held to be such absolute bars to recovery that the pleading
requirement was waived. In a now defunct case, Sferra v. Urling,'4 5
for example, the supreme court held that, though the statute of
frauds was a substantive rule of law limiting the judicial authority
to provide a remedy, and that it thus could be raised at any time
during trial,'4 6 the statute could not be raised for the first time on
147
appeal.
What perhaps underlies the rule apparent in Gnall is the judicial
notion that to allow recovery when the limitation has been exceeded would be to condone an unauthorized or "illegal" compensation award, 4 8 something that the court could simply not tolerate.' 49 The notion is not, of course, without support, since the very
definition of the statute of repose provides that its expiration extinguishes the right to compensation.1 5 At this level of conceptualization, an award of compensation granted after its assertion beyond the statutorily authorized limitation period would be
"illegal," prompting, in turn, the courts to correct the error regardless of the point at which the defense had" first been raised. 5 1
145. 328 Pa. 161, 195 A. 422 (1937).
146. Id. at 169, 195 A. at 425-26.
147. Id. at 170, 195 A. at 426-27.
148. Cf. Rollins Outdoor Advertising v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 506 Pa.
592, 487 A.2d 794 (1985). In Rollins, the supreme court reaffirmed the statutory rule that an
employer's settlement agreement with an employee is illegal, and allowed, over Justice Larsen's dissenting opinion that the employer had waived the issue by not raising it, 506 Pa. at
606 & nn.1-2, id. at 801 & nn.1-2 (Larsen, J., dissenting), the employer's subrogation right to
be established. Rollins constitutes a strong example of how far the courts are apparently
willing to go in order to arrive at the proper statutorily-authorized award.
149. Cf. Ringgold School Dist. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Belak),
Pa. Commw. , 507 A.2d 876 (1986) (court vacates and remands order of appeal board
granting benefits, because computation was based upon incorrect wage/benefit rate, notwithstanding fact that employer had never raised issue before referee or appeal board); id.
(Barry, J., dissenting) ("No allegation of error was made concerning reliance on an improper
average weekly wage standard. Under these circumstances . . . the employer [should be]
precluded from now raising this question for the first time in this Court.") (citing Dilliplaine
v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974)).
150. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
151. Whether the court would raise the issue sua sponte remains undecided.
If the court's reasoning in this respect is along the lines cited in the accompanying text,
we may fairly predict the outcome of the still-undecided issue (essentially unrelated to the
subject of this article) of whether the defense of sovereign immunity may be raised for the
first time on appeal. Exceptions to that immunity are strictly delineated by statute, see 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (Purdon 1982), and, like workmen's compensation, embrace the
granting of a cause of action in derogation (for all intents and purposes) of common law.
Consistent with that status, the commonwealth court has held (1) that the defense can
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c. Effect of "Disabilities":Not a Statute of Repose Issue
As detailed above, from the very earliest days of workmen's compensation it was held that disabilities such as incompetency or minority did not work to toll the limitation periods. 152 This is likewise the law today. It should be remembered, however, that this
rule has nothing to do with the statute of repose character of the
limitation provisions. The latter theory, one recalls, does not determine when a limitation statute begins or ends, but defines only the
effect of its expiration. 15 3
The recent re-affirmation of the disabilities rule in Riddick v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (State Correctional In1 54
stitute at Graterford)
is in total consonance, albeit unspoken,
with the preceding assertion. In Riddick the court rejected the argument that a claimant's mental incompetency would work to toll
the claim petition limitation period under the workmen's compensation act, acknowledging, but not accepting as persuasive, the fact
that this was the law in numerous other jurisdictions. 155 Although
the court prefaced its rejection of the argument with a recitation of
the statute of repose theory,15 it went on to effect the rejection on
wholly different grounds-by way, indeed, of reliance on a statute
never be waived, at least at trial, Hoffman v. J.D. Morrissey, Inc., 36 Pa. Commw. 513, 515,
389 A.2d 702, 703 (1978) (citing PA. R.C.P. No. 1032(1)); and (2), that, because the legislature intended "to exempt the sovereign from immunity only in specific, clearly-stated situations [it is] our duty. . . strictly to construe" the exceptions to immunity. Davidow v. Anderson, 83 Pa. Commw. 86, 91, 476 A.2d 998, 1000 (1984) (emphasis added).
The foregoing rules, of course, are precisely those which operate in the context of workmen's compensation statutes of limitations, and which ultimately produced Gnall. If the
reasoning suggested by this writer for that case is in fact that possessed by the court, it will
in the future most likely refuse to allow unauthorized liability against the state or its agencies, regardless of when the defense of immunity is raised. In other words, the defense of
sovereign immunity may well be declared jurisdictional.
152. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
154. Pa. Commw. -, 499 A.2d 694 (1985).
155. Id. at & n.3, 499 A.2d at 696-97 & n.3 (citing, inter alia, Croon v. Breitfellers Sales, Inc., 63 A.D.2d 1108, 406 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1978); Johnson v. Thomas & Skinner,
Inc., 152 Ind. App. 136, 282 N.E.2d 346 (1972)).
156. __
Pa. Commw. at __, 499 A.2d at 696. Beyond the terse articulation of the
rule-"[the limitation] extinguish[es] the right when the time expires"-and the invocation
of Ratto, however, the theory played no role in the decision. A recent suggestion, then, that
the statute of repose theory operated in Riddick to preclude the recovery must be dismissed.
See Judicial Highlights[:] Workmen's Compensation, The Pennsylvania Lawyer, Jan. 15,
1986, at 24 ("The workmen's compensation injury statute of limitations is a statute of repose which extinguishes rights when the three year time period expires. A claimant's incompetency therefore does not toll the three year period so as to suspend the running of the
statute.").
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of limitations precedent:
Our ... review of Pennsylvania law discloses ... only our Supreme Court's
clear holding that incompetency does not toll the statute of limitations in a
personal injury case. [In the case so holding], the Supreme Court held that,
because the limiting statutes themselves expressed no saving provision, persons under disability do not have the benefit of any exceptions to the opera167
tion of the time limits.

It perhaps could be questioned whether this reliance on statute
of limitations precedent was proper given the distinction between
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose. Conceivably, instead,
the statute of repose under consideration could have been construed as quasi-jurisdictional, as in other states, 158 and the conclusion drawn that incompetency did not toll the limitation since the
very right to compensation was absolutely barred and extinguished
three years after the incurrence of injury. Such a construction,
however, would be at odds with the theory 59 which does not define
the limitation commencement point. A decision under the workmen's compensation act to toll the statute of repose in the case of
disabilities is thus not precluded by the theory, and hence a contrary decision to so hold, as in Riddick, is'
as appropriately based
on general Pennsylvania law as on any other authority. The statute
of repose theory, in this context, demands only that the disability
accrue within three years of the injury (or the "discovery" thereof),
and that the limitation, once thereupon commenced, completely
extinguish the right to compensation upon its expiration.
B.

Mandatory Express Limitations

The inclusion of the term "shall" in a statute has long been held
to indicate that the statute is to be construed as mandatory in operation."1 0 Several of the time limitations of the workmen's com157.

Pa. Commw. at

-

-,

499 A.2d at 696 (citing Walker v. Mummert, 394 Pa.

146, 146 A.2d 289 (1958)). The court also noted that the Pennsylvania "general statute of
limitations currently expresses the hard rule as a matter of legislative policy" that unless a
limitation expressly provides for tolling for "infancy, insanity or imprisonment," extensions
are not to be permitted (quoting 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5533 (Purdon 1981)). - Pa.
Commw. at

-,

499 A.2d at 697.

158. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
159. Including, importantly, the theory as it has developed in Pennsylvania. See supra
notes 95-104 and accompanying text (statutes of repose may be tolled by fraudulent or constructively fraudulent acts).
160. City of Philadelphia v. Shapp, 44 Pa. Commw. 303, 308, 403 A.2d 1043, 1046
(1979) ("The term 'shall' is ordinarily construed to mandate, and not merely to allow certain
conduct ....").
But see Delaware County v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 34 Pa. Commw.
165, 171, 383 A.2d 240, 242 (1978) ("The word shall may . . .be interpreted as either
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pensation and occupational disease acts fall into such a category.
The notice of injury provisions are such limitations,"'1 that section
of the workmen's compensation act providing that
[u]nless the employer shall have knowledge of the injury, or unless the employee . . . shall give notice thereof to the employer . . . within one hun-

dred and twenty days after the occurrence of the injury, no compensation
shall be allowed. 8 2

Sections 315 (claim petition), 63 413 (reinstatement petition),6 4
and 426 (rehearing petition)16 6 also contain this strongly negative
language, and are hence also mandatory express limitations, as well
as being statutes of repose.
The inclusion of this imperative language has brought courts to
the conclusion that no discretion is to be exercised in permitting
late performance of the particular act involved. The oft-repeated
judicial statement in this regard is that "[tihe courts may not extend [such] period[s] ex gratia in aid of a meritorious claim or to
relieve against the hardship of particular circumstances."' 1 6 That
announced restraint is, of course, in harmony with the legislative
intent supporting mandatory provisions; by phrasing statutes in
such an imperative manner the legislature thereby voices the inmandatory or directory.").
161. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa. Commw.
305, 308, 340 A.2d 915, 917 (1975) (quoting language of workmen's compensation provision
and declaring that "[riecognizing that this section is to be liberally construed, it is, nevertheless, mandatory and bars a claim" when not complied with); Moyer v. Edinger, 192 Pa.
Super. 450, 455, 116 A.2d 234, 237 (1960):
Pennsylvania adheres strictly to the rule that the time limit prescribed by the statute
within which to notify the employer is mandatory and, unless there is fraud or its
equivalent present or some other act on the part of the employer which prejudices the
claimant, the courts have no authority to extend the time for giving the notice.
Id. (construing Section 311 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). See also Beck v. Franklin
Glass Corp., 136 Pa. Super. 204, 208, 7 A.2d 600, 602 (1939) ("Under the provisions of the
statute, which are mandatory, no discretion may be exercised by extending the time in
which a notice must be served.") (construing Section 311 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act)).
162. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 631 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See also id. § 1411 (Section 311
of the Occupational Disease Act) (unless notice is given within 120 days, "no compensation
shall be allowed").
163. Id. § 602.
164. Id. § 772.
165. Id. § 871.
166. Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 201 A.2d 276, 277 (1964)
(allocatur denied) (section 434); Thorn v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 62, 155
A.2d 414, 416 (1959) (section 315). See also Kopp v. Doylestown Processing Co., 78 Pa.
Commw. 292, 295, 467 A.2d 425, 426 (1983) (section 413) (court referring to reinstatement
petition limitation as "mandatory," and not allowing extension).

1008

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:975

tent that the strictures of the particular provision not be merely
directory, thus subject to being disregarded in the interests of
167
equity.
The foregoing explanation is, of course, an established notion of
statutory construction, and the theoretical basis of a mandatory
express time limitation is coextensively simple. At the same time,
however, the explanation makes clear that the mandatory operation of the statutes of repose is not dependent upon the extinguishment of right theory,16 8 but is primarily dictated by the plain
language of these statutes.1 69
167. Although this proposition is familiar enough, we are informed of the likely origins
of such legislative phraseology by Sedgwick in his late 19th century treatise on statutory
construction:
It seems to me difficult to deny that the practice of sanctioning the evasion or disregard of statutes ...

has been carried beyond the line of sound discretion ....

But it

is not to be denied that the practical inconveniences likely to result from insisting
with literal severity on strict compliance with all the minute details which modern
statutes contain, create a pressure on the judiciary very difficult to be resisted by
sagacious and practical men who desire to free the law from the reproach of harsh-

T.

ness or absurdity. If it should be thought ...
that the judiciary have, in regard to
the construction of statutes as directory, really infringed on the province of the Legislature, the only practicalremedy for it appears to be a more careful preparationof
the statutes, and an habitual insertion of the precise consequence which the
lawmaker intends to follow from the disregard of his directions.

324 (2d ed. 1874) (emphasis added).
168. Indeed, this general construction arose even before the statute of repose theory
was enunciated in Ratto. See Horn v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 274 Pa. 42, 44, 117 A. 409, 410
(1922) (quoting statutory language and denominating claim petition limitation as
"mandatory").
169. The best evidence of this is the fact that courts have continued to announce in
unambiguous terms that the disease act limitation is mandatory, even though the statute of
repose theory was expressly renounced under that act. See Dillon v. Philadelphia Fire
Dept., 25 Pa. Commw. 125, 128-29, 358 A.2d 765, 766 (1976).
There is actually no good reason why this would not be the construction. Still, there had
been debate in this context over the enduringly mandatory character of the provisions, debate which originated in the fairly revolutionary application of the discovery rule to the
disease act notice provision in Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 42 A.2d
280 (1945). In Roschak, the claimant had failed to give notice within ninety days of his
"disability," with the familiar cause being that he was simply unaware of its presence and
its work-related character until after the ninety day period had expired. Id. at 229, 42 A.2d
at 281. Faced with these facts, and acknowledging that it would be irrational to demand
timely notice of an injury of which the injured was unaware, the court established the rule
that the provision would only run from the date of constructive knowledge of the workrelated disability. Id. at 236-38, 42 A.2d at 283-85. This was held to be the rule notwithstanding the fervent assertion by the employer that the limitation was mandatory, and that
it, thus, must necessarily run strictly from the date of first objective disability. Brief for
Appellee at 6-8 (arguing, among other things, that "the statute runs from the date of the
breach of duty and 'not from the time the special damage is revealed or becomes definite.' "). This was, after all, the rule in the notice context of the parallel workmen's compensation act. See 157 Pa. Super. at 231, 42 A.2d at 282.
SEDGWICK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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C. JurisdictionalLimitations
Unlike the statutes of repose and mandatory express limitations
discussed in the foregoing sections, the provisions of the acts governing the time allowed for appeals 170 have been construed and
classified as jurisdictionalin operation. Such categorization is also
given to the appeal time provisions of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure17 1 governing appeals taken beyond the level of
the administrative proceedings before the Workmen's Compensa7 2
tion Appeal Board.
Rules governing appeal periods are, like the previously examined
limitations, strictly construed and are clearly mandatory. 17 The
earmark of a limitation so interpreted, of course, is its non-receptiveness to judicial extension in the interest of fairness, even in
Appropriately enough, the court in overcoming this argument did not declare that the
statute was not mandatory, but simply demanded that both the rational and liberal construction due the act required that the notice period only commence upon discovery of the
work-related disease. Id. at 235, 42 A.2d at 284. To change the commencement date, after
all, hardly required rejection of the mandatory characteristic of the limitation, which was
derived not from the commencement point designation of the limitation, but from the simple language of the statute.
After Roschak, arguments were nonetheless entered that the case had destroyed the
mandatory nature of the limitation. See, e.g., Stefan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 47
Wash. Co. 183, 186 (1967). In Stefan the court, after acknowledging the application and
implications of the discovery rule in the notice provision context, held as follows:
All of the cases we have found have held fast to the doctrine of the necessity of this
notice and none has extended [the] period ....
[No case] has extended the 90 day
period except those cases where the employer had somehow received actual notice.
Id. See also Ochran v. U.S. Steel Corp., 28 Fayette L.J. 188 (1965) (applying section
strictly); Mirabile v. State Workmen's Compensation Ins. Fund, 43 Wash. Co. 77 (1962)
(acknowledging but not applying mandatory operation).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 853 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (workmen's compensation act:
twenty days allowed following notice of referee's award/denial to take appeal to board); id. §
1523 (Purdon 1952) (occupational disease act: twenty days following notice of referee's
award/denial to take appeal to board); id. § 1527 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (occupational disease
act: thirty days allowed from date of appeal from board to file exceptions to findings with
common pleas court).
171. PA. R.A.P. 903, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1985) (thirty days allowed from
order of common pleas court to file notice of appeal to commonwealth court); id. 1512
(thirty days allowed from order of board to file petition for review to commonwealth court).
172. See, e.g., Washington v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Harrisburg Hospital), 69 Pa. Commw. 255, 257, 450 A.2d 803, 804 (1982) (construing § 853, court affirms
that defective appeal deprived appeal board of jurisdiction); Tulay v. General Foam Corp.,
40 Pa. Commw. 229, 234, 397 A.2d 45, 47 (1979) (construing § 1527, court holds that it was
"without jurisdiction to accept belated exceptions"); Criniti v. Department of Transp., 34
Pa. Commw. 512, 515, 383 A.2d 993 (1978) (construing PA. R.A.P. 1512(a), court holds that
"timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional.").
173. See, e.g., Riley Stoker Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa.
Commw. 533, 536, 308 A.2d 205, 206 (1973) (court recounting "strict" application of section
423).
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cases where the delay has caused no apparent prejudice to the potential appellee. 7 4 A statute declared jurisdictional, however, possesses the further attribute of being absolutely unwaivable. Indeed,
the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, commonwealth
court, and state supreme court, upon detecting that the time period has been exceeded, will disallow the appeal, even quashing the
action sua sponte.175 Pursuant to the same underlying theory-that
a court simply lacks the power to consider a case appealed outside
the prescribed period-it has long been held that parties to a dispute may not disregard an appeal limitation and stipulate to a tri76
bunal's jurisdiction.
These familiar strictures stem from the notion that although the
courts are a separate and independent branch of government, the
extent to which appellate tribunals will actually exercise power is
presumptively a matter of legislative directive. 77 For a court to allow a tardy appeal to be prosecuted would thus violate the familiar
and "fundamental rule that courts [are not] to intrude on the
province of the legislature. 17 8 Beyond the implication of this latter
notion (which, of course, often devolves into little more than
cliche), a practical reason for judicial faithfulness to a strict reading of jurisdictional provisions is the desire to promote order and
efficiency in the appeals process, and thus to avoid the confusion
and uncertainty thought inevitably to result from a lack of clear
174. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
175. See BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 6.24(1), at 84 (Supp. 1985) (citing Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Budd Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 249, 370 A.2d 757 (1977)). See also
Commonwealth v. Yorktowne Paper Mills, Inc., 419 Pa. 363, 367, 214 A.2d 203, 205 (1965).
176. See Devlin v. Grabler Mfg. Corp., 151 Pa. Super. 216, 220, 30 A.2d 138, 140
(1943) (construing the since defunct workmen's compensation act provision providing for
appeal from appeal board to superior court). See also Commonwealth v. Yorktowne Paper
Mills, Inc., 419 Pa. 363, 368, 214 A.2d 203, 205 (1965).
177. Compare PA. CONST. art. V, § 1 ("the judicial power shall be vested in a unified
judicial system ....
"), with id., § 2 ("The Supreme Court ... shall have such jurisdiction
as shall be provided by law); id., § 4 ("The Commonwealth Court shall.., have such juris-

diction as shall be provided by law."). See generally R.E.
TUTIONA I LAW 25-46 (1985).

WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTI-

178. Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 266, 401 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1979) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting). Cf. Klugman v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 198 Pa. Super. 268, 182 A.2d 223 (1962):
It has been repeatedly held ... that courts have no dispensing power, even in matters of practice, when the legislature has spoken. Thus, where a statute declares that
a judge at chambers may direct a new trial if application is made within ten days
after judgment, it has been said that "he can no more enlarge the time than he can
legislate in any other matter." When a statute fixes the time within which an act
must be done, the courts have no power to enlarge it, although it relates to a mere
question of practice.
Id. at 275, 182 A.2d at 226 (quoting SEDGWICK, supra note 167, at 277-78).
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adjudicative finality. 7 9
Notwithstanding this firm theoretical and practical foundation
for strict construction of jurisdictional provisions, courts have long
invoked their equitable powers to relieve the appellant from compliance with an appeal limitation in cases where fraud, constructive fraud, or a breakdown in the operation of court or administrative functions has precluded adherence. s' Acknowledging this
apparent contradiction, one court exercising its power to allow an
appeal filed after the limitation period has explained its action as
follows:
[Tihe judiciary is an independent department of government, exclusively
invested by the Constitution with one element of sovereignty, and. . . this
court receives its essential and inherent powers from the Constitution, and
not from the Legislature. This fundamental principle leads, as we are satisfied, to the proposition that, if an appeal within the time limited by law
should be prevented by the fraud of an appellee or his counsel, the court
might, notwithstanding the statutory limitation, grant an appeal upon a
proper application. This power, to put the doctrine in a somewhat different
form, exists not by virtue of legislation, but by virtue of the inherent right
of every superior court to maintain its dignity and independence, and to
control its process and maintain its inherent jurisdiction.'8'

This willingness of courts to exercise their powers ex cathedrato
"prevent the triumph of fraud"1'82 in the face of strict legislative
time prescriptions was displayed in the workmen's compensation
179. See Bass, 485 Pa. at 265, 401 A.2d at 1138:
[The court's refusal to strictly enforce jurisdictional appeal provisions] creates confusion and uncertainty in the minds of the bench, bar and public. Even more damaging,
today's majority decision [to so refuse] destroys confidence in, and respect for, the
integrity of the decisional process in a court of last resort.
Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting) (discussing PA. R.A.P. 903). See also id. at 1138-39:
The statutory thirty day filing requirement is a legislative determination that appeals
if taken must be within that period. That requirement is a legislative judgment that
statutory timely appeals and adjudicative finality advance the quality of our
jurisprudence.
[The refusal to strictly enforce jurisdictional appeal provisions] creates confusion in
appeal procedures and the administration of justice.
Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting from Denial of Application for Reargument). See also Gallardy v.
Ashcraft, 288 Pa. Super. 37, 43 n.8, 430 A.2d 1201, 1204 n.8 (1981) (warning of impending
"chaos" if standard for allowing appeal nunc pro tunc is not clarified).
Cf. Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 259, 198 A. 154, 157 (1938) ("An appellant is barred by
the lapse [of the prescribed time]; otherwise there would be no finality to judicial action.").
180. See, e.g., In re Zeigler, 207 Pa. 131, 135-37, 56 A. 419, 420-21 (1903).
181. Smythe v. Boswell, 117 Ind. 365, 20 N.E. 263 (1889) (quoted with approval in
Zeigler, 207 Pa. at 135-36, 56 A. at 420).
182. 207 Pa. at 137, 56 A. at 421.
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context promptly after the act's promulgation. After reciting the
time-honored theory of jurisdictional limitations, the supreme
court in Wise v. Borough of Cambridge Springs1 s3 reaffirmed that
under the act "where a party has been prevented from appealing
by fraud, or by the wrongful or negligent act of a court official...
the court has the power to extend the time for taking an appeal."1 84 This articulation of the requisite circumstances required
for an appeal "nunc pro tunc" has remained, for the most part,
intact to the present day under the workmen's compensation and
occupational disease acts, as in other contexts as well.
D.

Disease Manifestation Time Restrictions

1. Construction and Purpose
A fourth type of limitation statute included in both occupational
disease and workmen's compensation acts is not in fact a statute of
limitations in any sense, although often mistaken for one. These
limitations are discussed not only by virtue of this phenomenon,
183. 262 Pa. 139, 142-43, 104 A. 863, 864 (1918):
Where a statute fixes the time within which an act must be done, as, for example, an
appeal taken, courts have no power to extend it, or to allow the act to be done at a
later day, as a matter of indulgence. Something more than mere hardship is necessary
to justify an extension of time, or its equivalent, an allowance of the act nunc pro
tunc.
Id. (quoting Schrenkeisen v. Kishbaugh, 162 Pa. 45, 48, 29 A. 284, 285 (1884)).
184. 262 Pa. at 144, 104 A. at 864 (quoting Singer v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 254 Pa.
502, 505, 98 A. 1059, 1060 (1916)).
Wise was later to play a role in judicial construction of statutes of repose, when the issue
arose of whether notions of equitable estoppel would apply to delay the commencement of
such limitation provisions. In Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 47, 1 A.2d
839, 843 (1938), the case establishing that estoppel would apply (see supra notes 94-104 and
accompanying text), the court noted that the appeal limitation issue dealt with in Wise
constituted "a situation parallel" to that of the statute of repose under consideration, concluding that if fraud or its equivalent would serve to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc, so
could it likewise toll a statute of repose. Id. at 47-48, 1 A.2d at 843.
It is emphasized, however, that the allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc and the tolling
of a limitation statute by way of estoppel against the defendant to raise the bar constitute
two different legal notions. As evident from the discussion in the accompanying text, however "parallel" jurisdictional limitations and statutes of repose may be, they clearly have
divergent historical and theoretical origins. The suggestion, then, that "appeal periods are
deemed to be limitations on the right granted by the legislature. . . eliminat[ing] the right
as well as the remedy," Bmmmma, supra note 2, § 6.25(3), at 122 (emphasis added), is not
really accurate. This language primarily voices the statute of repose theory, and is probably
out of place in the context of appeal provisions. Appropriately, the cases cited for the
quoted proposition do not articulate the statute of repose theory. Cf. Iannotta v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 11 Pa. Commw. 156, 312 A.2d 475 (1973); General v. E. Roseman Co., 10
Pa. Commw. 569, 312 A.2d 609 (1973), overruled on other grounds, 461 Pa. 284, 336 A.2d
287 (1975).
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but also because these limitations, as a practical matter, often interact with the true statutes of limitations either to allow or disallow a claim.1"'
The provisions referred to establish certain maximum periods in
which diseases must manifest themselves in order to be compensable. Under the disease act, the disease must have occurred "within
four years after the date of. . . last employment in . . . [the] occupation or industry" 186 in which the employee was exposed to the
disease hazard. Under the disease recovery provisions of the workmeri's compensation act, meanwhile, the manifestation period has
been expanded to three hundred weeks.18 7 These provisions govern
both original claims for disability and claims for disease-related
deaths.'
Recalling the definition of a statute of limitations, viz., a "declaration that no suit [is to be] maintained on [a] cause[] of action
• . . unless brought within a specified period of time after the right
accrue[s],"' 18 9 it will be immediately recognized that these time periods are neither statutes of limitations nor statutes of repose.
They do not, after all, demand that any action be brought within a
certain period of time. Rather, they merely establish a substantive
prerequisite to ascertainment of the compensability of a certain
disease.' 9
The origins of legislative hostility towards compensation of all
disease victims, discernible in these "limitations," can be traced to
the earliest anxieties of the fathers of workmen's compensation
concerning the compensation of diseases under the strict-liability
of the new statutory scheme. The obvious difficulty of ascertaining
whether a disease was truly work-related-especially in a day when
185. Although the ensuing discussion reviews this interaction in some detail, the relationship of the disease manifestation requirements and the various applicable statutes of
limitations is more fully discussed infra notes 289-96, 297-305 and accompanying text; infra
notes 340-48 and accompanying text.
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(c) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 301(c) of the Occupational Disease Act).
187. Id. § 411(2) (Section 301(c)(2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act). Section
301(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
[Wihenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death
under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease
and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an
occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease.

Id.
188. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
190. The limitation statutes governing disease claims are sections 315 of the two acts.
Cf. generally supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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diagnostic processes were undependable-was thought to make
disease compensation under workmen's compensation unworkable. 191 Pursuant almost assuredly to this belief, recovery for workrelated diseases was not legislatively authorized until 1937,192 some
twenty-two years after the promulgation of the workmen's compensation act.
Included in this first disease act was a requirement that a compensable disease need manifest itself within two years of the last
exposure to the disease hazard."9 " This was, of course, a forerunner
to the limitations now under study. Professor Larson attributes the
specific origin of such restrictions to a concern beyond the difficulties of disease etiology which haunted the framers of the Pennsylvania act:
The original reasons for these restrictions was the fear that the compensation system could not bear the financial impact of full liability for dust diseases. . . . As investigators began to [examine industries with dust disease
hazards] they were apt to discover, to their alarm, that almost everyone had
silicosis in some stage or other.. . . Some states met this

. . .

problem by

throwing up a variety of barriers based on relation of time or degree of ex191. See, e.g., Bohlen, Some Recent Decisions Under the Workmen's Compensation
Acts of Massachusetts and Michigan, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1914):
Perhaps the most serious objection to compensation acts is the grave danger...
that the less industrious and honest members of the working class will endeavor to
exploit them by claims for compensation for disability either non-existent, or, if existing, in no way resulting from the employment ....
The opportunity for such
fraudulent, or at least unfounded claims ... , great as it is where only injuries to the
body are compensated, is greatly enlarged where compensation is allowed even for
diseases contracted on some particular occasion in the course of employment and is
immensely increased when it is allowed for all diseases of slow growth contracted
therein.
[D]iseases, [unlike injuries] . . - may be contracted anywhere, as everyone knows.
Every day experience shows that there is nothing more difficult to say with any precision than where, or when, or how a sufferer contracts his illness.
Id. at 565-66. The reader may find ironic Professor Bohlen's continued elaboration of the
perceived unworkability:
The only method of proof available is for the claimant to prove that he was subjected
in his employment to certain conditions to which he attributes his illness. This would
be supplemented by the testimony of that most unreliable class of witness, the partisan medical expert, to the effect that such conditions might and that in this case
probably did cause the illness in question.
Id. at 566 (emphasis added) (Bohlen was the first Chief Counsel to the Workmen's Compensation Board; see 1 W.C.B. (frontispiece) 1917)).
192. Occupational Disease Compensation Act, Act of July 2, 1937, P.L. 2714 [19371.
The legislation was received with some suspicion. See SKINNER, supra note 2, at 234 (3d ed.
1938).
193. Section 6(b) of the Occupational Disease Compensation Act. See SKINNER, supra
note 2, at 1001 (3d ed. 1938).
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posure to time of disability, death, or claim.'"

This purpose of disease manifestation restrictions brings to light
another patent distinction between true limitation statutes such as
statutes of repose and "pure" limitations. As examined in depth
later in this article, the latter are meant to protect the employer
from claims based upon stale evidence, to encourage diligence on
the part of claimants, and to grant "repose" to the potentially liable defendant. 95 The disease manifestation provisions, in contrast,
are unique creatures of the statutory scheme, possessing none of
the recited attributes, and reflecting no more than the simple legislative judgment that employers are to be relieved of at least some
of the liability which might possibly accrue, by means of an arbitrary time limit on the manifestation of disability-causing
diseases.19 6
194. LARSON, supra note 144, § 41.81. The treatise writer possesses an unabashed hostility for such restrictions, and the Pennsylvania statute under consideration is no exception. See id. § 41.82, at 7-471-72 & n.20 (stating that "[tihe arbitrariness of these statutes
and their exceptions has produced all kinds of senseless discriminations," after noting construction of section 301(c) of the Occupational Disease Act).
195. See infra notes 242-61 and accompanying text.
196. See also the recent pragmatic response to a demand that the disease manifestation provision of the workmen's compensation act be repealed:
Although we are not aware of the legislative intent behind the [three hundred week]
time requirement, it seems to be another example of legislative line-drawing intended
to afford employers and insurers reasonable limits on their exposure under the act.
Premium rates for workmen's compensation insurance directly reflect risks. Repeal of
the 300-week requirement would, without question, require a significant increase in
premiums.
Bond & Silver, Workers' Compensation[:]Employers and Insurers present their side of the
case, Penna. L.J. Rptr., Aug. 5, 1985, at 8. Cf. Gray v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 4 Pa. Commw.
590, 593-94, 288 A.2d 828, 829-30 (1972). With respect to the constitutionality of section
301(c) in its death claim context, see Formicola v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(City of Philadelphia),
- Pa. Commw. -,
509 A.2d 434 (1986).
It should be noted that under the disease act, benefits for most dust diseases may still be
obtained under section 301(i), even if the section 301(c) manifestation provisions are not
met, and even if the statute of limitations has not met with compliance. Section 301(i) provides, relevantly, as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, compensation for silicosis, anthracosilicosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, and asbestosis shall be paid . . . beginning
with the first month of disability . . . at the rate of. . . ($75) per month, to every
employe totally disabled thereby as a result of exposure thereto, who has not theretofore been compensated because his claim was barred by any of the time limitations
prescribed by this act, and shall continue during the period of such total disability.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(i) (Purdon Supp. 1985). To qualify, however, the foregoing
section further requires a two-year exposure to the disease hazard within Pennsylvania. Id.
This latter requirement is, of course, another of the family of restrictions discussed immediately above. See generally Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. Blank, 85 Pa. Commw. 156,
481 A.2d 705 (1984) (silica dust victim awarded compensation after disease manifestation
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Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp.

Having drawn the distinction between the two fundamentally
different types of "limitation" statutes, one may do well to consider the recent case of Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp.,19 7 a case in
which the dissimilarity was the pivotal factor in decision of the
controversy. An examination of the dispute is worthwhile because
of the fundamental implications a contrary decision would have
had on the ability of employees to recover for disease claims under
198
the Pennsylvania acts.
In Kilvady, a disabled worker's widow filed a claim for death
benefits. 19 Thus, under section 315 of the disease act, she was required to file the claim within sixteen months of her husband's
death,2 00 and under section 301(c) was required to show that the
death resulted within four years of the deceased's last employment-related exposure to the disease hazard. 20 1 The latter requirenine years after last exposure; case details proper apportionment of liability between employer and Commonwealth).
A recent challenge to the constitutionality of this section, based upon the argument that
employers may legitimately be held liable only for claims which are predictable, has been
rejected. See Grosser v. LE. Smith Glass Co., Pa. Commw. -,
-,
505 A.2d 1093,
1096-97 (1986) (dismissing argument that constitution, by authorizing only employer liability for "reasonable compensation," PA. CONST. art III, § 18, contemplated that "limitations
[must be] placed upon the time within which such actions can be brought." Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Grosser v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., Pa. Commw ....
505 A.2d
1093, 1096-97 (1986)).
197. 90 Pa. Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985).
198. Application of the discovery rule to the disease manifestation provisions of either
the disease or workmen's compensation acts (which, as will be seen, was the issue in
Kilvady), would vastly enhance the ability of claimants with late-developing disease disabilities to successfully pursue their claims. It is true that the case was decided under the provision of the increasingly defunct disease act. It is submitted at the outset, however, that the
general analysis and the rule ultimately affirmed by the commonwealth court in Kilvady has
application to the parallel provision of the workmen's compensation act. See also infra note
221 and accompanying text.
199. 90 Pa. Commw. at 588, 496 A.2d at 117-18.
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1415 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
201. Id. § 1401(c). See also Shrum v. Atlantic Crushed Coke Co., 186 Pa. Super. 377,
382, 142 A.2d 792, 794 (1958) ("where a claim.., is founded on death, the meaning of the
statute is clear and unambiguous and... such claim is valid only where the death alleged
. . . has occurred within the [time allotted in section 301(c)] ....
").
That this rule is perhaps not unanimously accepted is reflected in the appeal board's
decision in Kilvady, in which the suggestion was made that had the widow secured credible
evidence as to early manifestation of the disease, a death claim could have been successful:
"The cause of [the decedent's] death was subsequently discovered, but much too late to
press a fatal claim without proof of total disability from silicosis early enough after his
retirement." Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board Decision, Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp.
(No. A-71803, dated April 21, 1977) (emphasis added). The legitimacy of the latter construction of section 301(c) was not, in the end, a subject of the commonwealth court's review of
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ment was impossible to satisfy as a threshold matter: the claimant's deceased had died in 1972 but had not worked in the
presence of a disease hazard (silica dust) since 1957.2 o2 Although
the deceased had been ill from that time, it was only in the course
of his autopsy that a work-related silicosis was diagnosed.13 That
this was what led to the deceased's demise was essentially undisputed. 0 4 What motivated the filing of the presumably doomed
claim, however, was the remarkable further diagnosis, testified to
by the deceased's treating physician, that the silicosis had manifested itself and totally disabled the deceased in 1957,205 or at a
point well within the four-year period immediately following the
last disease hazard exposure.
Before the referee, the testimony was found unpersuasive and
the claim was dismissed, both for failure to prove that total disability had occurred within the four-year period, and on the more
fundamental grounds that death had occurred beyond the section
301(c)-prescribed four-year period; 206 this ruling was affirmed by
the workmen's compensation appeal board. 0 1 The common pleas
court, however, invoking Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry &
Machine Co., 20 s held that the discovery rule was to apply in determining whether the death claim was timely filed.20 9 The court thus
remanded the cases to the appeal board, directing it to order the
referee to reconsider the case, "giving due regard to this Court's
construction of section 301(c) ....,2"0 The notion underlying the
order was that, since the disease was only discovered at the time of
the autopsy, the section 301(c) four-year period would commence
at that point. Thus, whether or not the treating physician's testimony with respect to the early, undetected manifestation was believed, recovery could be had since the petition had been timely
the case. Surely, however, this cannot be the proper interpretation of section 301(c), which,
in its death claim context, would be thereby totally stripped of any purpose.
202. 90 Pa. Commw. at 588, 496 A.2d at 118.
203. Id. at 588, 496 A.2d at 117-18.
204. Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp., slip op. at 8,(Ct. Common Pleas, Westmoreland Co.,
filed Feb. 1, 1984) (Kilvady II).
205. 90 Pa. Commw. at 588, 496 A.2d at 118.
206. Id. at 588-89, 496 A.2d at 118.
207. Id. at 589, 496 A.2d at 118.
208. 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956). See Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp., 13 Pa. D. &
C.3d 181, 187 (1979) (Kilvady I).
209. 90 Pa. Commw. at 589 & n.4, 496 A.2d at 118 & n.4. See Kilvady I, 13 Pa. D. &
C.3d at 187-88.
210. Kilvady I, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d at 190. See also 90 Pa. Commw. at 589, 496 A.2d at
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filed under the sixteen month statute of limitations included in
section 315. Recovery was thus in essence guaranteed, and the remand order was in fact an order to grant an award to the claimant.
This was, of course, utter nonsense. However laudable the
Ciabattoni court's introduction of the discovery rule to claims
under the disease act, 211 the rule is applicable to statutes of limita-

tions-limitations which govern the time within which a claim is to
be pursued. Section 301(c), as discussed in the preceding section, is
not a statute of limitations, but rather a non-procedural statute
merely setting forth a requirement of compensable disease
disability.
The referee apparently shared this view, upon remand publishing precisely the same findings, and concluding again that the physician's testimony as to early manifestation was lacking in credibility, though omitting reference to the bar of the section 301(c)
death claim restriction. 1 2 The order to apply the discovery rule to
section 301(c) was ignored, as it was by the appeal board upon its
ensuing review.21 3 Determined to apply the rule, however, the com-

mon pleas court thereafter reversed and granted the petition,
maintaining that the evidence of an autopsy discovery of the disease, which would indicate the commencement of the running of
section 301(c), had been capriciously disregarded.2 ""
The commonwealth court settled the controversy, rejecting the
notion that the discovery rule was applicable to the section, and
declaring pivotally that the distinction between section 301(c) and
the statute of limitations of section 315 rested on the difference
between the very "right to compensation. . . and the time within
which that right must be asserted ....,,21' There is no doubt that

the latter statement is accurate and an adequate basis for rejection
of the discovery rule's role in the context of section 301(c). Still,
perhaps the better resolution of the case would have been simply
to point out the utter absurdity of applying the discovery rule to a
non-statute of limitations.21 6 The common pleas court's mischief
211. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
212. See Brief for Petitioner at Appendix C, Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp., 90 Pa.
Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985).
213. See id. at Appendix B.
214. 90 Pa. Commw. at 589, 496 A.2d at 118. See also Kilvady II, slip op. at 5, 8.
215. 90 Pa. Commw. at 592, 496 A.2d at 119.
216. The doctrinal incongruity which would result from such application would not be
the only absurdity. Had the discovery rule been held to apply to section 301(c), the court
would have created a statutory scheme with two discovery-rule governed "limitations."

Common sense, however, surely dictates that there be only one discovery rule limitation per
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hardly deserved the extended analysis undertaken in the case.2 17
Although the Kilvady decision involved the four-year restriction
of the disease act, it is manifest that the same construction is appropriately ascribed to the three hundred week period of section
cause of action.
217. That analysis was undertaken by the court in the course of refuting the claimant's argument, advanced in conjunction with the common pleas court discovery rule theory,
that the seminal case of Toffalori v. Donatelli Granite Co., 157 Pa. Super. 311, 43 A.2d 584
(1945) (allocatur denied), should operate to permit recovery. Toffalori held that where a
claimant has applied for and received total disability benefits, and dies before the expiration
of such lifetime benefits, the widow (or dependents) may file a claim for "continuation of
the payments. . . that had already been awarded," id. at 315, 43 A.2d at 585, notwithstanding the fact that the death itself occurred beyond the time mandated by section 301(c).
Seizing upon this holding, the claimant argued that Toffalori was analogous
because the decedent . . . did have a viable and valid claim for benefits during his
lifetime. . . . Under the Toflalori doctrine, if the decedent had asserted his claim for
benefits during his lifetime, there would be no question as to his widow's entitlement
to benefits. But such claim was not actually asserted only because the decedent did
not know . . . during his lifetime that he was suffering from an occupational disease.
Brief for Respondent at 14, Kilvady v. U.S. Steel, 90 Pa. Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985).
Application of the discovery rule to section 301(c), according to petitioner, would remedy
this hindrance to full applicability of Toffalori and hence allow recovery.
This proved, rightly, to be a failed, though concededly rational, argument. The commonwealth court in its analysis distinguished Toffalori by pointing out that the case had later
been interpreted to have dealt only with section 301(c) and the right to compensation,
rather than with the procedural issue of the "time within which that right . . . must be
asserted under Section 315." 90 Pa. Commw. at 592, 496 A.2d at 119 (emphasis in original)
(citing Moore v. Dodge Steel Co., 206 Pa. Super. 242, 213 A.2d 130 (1965)) (held: although
Tofjalori may allow a continuationof benefits, once the sixteen-month statute of limitations
expires, fatal claim petition is conclusively barred). Dealing with the right to compensation,
the court continued and declared that section "301(c) must be interpreted . . . as a statute
of repose," 90 Pa. Commw. at 592, 496 A.2d at 120, and, thus, not receptive to application of
the discovery rule.
Toffalori was, of course, properly distinguished, and section 301(c) indeed deals with the
right to compensation. Still, notwithstanding the adequacy of the court's analysis, what of
the declaration that the section is a statute of repose? We know from earlier portions of this
article that this terminology originated in and is applied to time restrictions in the nature of
proceduralstatutes of limitations governing legislatively-created causes of action. See supra
notes 54-92 and accompanying text. Section 301(c), in contrast, is not a procedural limitation of any character. The Kilvady declaration, it is submitted, stems from the original
Ciabattoni fallacy that whenever a limitation is not controlled by the discovery rule, it is a
statute of repose, and that when the discovery rule is applied, the limitation loses that character. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. See also Kilvady, 90 Pa. Cornmw. at
595, 496 A.2d at 121 (Kalish, J., dissenting) (citing Ciabattoni,if discovery rule not applied,
court would "convert section 301(c) into a statute of repose ....
").
The difficulty with the Kilvady declaration (and the dissent's response) is that not only
was Ciabattoni wrong, but that section 301(c) is not a statute of limitations in the first
place. Denominating the limitation as a statute of repose would apparently leave open the
future possibility that the discovery rule may be applied, a course of construction surely
inappropriate given the section's non-procedural character.
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301(c)(2) of the workmen's compensation act.218 Section 315 of the
latter act 2 19 is the statute of limitations governing filing of disease
claims under the act, and the discovery rule has been held applicable to its operation. 22 0 Extension of the rule to a non-statute of
limitations under the workmen's compensation act, it is submitted,
would be just as absurd as the failed attempt to do so in Kilvady
under the provisions of the disease act.
Part II
APPLICATION OF THE LIMITATION PROVISIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION

The ensuing sections of this article present and discuss the time
limitations of the Pennsylvania acts in their operative context.
Greater emphasis is given to the workmen's compensation act,
since the great majority of claims for both "traditional" injury and
disease are brought under its provisions. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly apparent that the courts quite properly afford
substantial weight to prior interpretations of the occupational disease act in the course of considering the nuances of disease recovery under the "injury" act;2 consequently, interpretations of the
increasingly defunct disease act are also discussed.
II.

SECTION

315 - "TRADITIONAL INJURY" AND DEATH CLAIMS

From 1915 until 1974, section 315 of the workmen's compensation act served as the limitation provision governing only claim petitions seeking recovery for "accidental" injuries-"traditional" injuries stemming from industrial and other workplace traumas.
When the first disease act was enacted in 1937, section 315 operated briefly as the claim petition limitation governing claims
218. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
219. Id. at § 602.
220. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 576-78, 496 A.2d 412, 417-18 (1985) (discovery rule applied
to disease claim petition limitation of workmen's compensation act; prior disease act construction found persuasive). See also Diggans v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Duquesne Light Co.), No. 1235 C.D. 1984, slip op. at 7 (Pa. Commw. Dec. 4, 1985) (unreported
mem. op.) (claimant's argument that 300-week disease manifestation provision of workmen's
compensation act was unconstitutional rejected, court stating that "similar constitutional
attacks were made on the Occupational Disease Act [four-year manifestation requirement],
but rejected in . . . Guess v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 77 Pa. [Commw.]
319, 466 A.2d 1098 (1983)").
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brought thereunder, until passage of the more comprehensive disease act two years later.2 22 The claim petition of the latter act, also
numbered 315, is treated later in this article.22 3
In 1974, however, section 315 of the injury act was amended to
indicate that the term "injury" under the section was to include
"disability resulting from occupational disease." At the same time,
the section was amended to codify the "discovery rule" which had
developed under the disease act.2 24 The present section 315, governing claims for both traditional injuries and diseases, thus operates in two different ways. In the former context, the time period
runs, with some variation, from the time of the occurrence of the
injury. With respect to disease claims, however, the discovery rule
has been held applicable, so that the limitation runs only from
when the claimant possesses constructive knowledge of the workrelated disabling disease. The following discussion deals with the
operation of section 315 only in its "traditional" injury context.
Treatment of the discovery rule amendment is undertaken along
with that of section 315 of the disease act, under which the discovery rule originated.22 5
As discussed in the first part of this article, a judicially created
distinction has evolved between the claim petition limitation governing traditional injuries and those governing occupational disease claims. Section 315 in its former context has been denominated a "statute of repose,"22 while for the same section in its
latter context, and for section 315 of the disease act, this characterization has been rejected. The argument of the preceding section was that this distinguishing, or at least the discarding of the
statute of repose terminology,, was misconceived, because the discovery rule as applied to occupational disease claims does no more
than establish as a matter of law when a limitation period is to
commence. A statute of repose, on the other hand, as the notion
has developed in Pennsylvania workmen's compensation law, possesses a variety of characteristics which are not negated by application of the discovery rule. For purposes of the following discussion,
however, it is important to note that the practical difference between the two claim petition requirements is limited to rules surrounding the initial filing. Sections 315 of both acts are mandatory
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See
See
See
See
See

generally supra note 193.
generally infra notes 306-91 and accompanying text.
infra note 235.
generally infra notes 306-91 and accompanying text.
generally supra notes 72-104 and accompanying text.
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statutes, and their limitation periods may be tolled or extended by
the same circumstances.
A.

Initial Tolling: Claim Petition or Notice of Compensation
Payable

Section 315 provides in mandatory terms that "all claims for
compensation shall be forever barred" unless within a three year
period after the injury the employee and employer (or insurance
carrier) agree "upon the compensation payable" under the relevant
provisions of the act. Additionally, the section provides that the
bar will not apply if "one of the parties shall have filed a petition
'227
as provided in article four hereof.
The former provision normally operates in instances where the
disability is not contested, as in the case of an uncontestable workplace injury;228 the manifestation of the agreement is the "Notice
of Compensation Payable," which permanently tolls the limitation
period. If compensation is later terminated or suspended, other
limitation periods operate to control the claimant's ability to reopen the claim.22 e Tolling of the limitation by filing of the claim
227. Section 315 provides in its entirety as follows:
In cases of personal injury all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within three years after the injury, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under this article; or unless within three years after the injury, one
of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in article four hereof. In cases of
death all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless within three years
after the death, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation under this arti,
cle or unless, within three years after the death, one of the parties shall have filed a
petition as provided in article four hereof. Where, however, payments of compensation have been made in any case, said limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of three years from the time of the making of the most recent payment prior to
date of filing such petition: Provided, That any payment made under an established
plan or policy of insurance for the payment of benefits on account of non-occupational illness or injury and which payment is identified as not being workmen's compensation shall not be considered to be payment in lieu of workmen's compensation,
and such payment shall not toll the Statute of Limitations. However, in cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation in which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not known to the employe, the time for filing a claim shall
not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment. The term "injury" in this section means, in cases of occupational disease,
disability resulting from occupational disease.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
228. See, e.g., Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State Corr. Inst. at
Graterford), Pa. Commw. -,
-,
499 A.2d 694, 695 (1985); Muse v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Western Elec. Co.), 89 Pa. Commw. 171, 173, 492 A.2d 102, 103
(1985).
229. Section 434, for example, provides for a three-year limitation on the claimant's
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petition, on the other hand, often arises where the employee's disability is contested° 30 or in instances where the occurrence of the
injury was simply unknown to the employer.2 3' In either case,
where the injury is "traditional," that is, where its cause is obvious
and effect immediate, the statute provides explicitly that the limitation period runs from the date of injury,23 a point which is not,
in most such instances, difficult to ascertain.
The statutory language providing the limitation on death claims
is the same, barring in mandatory language any claim three years
after death unless compensation is agreed upon or a petition has
been filed.2 33 As discussed below, however, the two provisos are not
construed in precisely the same fashion. 3 4 This is principally due
to the fact that claims for both original disability and for death
(dependents') benefits can be pursued after the worker's death; the
rules, necessarily, differ for each form of recovery.
B. Initial Tolling: "Continuous Trauma" and Aggravation
Cases
The 1972 amendments to the workmen's compensation act replaced the term "accident" with the word "injury" to designate the
event for which compensation may be paid. 3 6 One result of this
amendment has been the allowance of recovery for disabilities
which (1) are the result of "continuous trauma," (2) originate from
a non-disabling work incident but become disabling due to further
workplace aggravations, or (3) originate in a non-work-related context but reach a disabling level due to workplace aggravations. 2 6
Recovery for these new forms of injury has presented problems
with respect to the commencement point of the claim petition limitation."' At the time of this writing, however, aggravation and
ability to set aside a final receipt of compensation. See infra notes 638-68 and accompanying
text.
230. See, e.g., Hammerle v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Dept. of Agriculture, Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement), 88 Pa. Commw. 486, 488, 490 A.2d 494, 496 (1985).
231. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Niemann, 24 Pa. Commw. 377,
380, 356 A.2d 370, 371-72 (1976).
232. See supra note 227.
233. See id.
234. See infra notes 289-305 and accompanying text.
235. See generally BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 8-10.
236. See generally STANDER, supra note 44, at 53-65. See also infra notes 385-92 and
accompanying text.
237. Courts attempting to compensate such injuries when the act still defined the accident as the compensable event faced an even greater problem. Predictably, claimants were
met with employer arguments that the limitation should run from the date of the original
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continuous trauma injuries are still considered by the courts to be
in the nature of "traditional injuries" in terms of their relationship
to the running of the claim petition limitation. The alternative, of
course, would be to apply the discovery rule, pursuant to an argument that such injuries, like diseases, develop slowly, and are "insidious."2 38 In any case, the consequence of this on-going "traditional injury" view is that the referee must designate a particular
date identified by medical testimony as that on which the aggravation occurred or culminated in an injury.2 9
Given the nature of such injuries, the claimant will often have
worked under the aggravation or continuous trauma until it is simply unbearable, forcing a termination of work. In view of this phenomenon, and because at this point the employee usually loses
earning power, referee decisions to the effect that the injury occurred on the last date of employment while the claimant was exposed to the aggravation or trauma have been consistently upheld
by the commonwealth court.2 40 The claimant would have three
work-related accident. This problem was particularly substantial in the context of "aggravation" or "continuous trauma" injuries, because a definite "accident" was impossible to pinpoint. See, e.g., Hinkle v. H.J. Heinz Co., 462 Pa. 111, 118, 337 A.2d 907, 910-11 (1975), in
which the supreme court resolved the problem in the course of granting benefits for partial
hearing loss:
The right of a claimant to compensation should not be barred because he cannot
definitely fix the date of the accident resulting in his disability either because he
cannot remember the precise time when the accident occurred or because the accident was of such a nature that there is difficulty in ascertaining when it happened.
Id.
238. This approach, however, has recently been rejected by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. See Young v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd.Dckt. No. 1-83966, Sept. 29, 1983) (unreported), aff'd sub nom. Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), Pa. Commw. -'
509 A.2d 945 (1986).
239. Cf. STANDER, supra note 44, at 62 ("The practical question of fixing a specific
date for the . . . 'injury' is generally handled by stating that the date of the .
'injury' is
the date on which disability [total loss of earning power] is first shown.").
240. See Divine Providence Hosp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bonner),
75 Pa. Commw. 565, 570, 462 A.2d 917, 919 (1983). In Divine Providence, the claimant suffered from Charcot's Foot, a disease affecting the nerves of the lower extremities. Prolonged
standing in the course of the claimant's duties as an emergency room physician led to aggravation of the disease to the point of amputation of the claimant's right foot. In rejecting the
employer's argument of untimely filing, the court upheld the referee's finding "that the
[claimant's] injury occurred on the day he was no longer able to work on account of the
repeated injuries inflicted in the course of each earlier workday." Id. at 568, 466 A.2d at 919.
See also Beaver Supermarket v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa. Commw.
505, 424 A.2d 1023 (1981) (claimant suffered undisputedly work-related back injury, manifesting itself, due to aggravation, into total disability nine years later; held, recovery available and limitation satisfied since petition was "filed within three years after the last aggravating injury sustained on the last day claimant worked.") (cited and explained in Divine
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years from the last exposure to file in such circumstances. There is,
however, nothing to prevent a determination that the injury occurred before the cessation of work;2 41 this is largely a matter of
the medical testimony available.
C. Purpose of the Claim Petition Limitation and of
Limitations in General
As discussed earlier, statutes of limitations are of an ancient
character. They reflect a societal desire that those possessing
claims not "sleep on their rights, 2 4 2 but rather pursue their claims
with diligence, so as to provide repose to society. Seventy years of
construction of the limitations of the Pennsylvania acts, have, in
addition, brought to these provisions more pinpointed judicial
statements of purpose.
A distillation of that interpretive history was recently articulated
in Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Township
of Marple):24s "The purpose and policies underlying the statutes of
limitations . . . are the stimulation of the prompt pursuit of legal
rights and the avoidance of the inconvenience and prejudice resulting from deciding stale cases on stale evidence."24 In addition, a
further purpose evident in every statute of limitations is the desire
to grant "personal certainty" to the potential defendant with reProvidence, 75 Pa. Commw. at 568, 462 A.2d at 919); Reddinger v. St. Joe Zinc (Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. Dckt. No. A-85444, Oct. 20, 1983) (in claim for total, bilateral
hearing loss due to continuous trauma, three-year claim petition period ran from claimant's
last exposure to noise hazard in employer's workplace) (unreported decision) (petition for
review granted) (argued March 17, 1986).
241. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 40 Pa.
Commw. 142, 144, 396 A.2d 902, 903 (1979) ("repetitive trauma" injury held to have occurred when claimant reported to employer's nurse and displayed atrophied right hand
muscle and inability to straighten right elbow; referee's denial of claim due to exceeding of
claim petition limitation reversed, since premised on running of limitation from date of precipitating, non-disabling fracture of right elbow many years before).
242. See Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Twp. of Marple), 80 Pa.
Commw. 233, 241, 471 A.2d 169, 173 (1984), aff'd per curiam, - Pa. , 507 A.2d 388
(1986).
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing DeMartino v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, N. Div., 313 Pa. Super.
492, 460 A.2d 295 (1983)). See also City of Hazleton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. 477, 483 n.3, 386 A.2d 1067, 1070 n.3 (1978) (purpose underlying claim
petition limitation is "to put the employer-defendant on notice as to the nature and circumstances of the claim ....
") (citing Horn v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 274 Pa. 42, 117 A. 409
(1922)). Compare Bigley v. Unity Auto Parts, Inc., 496 Pa. 262, 275, 436 A.2d 1172, 1179
(1981) (O'Brien, J., dissenting) ("If, as the majority claims, the prompt and efficient disposition of claims is not a purpose of the Act, there would be no underlying reason for the
legislature to have included a time limitation for the assertion of a claim for benefits.").
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spect to future contingent liability, 45 a purpose in the workmen's
compensation context more accurately cognizable as the need to
grant to insurance carriers the ability to manage their accounts
24 6
and estimate their reserves with some degree of certainty.
An example of at least one of the limitation purposes in vindication is exhibited in Dudley itself. In that case, the claimant's employer had unintentionally "lulled" the claimant into believing
that it had filed a claim on his behalf following an undisputed
245. See Kelley, Statutes of Limitations in the Era of Compensation Systems: Workmen's Compensation Limitation Provisions for Accidental Injury Claims, 1974 WASH.
U.L.Q. 541, 545.
Professor Kelley sets forth in summary fashion the purposes of statutes of limitations as
follows:
(1) [T]he evidentiary purpose-to prevent error or fraud that may result from deciding factual issues long after the events in question, when witnesses may have died,
memories may have dimmed, and documents may have been lost or destroyed; (2) the
personal certainty purpose-to assure a potential defendant that he will not be subject to court-imposed liability after a specified period of time; and (3) the diligence
purpose-to discourage prospective claimants from "sleeping on their rights."
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Jackson, The Legal Effects of the Passing of Time, 7 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 407, 409 (1970)).
246. This proposition is rather graphically supported in a study detailing the litigation
expenses involved in the current asbestos litigation explosion. Due to expanded application
of the discovery rule of statutes of limitations in the tort/products liability sphere, numerous manufacturers became liable for causing the disease, years after their insurance policies
had lapsed:
Determining the responsibility of insurance companies is every bit as difficult as
determining that of defendants. Complex webs of insurance arrangements have been
made, amended, unmade, and then remade by defendants over the decades during
which most plaintiffs claim exposure to asbestos. For each defendant in each year,
there is normally a separate set of layers of primary coverage, excess coverage, and
reinsurance coverage. . ... Several major insurance carriers have many insured defendants, some of whom may have different interests, vis-a-vis each other, in any
particular case.
The policies that provided coverage contain language that has given rise to protracted litigation concerning the responsibility of the insurance carriers to respond to
particular claims. In a non-trivial number of instances, it is even a serious issue
whether any policy was in force; neither insureds nor carriers are able to produce
papers they had assumed long ago to be of no further relevance. But even when where
there is agreement that coverage did exist, there is nothing like accord between many
defendants and their insurers, or among the insurers themselves, as to what is covered, when, and by whom. The basic uncertainty over insurance coverage has severely
complicated relations between defendants and insurers, and has itself spawned a
large number of lawsuits.
KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 6 (1984). That particular crisis was sought to be

J.

remedied by special action which involved close cooperation between the various insurers.
See Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 375 (1984-85); Comment, The Asbestos Claim Facility-An Alternative to Litigation,
24 DUQ. L. REV. 833 (1986).
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work-related injury.2 4 7 Although the employer paid the claimant's
medical bills, including those for an initial surgery, it refused to
pay for the claimant's second surgery five years after the original
injury.2 4 1 When the claimant filed a petition in response, the employer unsuccessfully attempted to set up the three-year bar.24 9
Sustaining the referee's finding, the court held that the claimant
had succeeded in demonstrating that he had been "lulled into a
false sense of security regarding the filing of his claim. 2 50 So concluding, the court agreed that the employer could be precluded
from setting up the claim limitation bar. The court went further,
however, and rejected the long-standing rule that in such instances
the limitation period would commence from the point of the "last
misleading act. '251 Instead, the court, applying a discovery rule,
held that the "period reasonably should not begin to run until the
claimant knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, of his
22
deception.
The result in Dudley is in two senses harmonious with the purposes underlying limitation statutes. First, the preclusion of the
employer's right to set up the claim limitation bar in a situation
where the character of, and circumstances surrounding, the initial
injury were undisputed is not inconsistent with the concerns that
important evidence would be unobtainable, or that the ability to
ascertain the nature of the injury would be prejudiced by delay.
Second, the replacement of the last misleading act doctrine with a
discovery rule establishes a rule compatible with a desire to stimulate prompt claims. A party can only be expected to exercise diligence after the knowledge has been acquired of the need to file a
claim. In the Dudley court's words, it "cannot [be said] that an
injured worker, who does not file a claim because he reasonably
believes his employer has done so on his behalf, is guilty of sleep'253
ing on his rights.
In contrast, Mangine v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board (ConsolidationCoal Co.)2 54 is illustrative of a circumstance
in which a limitation period clearly operated to bar a claim in vin247. 80 Pa. Commw. at 235-36, 471 A.2d at 171.
248. Id. at 235, 471 A.2d at 170.
249. Id. at 235-36, 471 A.2d at 170-71.
250. Id. at 237, 471 A.2d at 171.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173. In so construing, the court overturned a well-established, longstanding doctrine. See infra notes 704-05 and accompanying text.
253. 80 Pa. Commw. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173.
254. 87 Pa. Commw. 543, 487 A.2d 1040 (1985).
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dication of the "stale evidence" purpose. In Mangine, the claimant
had filed a claim under the disease provisions of the workmen's
compensation act alleging total disability due to black lung disease. 255 Upon the commencement of hearings, the claimant sought
to amend the petition to assert that the disability stemmed from a
work-related heart attack suffered years before. 256 The original disease claim had been timely, because of the application of the discovery rule; the amendment, however, was denied. The referee
ruled that "its effect would be to permit Appellant to assert a new
cause of action after the expiration of the [section 315] statute of

limitations ....

"257

Affirming the referee and appeal board, the court first noted that
such amendments were routinely allowed when the amendment
sought was a change from the originally pursued, less generous
provisions of the disease act, to recovery under the disease provisions of the workmen's compensation act.2 58 Distinguishing those
allowances, the court held that to allow an amendment under the
involved facts would make the employer subject to liability for a
claim of an entirely different character than that first brought:
The facts and circumstances of Appellant's alleged occupational disease and
the proof necessary to sustain such a claim are substantially different from
the facts and circumstances of Appellant's heart disability and proof required for that claim. To permit this amendment would obviously prejudice
the employer, who is prepared to defend the occupational disease claim. We
do not here have a case where the amendment would allow the claim to
"I
proceed under a different act but using the same theory of recovery ....

In addition to being a case which demonstrates the stale claim
prevention purpose of a limitation provision, Mangine is an excellent illustration of the Pennsylvania courts' tendency to distinguish between the liberal construction normally due the act 2 0 and
the need for faithfulness to a consistently applied limitations policy. The liberal construction rule, pursuant to which workmen's
compensation pleadings are freely amended, did not, in Mangine,
preempt the laudable desire to preclude a claim asserting an injury
255. Id. at 544, 487 A.2d at 1040-41.
256.
257.

Id. at 545, 487 A.2d at 1041.

Id.
258. Id. at 546-47, 487 A.2d at 1041-42 (citing Anthra Textile, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa. Commw. 294, 416 A.2d 1172 (1980); Findlay Refractories v.

Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 52 Pa. Commw. 454, 415 A.2d 1270 (1980)).
259. 87 Pa. Commw. at 547-48, 487 A.2d at 1042.
260. See generally infra note 285 and accompanying text.
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that had occurred some five years before,"' investigation of which
would surely have necessitated a reliance upon stale evidence
which the limitation provision was established to avoid.
D.

Effect of Legislative Amendment

It is well settled under Pennsylvania law that amendments to
the claim petition statute expanding the limitation period are applied retroactively:
Thus, where a claimant file[s] after the statutory deadline in effect at the
date of injury, but the statute is amended effective before the expiration of
the original deadline so as to extend the time for filing, and the filing is
timely under the amended statute, the claim is governed by the amended
6 2
statute, and the claimant thus benefits from the extension of time.

The controlling notion which allows such application is that the
limitation, although qualifying a substantive right, is nonetheless
essentially a procedural requirement;2 6 3 changes to the claim petition statute may thus be applied to causes of action existing at the
26 4
time of the amendment.
The announcement that the time restrictions are procedural may
appear to be at odds with the notion that the limitation periods of
261. As evidenced from the court's footnote, the statute of repose nature of the claim
petition limitation likewise played a fundamental role in denial of the claim. Since the limitation extinguishes both right and remedy, the claimant would have to have filed a claim
petition within three years from November 22, 1977, the date of the heart attack. The petition seeking recovery for incurrence of the disease was filed on November 21, 1980, within
the time limit. This filing did nothing to toll the limitation period, because the right to
recover for a heart attack was forever barred after November 22, 1980. The claimant's argument that amendment of the petition would be legitimate was no doubt premised on the
notion that the original timely filing had the effect of tolling the limitation for the amended
claim. This was not the case, however, since the amended claim sought recovery for heart
attack disability, rather than disability stemming from a disease. See 87 Pa. Commw. at 548
n.4, 487 A.2d at 1042 n.4.
Also evident from the court's footnote is the rule that the employer's actual knowledge of
the heart attack (or other injury) will be ineffective to toll the limitation period. See id.
While the employer may have had notice of the claimant's ailment, the claimant did nothing
within the prescribed time to ensure that his rights were protected.
262. City of Hazleton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. 477,
482, 386 A.2d 1067, 1070 (1978) (discussing effect of 1974 amendment expanding limitation
from two to three years).
263. See id. ("It is well settled that the . . . statute of limitations is procedural in
nature and does not affect a claimant's substantive right to benefits ....
). See also
Matkosky v. Midvale Co., 143 Pa. Super. 197, 199, 18 A.2d 102, 103 (1941).
264. Causes of action for injuries accrued and barred by the then-existing limitation,
however, will not be revived by an amendment extending the limitation. See Ferki v.
Frantz's Transfer Co., 152 Pa. Super. 267, 270, 31 A.2d 586, 587-88 (1943). See also BARBSIERI,supra note 2, § 5.42, at 145.
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the act limit not only the "remedy" but also the "right" to compensation. If, after the running of the limitation the very right to
compensation is extinguished, it is difficult to conceptualize the
limitation period merely as the proceduralmodality defining when
the claim is to be asserted. Indeed, the whole notion of statutes of
repose developed in the context of a rejection of the "procedural"
character of limitation provisions.2 6
This issue was addressed expansively in Seneca v. Yale & Towne
Manufacturing Co., 266 a case which arose after the original oneyear limitation had been increased to two.2" 7 Relying principally on
Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 268 the case which established section 315 as a statute of repose, the employer argued against retroactive application of the amendment, asserting that "[t]he one
year period within which a claimant must move or be forever
barred is a condition of the substantive right to compensation. Being part of the substantive right, no subsequent act of the legisla'269
ture could apply retroactively.
In response, the court acknowledged that the section was "by
origin, an incident of a new substantive right created by statute,"
but insisted nevertheless that the period dealt "merely with the
exercise of that substantive right ....
"27o The limitation provision was then held to be so "basically procedural" that it was to be
applied to existing causes of action.
The roots of the court's dual-natured characterization are found
in earlier wrongful death cases, the source, notably, from which the
Ratto court drew its earlier characterization of section 315 as a
statute of repose. 271 Noting that in Rosenzweig v. Heller272 the supreme court had held that the limitation period in wrongful death
actions was a question of procedure,2 73 the Seneca court held that
265. See supra notes 45-92 and accompanying text.
266. 142 Pa. Super. 470, 16 A.2d 754 (1940).
267. Id. at 473, 16 A.2d at 755.
268. 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931).
269. Brief for Appellant at 17, Seneca v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 142 Pa. Super. 470,
16 A.2d 754 (1940).
270. 142 Pa. Super. at 476, 16 A.2d at 757 (emphasis in original).
271. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. The court also relied on the retroactive treatment afforded to one of the appeal provisions of the act. 142 Pa. Super. at 473-74,
16 A.2d at 756 (citing Kuca v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 268 Pa. 163, 110 A. 731 (1920)). The
common pleas court had done the same, prompting the employer to argue, not unreasonably, that the latter provision was more obviously procedural than the right-limiting statute
of repose. Brief for Appellant, supra note 269, at 10, 18-19.
272. 302 Pa. 279, 153 A. 346 (1931).
273. 142 Pa. Super. at 477, 16 A.2d at 757.
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"by the same reasoning the limitation period [in workmen's compensation] must also be held to be a procedural matter."2 74 In so
holding, the court was breaking with the rule which at the time
was thought in some jurisdictions to apply to such limitations. 275
The section 315 limitation period has been shortened on only
one occasion.2 76 In litigation initiated during the period of that new
shortened provision,27 7 it was held that, because the involved injury had occurred during the more generous prior period, a "reasonable time" after the expiration of the shortened provision was
to be allowed within which a claim could be filed.27 8Determination
of that "reasonable time" was held to be a task of the court, gar2' 79
nered "from the facts and circumstances in each case.
274. Id. at 476, 16 A.2d at 757.
275. See Brief for Appellee at 16, Seneca v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 142 Pa. Super.
470, 16 A.2d 754 (1940). See also 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4(a) (1948):

Cause of action created by statute. Where the cause of action involved is one created
by statute, and the time for commencing the action is a condition of liability, it is not

a statute of limitations and will operate retrospectively if a contrary intention is not
manifest. However, it has been held that a statute extending the time within which
a statutory cause of action may be asserted will not be given retroactive effect unless such legislative intent clearly appears.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

It may be recalled at this point that West Virginia was one such jurisdiction to draw the
conclusion that since the statute limited both right and remedy, the provision was substantive and thus unreceptive to retroactive application. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text. With this firm notion in place, no judicial gloss such as that used by the Seneca
court could be applied in West Virginia when precisely the same issue came before that
state's supreme court. Indeed, in Lester v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 242
S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1978), the court felt constrained to abolish the entire statute of repose/
substantive time limitation principle in the course of its determination to allow retroactive
application of an amendment to the state's workmen's compensation act limitation. See id.
at 446 (overruling Sudraski v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 441, 181
S.E. 545 (1935)). Lester's most notorious progeny, Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation
Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1982), was subsequently to state the rather disturbing,
though admittedly inevitable conclusion forced by the abolition: "Workmen's Compensation
...does not create statutory rights, but rather replaces with statutory remedies the common law rights its beneficiaries are denied." Id. at 907. The problem with this declaration,
of course, is that it is simply untrue. It also turns seventy years of understanding of workmen's compensation theory on its head.
Given the West Virginia court's unsuccessful struggle with these conceptual issues, one is
thankful in retrospect that the Seneca court adopted a dual-natured characterization of the
statute of repose: a provision limiting the substantive right to compensation, but nevertheless "procedural to the extent that a new enlarged period of time ... can redound retroactively to the benefit of an injured employe." BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 5.42, at 145.
276.
277.

Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 520, § 1.
Strouse v. Quaker Knitting Mills, 159 Pa. Super. 39, 46 A.2d 526 (1946).

278. Id. at 42, 46 A.2d at 528.
279. Id. at 42-43, 46 A.2d at 528-29 (citing Kennedy v. Holmes Constr. Co., 147 Pa.
Super. 348, 24 A.2d 451 (1942)).
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Further amendment to either lengthen or shorten the claim petition limitation period is not foreseen. Recent suggestions for
amendment of the act from the claimants' bar, for example, did
not include a demand that the already generous period be enlarged.2 0 The existing period is, indeed, neither inequitably short
nor below national standards. The issue of retroactive application
is thus not likely to arise in the near future.
E.

Necessity to "Plead" the Limitation

The landmark case denominating section 315 as a statute of repose, Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 2a' held specifically that, due
to the special nature of the provision, the "statute need not be specially pleaded."'2 8 Ratto, of course, has never been overruled, and
it is beyond doubt that the statute of repose theory survives to this
day in other contexts of its operation, as illustrated by a number of
2 83
recent commonwealth court decisions.
The significance of Ratto, both in its theoretical declaration and
actual holding, is important in light of Yellow Freight System, Inc.
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,2 84 in which the commonwealth court affirmed the rule that "'affirmative' defenses not
raised in an effectively filed pleading are deemed waived. ' 285 Be280. See Lurie & Jacobs, Workers' Camp. Law Amendments Urged, Pa. Law J.-Reporter, July 8, 1985, at 1.
281. 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931).
282. Id. at 247, 156 A. at 751. As the case progenitor of the statute of repose theory,
Ratto has been expansively treated in an earlier portion of this article. See supra notes 8492 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State Corr. Inst. at
Graterford), Pa. Commw. -,
, 499 A.2d 694, 696 (1985); Palm v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cluett, Peabody & Co.), 78 Pa. Commw. 63, 66, 466 A.2d 1108,
1110 (1983).
284. 56 Pa. Commw. 1, 423 A.2d 1125 (1981).
285. Id. at 7, 423 A.2d at 1127 (citing Teodori v. Penn Hills School Dist. Auth., 413
Pa. 127, 196 A.2d 306 (1964); Lewis v. Spitter, 266 Pa. Super. 201, 403 A.2d 994 (1979);
Birdman v. Medley, 261 Pa. Super. 23, 395 A.2d 285 (1978) (non-workmen's compensation
cases)). There may have been some doubt with respect to the applicability of the civil rule
to workmen's compensation proceedings, where the rules of pleading have traditionally been
held to receive liberal treatment. See infra note 637.
That the rule of liberal construction works only one way in this respect (toward the claimant), however, is aptly illustrated in Yellow Freight. Cf. Rackoczy v. Jandy Coal Co., 26 Pa.
Commw. 459, 463, 363 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1976) (held, liberal construction normally afforded
the provisions of the act would not be "served by broadly interpreting the statute in favor of
an employer against the Commonwealth."); Cf. Frey v. Lehigh Eng'g Co., 32 Pa. D. & C.2d
583, 588, 30 Leh. L.J. 255, 260 (Ct. Common Pleas Lehigh Co. 1964) ("The relaxing of the
rules of evidence is permitted in workmen's compensation cases in the futile hope that unlearned claimants might proceed without learned counsel. It was not intended to be em-
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cause Ratto establishes the limitation as one extinguishing the
right to compensation, the limitation is not an affirmative defense.2 86 Thus, if the inclusion of the limitation "defense" comes in
2 87 or its omission
a tardily filed answer, as in Yellow Freight,
comes in a timely filed answer, as in Ratto, or even if its omission
comes in a tardily filed answer, the Yellow Freight rule should
have no application. This is undoubtedly the rule, especially in
light of the recent pronouncement that the limitations in the nature of statutes of repose may be raised for the first time on
2
appeal. 88
F. Death Claims
1. "TraditionalInjury" Death Claims; Interaction with Section
301 (c) (2)
Section 315 of the workmen's compensation act provides that
where the claim is based upon death of the employee
all claims for compensation shall be forever barred, unless, within three
years after death, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation
under this article; or unless, within three years after the death, one of the
parties shall have filed a [claim] petition . ...89

When the death is immediate and from a "traditional" injury, such
as one stemming from a severe trauma, there is little problem in
establishing the commencement point of the three-year period.
Even in cases in which the death occurs sometime after the injury,
the time of death still marks the commencement point of the limitation period; thus, the injured worker's failure to file a claim during a period of terminal disability will not necessarily preclude his
ployed in a contest between two insurance companies, each with able counsel.").
286. See Ratto, 102 Pa. Super. at 346-47, 156 A. at 751:
[Normal statutes of limitations are] weapon[s] of defense, and ordinarily must be
pleaded and relied on by the defendant. Yet the necessity of pleading the statute of
limitations applies only to cases where the remedy alone is taken away, and in which
the defense is by way of confession and avoidance and does not apply where the
right and title to the thing is extinguished and gone, and the defense is by denial of
that right.
Id. (emphasis added).
287. See 56 Pa. Commw. at 3, 423 A.2d at 1125-26. In Yellow Freight the answer was
submitted nineteen days beyond the fifteen days allowed by statute. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 77, § 821 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 416 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). The
omitted defense was that the claimant's deceased had been intoxicated at the time of his
fatal truck crash. 56 Pa. Commw. at 5, 423 A.2d at 1126.
288. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
289. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See supra note 227.
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widow from asserting a fatal claim petition.29 ° Such failure, in certain instances, also will not preclude the widow or dependents
from receiving the claimant's unpursued disability benefits.2 91
A limit from another source, however, does operate to control
the employer's contingent liability for death claims. Section
301(c)(1) of the act includes a non-procedural requirement that
"wherever death is mentioned as a cause for compensation under
this act, it shall mean only death resulting from [an] injury and its
resultant effects, and occurring within three hundred weeks after
the injury. ' 292 The outer perimeters of the employer's contingent
liability would thus be reflected by a claim filed exactly three years
after the employee's death, which occurred 299 weeks and six days
290. See, e.g., Parks v. Winkler, 199 Pa. Super. 224, 226-29, 184 A.2d 124, 126-27
(1962). See also Holahan v. Bergen Coal Co., 164 Pa. Super. 177, 183, 63 A.2d 504, 507
(1949).
291. This rule was established in Frederico Granero v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 48 Pa. Commw. 252, 409 A.2d 1187 (1980). In Frederico Granero, the deceased
suffered a severe injury in the course of his employment and was immediately hospitalized.
He remained in this condition until his death two weeks later. During that period, the deceased lost two weeks of earning power and incurred $33,060 in medical expenses. No claim
for these benefits was filed before the death. After the deceased's widow timely filed her
fatal claim petition, the referee granted not only death benefits but also the deceased's disability payments and medical expenses. Id. at 254, 409 A.2d at 1188.
The commonwealth court upheld the appeal board's affirmance of the award, distinguishing cases which seemingly forbade such an award. See id. at 256-57, 409 A.2d at 1188-89
(distinguishing DeMontis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 34 Pa. Commw. 225, 383
A.2d 259 (1978); Flynn v. Asten Hill Mfg. Co., 34 Pa. Commw. 218, 383 A.2d 255 (1978)).
The court's decision turned in part on recognition of section 410 of the workmen's compensation act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit 77, § 751 (Purdon Supp. 1985), which provides that an employee's "dependents may present a claim petition for compensation" in case an agreement
is not achieved voluntarily. 48 Pa. Commw. at 255, 409 A.2d at 1188. An award was also
found to be especially in order in the case because of the clear entitlement to benefits the
deceased would have had had he filed, and because of the brief period between the injury
and death: "We fail to see how [claimant] could have been required or expected to file a
claim petition in her husband's behalf during that critical period." Id. at 256, 409 A.2d at
1188.
It should be noted that the commonwealth court has now ruled that, for disability or
other lifetime benefits to be recovered under Frederico Granero, the time between injury
and death is irrelevant. See Associated Town "N" Country Builders, Inc. v. Workmen's
505 A.2d 1358, 1360
Pa. Commw.
Compensation Appeal Bd (Marabito), (1986):
The compelling circumstances surrounding the claim . . . in Frederico Granero
• . . clearly influenced this court's decision. The claimant here did not allege compelling circumstances to explain her husband's failure to file a claim during his lifetime.
However, [the principle of liberal construction] requires that section 410 of the Act
allow a deceased employee's dependent to receive compensation without having to
demonstrate exigent circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted) (specific-loss claim).
292. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
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after the injury catalyzing the deceased's ultimate demise. This
represents a period of approximately nine years.
That the section 301(c)(1) limitation works as a bar in another
way is illustrated in Kujawa v. Latrobe Brewing Co. 29 3 In Kujawa,
the employee had filed a claim following a traumatic injury and
had received compensation for total disability for seven years; immediately after his death, the claimant's widow filed a fatal claim
petition.2 9"' Although the widow argued that the petition should be
viewed as one "for a continuation of the compensation payments
which had already been awarded for total disability, 2 95 the court
denied any award of benefits, holding that the "clear language of
[sjection 301(c)" acted as a bar.2 9e It is worth adding that, as in the
hypothetical described in the foregoing paragraph, section
301(c)(1) operates as a non-procedural limitation of the employer's
liability. Section 315 is the statute of limitations.
2. Death Claims Under Section 315 of the OccupationalDisease
Act; Interaction with Section 301(c)
The notion underlying the rule that a fatal claim petition seeking death benefits may be pursued even in lieu of any claim having
been filed before death is that the right of the widow (or other
dependents) to compensation is distinct from that of the employee.
In Smith v. Primrose Tapestry Co., 297 the case establishing the
rule under the workmen's compensation act, the court held that
this notion was compelled by the very structure of section 315,
which provides in separate portions for the limitation to be applied
in cases of injury or death.29 8
The same notion controls under the disease act. Thus, at an
early point it was held that the deceased worker's widow was entitled to compensation under a fatal claim petition notwithstanding
the fact that the worker had never filed a claim petition.2 99 The
293. 454 Pa. 165, 312 A.2d 411 (1973), afl'g 4 Pa. Commw. 599, 288 A.2d 847 (1972).
294. 454 Pa. at 166, 312 A.2d at 411-12.
295. Id. at 168, 312 A.2d at 412 (citing Toffalori v. Donatelli Granite Co., 157 Pa.
Super. 311, 43 A.2d 584 (1945)).
296. 454 Pa. at 170, 312 A.2d at 413.
297. 285 Pa. 145, 131 A. 703 (1926).
298. Id. at 149, 131 A. at 704 ("The limitation expressly named controls, and proceedings to be effective must be commenced within the time designated.").
299. See Holahan v. Bergen Coal Co., 164 Pa. Super. 177, 183, 63 A.2d 504, 507 (1949)
("Claimant had merely an inchoate right to compensation until her husband's death. At
that time her right accrued.") (holding also that no notice to employer was necessary).
It is arguable that the rule established in Smith under the workmen's compensation act
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same principle has led to the rule that the husband's mere filing of
a claim before his death will not allow the widow to amend the
latter beyond the applicable death claim period to include her
claim for death benefits; 0 0 because the fatal claim is separate and
distinct, the prior filing had no tolling effect. Nevertheless, where
the claimant fails to file a petition for benefits during his lifetime,
the court has indicated that the widow is entitled both to benefits
for lifetime disability and to death benefits, in cases where it is
clear that the deceased would have had a valid claim for disability
during his lifetime.30 1
and applied likewise under the disease act is at odds with the evidentiary purpose of statutes of limitations. Indeed, in Smith, this was a principal argument of the employer, who
was defending a death claim filed some three years after the injury-a relatively minor and
non-suspicious trauma which resulted in a fatal sarcoma. (The claim petition period at the
time was one year). 285 Pa. at 146-47, 131 A. at 703; see Brief for Appellant at 10, id.
("Instead of the employer being relieved of stale claims of a doubtful nature, there [would
be by the court's holding] foisted upon him a liability to answer with absolutely no means of
answer.
...).
Still, the apparent harshness of the rule vis-a-vis the employer is naturally mitigated to
some extent by the difficulty of obtaining credible medical testimony to support the concededly stale claim. See 285 Pa. at 150, 131 A. at 705 ("The forced delay naturally makes more
difficult the proof of the causal connection between the accident and death-a fact which
the claimant must affirmatively establish ....
"). Notwithstanding this mitigation, the employer's unsuccessful argument against the now taken for granted Smith rule still possesses
a credible ring:
The liability of the employer to pay and the right of employees and their dependents
to receive compensation is founded upon a[n] . . . agreement supplied by statute.
The facts essential to support a claim by the injured person are identical with those
necessary to support a claim by dependents of the injured person. The claim of the
dependents is thus the same as the claim of the injured person himself, namely, [a]
certain percentage of the injured person's [employee's] wages as compensation. The
statute relating to claims for personal injuries provides [under section 307, PA. STAT.
ANN., § 541 (Purdon 1952) (since repealed)] that the compensation "payable to his
dependents . . . shall be reduced by the period during which compensation was paid
to him in his lifetime." By the terms of the statute, therefore, the existence of a claim
by dependents to compensation for death following injury is dependent upon the
right of the injured person at the time of his death. . . . This provision . . . is evidence of an intention on the part of the legislature to consider as one claim, both
the right of the injured himself and [the right of] his dependents . . .
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Smith v. Primrose Tapestry Co., 285 Pa. 145, 131 A. 703 (1926)
(emphasis added).
300. See Moore v. Dodge Steel Co., 206 Pa. Super. 242, 247-48, 213 A.2d 130, 132-33
(1965). In Moore, the employee had filed a timely claim, but died before any hearings were
held. Although compensation was awarded for the period from his filing until his death, the
dependency claim was refused.
301. The rule differed in Flynn v. Asten Hill Mfg. Co., 34 Pa. Commw. 218, 223-24,
383 A.2d 255, 257-58 (1978). That case, however, was disavowed by the commonwealth court
in Frederico Granero, 48 Pa. Commw. 252, 409 A.2d 1187 (1980):
To the extent that Flynn. . . contain[s] language which may be construed as holding
that a dependent of a deceased employe who failed to file a claim during his lifetime,
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As under the workmen's compensation act, death claims under
the disease act are compensable only if they occur "within four
years after the date of.

.

.last employment in [the] occupation [in

which the deceased was exposed to the disease hazard]. 302 For disease-death claims under the workmen's compensation act, death
must occur within three hundred weeks of last exposure.30 3 In each
case, however, section 315 of the respective acts is the procedural
statute of limitations which controls after a determination is made
of whether the death did in fact occur within the applicable period.
The relationship between the two sections is especially important in the context of death claims. The "death occurrence" restrictions operate as strict bars, 3 04 and if death occurs beyond the
applicable length of time after last exposure, no claim will be successful, notwithstanding both a "timely" filing under the procedural sections and persuasive medical testimony of an early manifestation of the disease. 0
III.

SECTION 315 OF THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT; DISCOVERY
PROVISION OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

As discussed in a prior section of this article, the discovery rule
has been applied to the claim petition limitation of the occupational disease act.306 In addition, the 1972 amendments to the
workmen's compensation act brought recovery for disease disability within the act's parameters. The most peculiar aspect of that
legislative action was the failure to clearly establish the discovery
rule as applicable to such disease claims. Although the courts and
most commentators 80 7 were generally of the view that the rule was
may not file a claim thereafter ... the same is hereby disavowed.
Id. at 257 n.3, 409 A.2d at 1189 n.3. See also supra note 291.
302. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(c) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 301(c) of the Occupational Disease Act).
303. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 301(c)(2) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act).
304. See Shrum v. Atlantic Crushed Coke Co., 186 Pa. Super. 377, 142 A.2d 792
(1958); Wonderlick v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 170 Pa. Super. 65, 84 A.2d
233 (1951).
305. See Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp., 90 Pa. Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985). See
supra notes 185-220 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
307. Cf. STANDER, supra note 44, at 127. Cf. also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. 58, 60, 384 A.2d 1046, 1048 (1978).
In this non-statute of limitations case, the commonwealth court stated that
[wie have consistently held that the date of disability does not automatically coincide
with the date of final exposure, nor is it automatically the date on which the physi-
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to apply, this has only recently been conclusively established by
the commonwealth court in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
30 Thus, with
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Feiertag).
respect to treatment of the commencement of the two limitation
periods, the author will treat the sections together, as the discovery
rule of statutes of limitations operates in precisely the same fashion in the contexts of both statutes.
It should be noted as a preliminary matter that the importance
of the application of the discovery rule to the claim petition limitations is to a certain extent mitigated by the application of the rule
to the notice of injury provisions of the acts. 0 9 There has been
plentiful litigation with respect to the rule in the latter context, in
which this limitation commencement theory is now statutorily established.31 0 A practical result of this frequent application is that a
considerable body of law has evolved governing the nuances of
when an "employee knew or should have known" that he or she is
totally disabled due to a work-related ailment. Furthermore, because the commencement of both periods is governed by this same
subjective determination, disputes concerning the timeliness of a
discovery-rule governed claim petition are necessarily governed by
that same body of law. This is, perhaps, to state the obvious, because a prerequisite to any recovery is always that proper notice be
given to the employer. The issue of whether the claim petition has
been timely filed, vis-a-vis the discovery rule, is thus never reached
if a failure of notice is discerned."'
cian examines the Claimant and determines Claimant is disabled from an occupational disease. The date of disability must be determined independently on the facts
of each case.
Id. (citing Novak v. Mathies Coal Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 122, 370 A.2d 435 (1977)).
308. 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 579, 496 A.2d 412, 417-19 (1985):
We conclude that, in cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the
three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition under section 315 [of
the workmen's compensation act] commences at the time when the claimant knows,
or should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and that it
is caused by an occupational disease.
Id. (follows extensive review of Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 386 Pa.
179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956)).
309. See infra notes 496-521 and accompanying text.
310. See id. This latter statement is true only with respect to the workmen's compensation act; the rule, of course, evolved as a matter of statutory interpretation under the
disease act.
311. Put another way, if there is proper notice under the discovery rule, there is no
issue, vis-a-vis the discovery rule, with respect to timely filing.
The author will thus posit the following: application of the discovery rule to the notice
provision involves a case-by-case determination of when the claimant discovered his work-
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Claim Petition Discovery Provisions

Section 315 of the occupational disease act provides:
In cases of disability
unless, within sixteen
ties shall have agreed
unless, within sixteen
the parties shall have

all claims for compensation shall be forever barred,
months after compensable disability begins, the parupon the compensation payable under this article, or
months after compensable disability begins, one of
filed a [claim] petition .... 311

As discussed above, the term "compensable disability" is interpreted to mean a subjective awareness of total disability stemming
from occupational disease-it does not indicate a partial disability
or even objective total disability.3 13 Most modern disease claims,
however, are not governed by this latter provision, but by the last
clause of section 315 of the workmen's compensation act, which
provides that
in cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation in which the nature of
the injury or its relationship is not known to the employe, the time for filing
a claim shall not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should know of the existence of the injury and its pos4
sible relationship to his employment."

A close reading of the statute leaves one with the impression
that this discovery rule codification was to apply only to injuries
stemming from radiation hazards. Feiertag, however, has conclusively put to rest the notion that the rule is to be so limited. 15 At
related malady; application of the discovery rule to the claim limitation involves a one-time
legal declaration with respect to when the limitation period commences.
312. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1415 (Purdon Supp. 1985). See also Leibman & Dworkin,
Time Limitations Under State Occupational Disease Acts, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1985), for
the most comprehensive survey and discussion of the various state disease act limitation
provisions. Interestingly, however, the authors seem to be unaware that the Pennsylvania
scheme includes the discovery rule. See generally id. at 324-25.
313. See supra notes 113-14.
314. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
315. The issue was squarely addressed by the litigants. Noting that the notice provision of the act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 631 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 311 of the Workmen's Compensation Act), does indicate that the discovery rule is to apply to injuries from
ionizing radiation "or any other cause," (id., emphasis added), the employer argued that
"[tihe statutory distinction between Section 311 and Section 315 would indicate that the
extension only applies to ionizing radiation cases and not occupational disease cases." Brief
for Petitioner at 12, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Feiertag), 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 496 A.2d 412 (1985). The claimant argued that the concept
underlying Ciabattoni should be applied under the injury act, noting, importantly, that
outside the workmen's compensation act context the discovery rule "was not derived from
and did not depend upon language of a particular statute but was instead a judicially
created rule generally applicable to all statutes of limitation and to all cases when injury or
its cause was not immediately evident." Brief for Respondent at 8-9 in id. (citing, inter alia,
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the same time, however, the holding of Feiertag is itself narrow.
We conclude that, in cases of total disability due to an occupational disease, the three-year period in which a claimant must file a claim petition
under Section 315 . . . commences at the time when a claimant knows, or
should have known through reasonable diligence, of his or her disability and
6
that it is caused by an occupational disease.

B.

Purpose of the Limitation

It has not gone unnoticed that application of the discovery rule
is at odds with both the evidentiary and "personal certainty" purposes of statutes of limitations.3 17 In claims seeking recovery for
occupational disease, the disability will of course be present at the
time the claim is made, and hence receptive to a current verification, but evidence shedding light on its work-related character may
well have become diminished in existence or quality.3 1 8 Likewise,
the raising of claims at various unpredictable times following the
termination of employment by members of an employer's
workforce reflects the lack of personal (or insurance carrier) cer31 9
tainty wrought by application of the discovery rule.
Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 95, 425 A.2d 428, 432 (1980) [rev'd, 496 Pa. 119,
436 A.2d 181 (1981)]).
316. 90 Pa. Commw. at 579, 496 A.2d at 419.
The narrow holding of Feiertagwas necessitated chiefly by the reasoning employed by the
court in the opinion in order to avoid the restrictive language of the section 315 discovery
rule codification. Rather than read into the statute language directing that the discovery
rule was to apply to disease claims, the court instead imputed to the operation of the limitation the discovery rule as judicially applied to the disease act limitation in Ciabattoni v.
Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 386 Pa. 179, 182, 125 A.2d 365, 367 (1956). See Feiertag, 90 Pa. Commw. at 576-79, 496 A.2d at 417-18. By way of this application, the section
315 limitation, which refers only to radiation injuries as receptive to discovery rule treatment, could be totally avoided. Indeed, in response to the employer's argument that the
restrictive section 315 discovery rule demonstrated that disease claims were not covered, see
supra note 315, the court indicated that section 315 was irrelevant. Id. at 577 n.13, 496 A.2d
at 418 n.13.
The problem with this reasoning, of course, is that the legislature, by including one form
of injury as receptive to the discovery rule, surely must be viewed to have intended to exclude all others. Latella v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 74 Pa. Commw.
14, 30, 459 A.2d 464, 473 (1983) ("where certain things are specifically designated in a statute, all omissions should be understood as exclusions."). In addition, it is questionable
whether Ciabattoni should have played any role in the construction of legislation which
already possessed a codified discovery rule.
317. See Kelley, supra note 245, at 545. Professor Kelley notes, however, that the rule
"is arguably consistent with the diligence purpose, since a prospective claimant justifiably
ignorant of the facts supporting his legal right is not 'sleeping on his rights' by not suing."
Id.
318. See, e.g., id. at 626.
319. For an example, see supra note 246.
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The rationale for the application of the discovery rule, offered in
both Ciabattoni v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co. 320 and
Feiertag, that the legislature could not possibly have intended to
bar claims the presence of which could not be discerned,3 2' is not
particularly satisfying in response to the concerns engendered by
traditional statute of limitations purposes.32 2 This approach seems
at odds, likewise, with a plain reading of the statute.2 3 Indeed, in
Pennsylvania, where the legislature was surely aware of the prior
discovery-rule interpretation of section 315 of the disease act, it
would have made sense that when recovery for disease was to become available under the workmen's compensation act, the legislature would have clearly codified the discovery rule in expansive
32
terms had it intended the rule to apply in such a manner. 1
Nevertheless, the court's answer is satisfying if one is to recognize the general rule that a cause of action does not accrue until all
of its elements are present. 2 5 A limitation statute, in turn, can
only begin to run after this accrual, and it may be viewed as unfair
to consider this point as other than when the potential claimant is
fully aware of the nature of his ailment. This notion is present, if
not specifically articulated, in Ciabattoniand Feiertag.The logical
conceptual outcome of recognition of this rule is that the discovery
rule does not in fact constitute a deviation from the principles of
statute of limitations construction, 32 at least when applied to inju320. 386 Pa. 179, 125 A.2d 365 (1956).
321. For Ciabattoni, see id. at 184-85, 125 A.2d at 367-69; for Feiertag,see 90 Pa.
Commw. at 577-78, 496 A.2d at 417-18.
322. See Kelley, supra note 245, at 546.
323. Cf. id. at 601 (noting that "[it] is hard to see how the word 'injury' can mean
'discovery of injury.' ").
324. This argument may safely be said, however, to be dead after Feiertag.
325. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1200-01.
326. See Note, supra note 107, at 516-19. See also id. at 523:
The "discovery rule" is... not an exception on policy grounds to the general rule
of accrual in tort actions. It is rather an application of a basic principle of tort recovery involving non-traumatic injuries. Latent injuries . . . are no longer unusual; and
latent injury claims should not be denied protection simply because the injury involved does not fit a traditional conception of injury.
Id.
We may recall at this point that the Ciabattoniand Feiertagcourts had to overcome the
notion that the disease limitations were not simple statutes of limitations but were instead
statutes of repose. The Ciabattonicourt, at least, was of the view that such characterization
would necessitate that the point of first objective disability be the commencement point of
the limitation period. Determined to apply the discovery rule, the court felt compelled to
discard the notion that the limitation was a statute of repose. This was a misconception; the
discovery rule and the statute of repose theory are entirely compatible. See supra notes 11516 and accompanying text.
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ries which are truly insidious, and which merit application of this
subjective standard.
If the foregoing explanation vindicates application of the rule,
the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine with the evidentiary
and personal certainty purposes of the statutes of limitations remains. Professor Kelley has seized upon this problem and reached
conclusions which may well lessen the degree of inconsistency,"2 7
although these conclusions are only as satisfying as one's own philosophical notions regarding workmen's compensation, and are to a
great extent reliant upon certain economic and factual
assumptions.
First, Kelley argues that, while application of the discovery rule
may cause evidentiary prejudice to the employer, the latter
concern
is relatively unimportant in a workmen's compensation system, since the
"evil" to be prevented-compensation for non-work-related disabilities-is
not much of an evil within that system. Furthermore, the proposed remedy
for that evil-wholesale preclusion of both valid and invalid late
claims-denies compensation to many deserving claimants, thus frustrating
38
the purpose of the workmen's compensation system. 2

Second, Kelley suggests that the presumed sophistication of the
administrative tribunal (the referee in Pennsylvania) should naturally protect it from the fraudulent claims which may arise under a
rule which allows claims to be asserted long after the claimant's
separation from the environment alleged to have caused the compensable ailment. In support of this assertion, the commentator offers the not unreasonable analogy of the liberal treatment of evidence in the workmen's compensation system: 29 "insofar as the
[evidentiary] purpose of limitation provisions derives from the
same source as the exclusionary rules of evidence-the need to
control the kinds of evidence submitted to a jury-the [relaxation
of the rules of evidence] . . . apply with equal force to support
elimination of the limitations bar."3 30
327.
328.

Kelley, supra note 245.
Id. at 627.

329. Id. at 628 ("Presumably, the administrative agency is a more sophisticated
factfinder than the jury and does not need to be protected from the possibility of naive
reliance on untrustworthy evidence .... The evidentiary purpose of limitation provisions
thus retains some, although perhaps lessened, importance in a workmen's compensation
system.").

330. This is the rule applied in Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 834 (Purdon
Supp. 1985) (Section 422 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). See also Webster v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.(234, Inc. & S.Q. Corp.),

-

Pa. Commw.

-

,

-

, 499
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Finally, Kelley points to a study which "failed to establish a statistically significant correlation between insurance costs and either
the length of the limitations period or the harsh 'accident' provision [which precluded any discovery rule application]."' s " Instead,
the study demonstrated that the difference in insurance premiums
was due principally to benefit levels. The unpersuasive suggestion
implicit in this finding is that application of the discovery rule to
statutes of limitations-action which is often said to wreak havoc
to the ability of insurers to estimate their liabilities properly-is
merited from an economic point of view, since such application
ap3 32
significantly.
levels
premium
affect
not
does
parently
The pragmatic difficulties, philosophic objections, and questionable economic assumptions inherent in these attempts to mitigate
the importance of limitations in workmen's compensation schemes
are perhaps obvious; and, indeed, the commentator to a great extent anticipates his critics. 333 An extended treatment of those diffiA.2d 1117, 1119-20 (1985).
331. Kelley, supra note 245, at 628.
332. Id. at 629 n.356 (citing J. BURTON, THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CAUSES OF THE INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN THE EMPLOYER'S COSTS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1965)). Professor

Kelley, whose article was published in 1974, notes that this study did not involve the use of
limitation variables as originally undertaken. The conclusion referred to in the accompanying text was the result of a second study. See id.
Notwithstanding these findings, insurers charge that application of the discovery rule is
incompatible with rational insurance schemes, arguing (1) that retroactiveapplication of the
rule especially renders the premium charged the employer non-reflective of ultimate insurance carrier liability and (2) that, in general, reserves are difficult to measure and uncertainty is encountered in deciding whether or not to close an employer's account. See generally Kelley, supra note 245, at 551 & n.30; see also KAKALIK & SHANLEY, supra note 246, at
6. For a discussion of insurance reserves which may bring the concern into focus, see generally Houser & Zuck, InsuranceClaim Reserves: Are They Admissible?, 52 INS. COUNS. J. 152,
153-54 (1985), See also Murris, The Insurance Reserve, 1966 FED. INS. COUNS. Q. 34. Once
the discovery rule is established as applying to a particular limitation, however, the only real
objection of insurers is with respect to the latter concern. The increased liability caused by
the application of the discovery rule is easily dealt with by insurers simply by raising premiums. Application of this subjective standard is, thus, in the end a concern principally for
employers, not insurers.
333. In summary, Professor Kelley recognizes (1) that the workmen's compensation
scheme, while remedial legislation, was not intended to embrace a general social insurance
system with totally open-ended employer liability; (2) that even "'sophisticated' administrative agencies may make mistakes at times .... ";(3) that although the insurance cost of
a relaxed statute of limitations is itself not overburdening, that notion cannot be repeatedly
invoked in the face of economic realities. See Kelley, supra note 245, at 627-29.
With respect to this latter concern, Professor Kelley-notwithstanding his enthusiasm for
a broad discovery rule-warns of the possible repercussions of indifference to the economic
realities of the unrestrained application of the rule, repercussions which lawmakers of both
the legislature and judiciary should recognize in their future decisions with respect to application of the doctrine to new forms of injury alleged to be insidious in development:
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culties is not undertaken here in light of the fact that the discovery
rule has, especially with Feiertag,been securely established under
the Pennsylvania act. The foregoing observations may well be crucial, however, in considering the extent to which the discovery rule
is to be applied under the act outside the disease realm, as the
nature of injuries for which compensation is sought and awarded
continues to change from the traditional traumatic injuries of the
industrial workplace to those which are alleged to be latent in de3 34
velopment or, in any case, difficult to discern.
C.

Necessity to "Plead" the Limitations

Given the oft-repeated statement that application of the discovery rule to the limitation periods deprive these statutes of their
incremental cost arguments in compensation schemes may be treacherous, for repeated successful applications of the same argument can lead to a system in which
costs become more oppressive, causing continued inflation in the price of goods and
services and drawing away risk capital needed to keep the private enterprise system
itself alive and healthy.
Id. at 69.
334. The two principal injury types encompassed in this change are emotional injuries
and those alleged to have developed from aggravations of pre-existing work-related and nonwork-related ailments. Both of these forms of injury are increasingly popular subjects of
claims, and court panels have demonstrated an unmistakeable willingness to facilitate recovery. See generally Comment, Mental Stimulus Causing Mental Disability: Compensability
Under the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 375 (1985); Comment, Workers' Compensation And Gradual Stress in the Workplace, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
847 (1985). See also generally Richman, Struggle for Reason and Accountability: Current
Concepts of Causation, Aggravation and Substantial Evidence in Occupational Disease
Claims, 90 DICK. L. REV. 363, 375-80 (1985). Because these injury types generally do not
accrue from sudden, obvious traumas, they are often said to be potentially receptive to the
discovery rule as the applicable standard to govern the commencement of the statute of
limitations.
The wisdom of expanding the discovery rule to such injuries may be questioned on a
number of grounds. Currently acting as a bar, of course, is section 315 itself, which limits
application of the discovery rule to disease claims and those stemming from radiationcaused injuries. See infra notes 388-84 and accompanying text. Should it be determined
that that rather formidable bar is to be overcome, however, it is submitted that some degree
of prudence be exercised in determining which injuries are truly so insidious that the discovery rule is properly applicable. It may be questioned, for example, whether a back injury
suffered due to work-place aggravations of a pre-existing ailment in fact possesses such a
hidden environmental cause or medical etiology that the claimant should receive the benefit
of this subjective standard, especially in the presence of an already generous traditional
statute of limitations. It is far from clear that such an employee, who is "hurting" in the
course of his work duties is incurring an injury even remotely analogous to the insidious
diseases properly governed by the discovery rule.
The foregoing, of course, is only one example of the type of injuries which are becoming
more "common" and may well receive discovery rule treatment in the future. It is submitted, however, that the nature of these new injuries must be studied from a medical and
practical standpoint before new open-ended liabilities are imposed upon employers.
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"statute of repose" character, it would be logical to expect that,
concomitantly with that deprivation, the rule would be that the
limitation was waived if not included in the employer's initial answer. 3 5 This is, however, not the rule under Commonwealth v.
Brown.336 In Brown, the defendant had failed to raise the limitation provision in its answer to the claimant's petition;13 3 nevertheless, the court went on to consider the defense, citing a pre-Ciabattoni case for the proposition that the disease act section 315 "is
not a mere technical statute of limitations, but is a statute of repose . . . [which] need not be specially pleaded to be enforced." 3 8
There is, in addition, no reason to believe that this is not the
rule applied to claims brought under the discovery-rule-governed
limitation of the workmen's compensation act.3 9
D. Interaction of ProceduralDiscovery Provisions and
Substantive Disease Manifestation Time Restrictions
In Kilvady v. U.S. Steel Corp.,34 0 the commonwealth court properly rejected the notion that the discovery rule had any application
to section 301(c) of the occupational disease act.3 4 ' Although the
case arose in the context of a death claim, Kilvady should be read
as re-affirming in all contexts the notion that the section is a substantive provision affecting the right to compensation.3 42 Thus, the
interaction of sections 301(c) of both acts, vis-a-vis the procedural
limitations thereof, can be safely said to continue as has always
been understood.
That interaction can be summarized as follows. Section 301(c) of
the disease act provides that, for a disease to be compensable, it
must result "from occupational disease[,1 and occur[] within four
years after the date of [the claimant's] last employment in [the
335. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
336. 16 Pa. Commw. 148, 329 A.2d 541 (1974).
337. Id. at 154, 329 A.2d at 544.
338. Id. at 154, 329 A.2d at 544-45 (quoting Reichert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 Pa.
Super. 213, 221, 40 A.2d 158, 161 (1944)). See also supra notes 118-19 and accompanying
text.
339. Feiertag justified application of the discovery rule to disease claim petitions
under the workmen's compensation act on precisely the same grounds as Ciabattoni. See
supra note 315-16 and accompanying text. There is no logical reason to believe that cases
decided under section 315 of the disease act dealing with matters such as waiver-decided
in full recognition of Ciabattoni-arenot applicable with respect to the workmen's compensation act.
340. 90 Pa. Commw. 586, 496 A.2d 116 (1985).
341. Id. at 592, 496 A.2d at 119.
342. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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occupation in which he was exposed to the disease hazard]. '343 The
correlative section for disease recovery under the workmen's compensation act is the same, but the period has been expanded to
three hundred weeks.34" The respective limits do not necessarily
"run" from the last day of work in such occupation or industry,
but from the last point of exposure to the disease hazard.34 5
The substantive disease manifestation time restrictions do not
procedurally limit a disease disability claim. This is aptly illustrated in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Segzda, 3 "6 in which the
claimant became aware of his occupational disease a full eight
years after his last exposure. At that time, he immediately filed a
valid claim under the discovery rule of the disease act section 315.
The claim was ultimately unsuccessful, but only because of the
pragmatic difficulty of obtaining current medical testimony that
the disability had occurred within four years after the last
3 4,7
exposure.
The disease manifestation time restrictions and the claim limitation provisions of the respective acts thus operate independently; a
claim is presumptively valid whenever filed within the applicable
period following the discovery of the occupational disease.
Whether the disease manifestation restrictions are satisfied is a
matter not of timeliness in a procedural sense, but rather one of
securing the appropriate medical testimony that the disease mani348
fested itself within the applicable period.
E.

Death Claims and the Discovery Rule
34 9
In Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Chobanian, it
was established that the discovery rule had no application to death
claims brought under section 315 of the disease act.3 50 Thus, in
343.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(c) (Purdon Supp. 1985).
344, Id. § 411(2) (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 301(c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act).
345. See Gray v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 4 Pa. Commw. 590, 593-94, 288 A.2d 828, 82930 (1972). See also Gawlick v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 178 Pa. Super. 149, 151, 113 A.2d 346,
348 (1955) (death claim case). See also BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 7.23(1), at 72-73.
346. 4 Pa. Commw. 498, 287 A.2d 708 (1972). See supra note 218-20 and accompanying text.
347. Id. at 502-06, 287 A.2d at 709-12.
348. A matter which, in its own right, acts as a limit of sorts on the possibility of
recovery. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Segzda, 4 Pa. Commw. 498, 287 A.2d 708
(1972); Peron v. Phoenix Park Coal Co., 202 Pa. Super. 495, 498-99, 198 A.2d 370, 371-72
(1964).
349. 19 Pa. Commw. 632, 339 A.2d 126 (1975).
350. For the relevant statutory language, see supra note 312.
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Chobanian, where the claimant's deceased died on December 21,
1971, but it was only discovered some twenty months later that the
death was due to an occupational disease, the claim was barred.35 1
Had the discovery rule been applied the claim would have been
successful, because the death had occurred within four years of the
deceased's last exposure as required under the disease act section
301(c).3 52

There is every reason to believe that this is the rule under section 315 of the workmen's compensation act. First, the Chobanian
court rested its decision on the fact that the provision's language
governing death claims was specific, 53 leaving no room for application of the discovery rule. Under section 315 of the workmen's
compensation act, which now governs most disease death claims,
the language is equally specific. 354 Further, when the discovery rule
was in effect codified in the latter section, the legislature clearly
3 55
limited its application to injuries.
Finally, the Feiertag court's
affirmation that the discovery rule had a pervasive application to
section 315 was couched narrowly, and does not go beyond the limited reasoning of Ciabattoni and its progeny.3 5e
F. Application of Claim Petition Discovery Rule to NonDisease Claims
Taking into account the intrinsic soundness of the discovery rule
351. 19 Pa. Commw. at 633, 339 A.2d at 127. See also Brief for Appellant at 5-6,
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Chobanian, 19 Pa. Commw. 632, 339 A.2d 126
(1975) ("the testimony of the appellant clearly shows that it was not until July 1973 when
she received from her husband's employer and physician the documentary information
which would enable her to know that she had reason to file a claim petition.").
352. Referee's Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 5, reproduced in Brief for Appellant at 49a,
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Chobanian, 19 Pa. Commw. 632, 339 A.2d 126
(1975) (deceased's last exposure was Dec. 16, 1971; death occurred Dec. 21, 1971).
353. 19 Pa. Commw. at 635, 339 A.2d at 127. The court in so holding rejected the
claimant's argument that the Ciabattoni reasoning should apply, although it is not totally
clear that the statutory language relied upon in that case was particularly suggestive of a
discovery rule commencement point. See supra note 323.
354. For the statutory language, see supra note 227.
355. See generally infra notes 357-92 and accompanying text.
356. In the alternative, the court could have applied the reasoning applied by Judge
Spaeth in Anthony v. Koppers Co., 284 Pa. Super. 81, 95, 425 A.2d 428, 436 (1980) ("the
discovery rule. . . is not derived from, and does not depend upon, the language of a particular statute ....
"), rev'd, 496 Pa. 119, 436 A.2d 181 (1981). See also 496 Pa. at 124, 436
A.2d at 185 (O'Brien, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to majority's declaration that "the statute
of limitations [in a wrongful death case] runs in a vacuum, impervious to the considerations
which would accompany the decision whether or not to invoke the discovery rule."). Had the
court done so, or if it decides to follow such a course in the future, it may well be that the
rule could apply in death cases.
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and the relative receptiveness of Pennsylvania courts to its application, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the rule would
experience broad application to all injuries which possess periods
of latency or arguably elusive etiologies. This has not, however,
been the case. It is important to note in this respect that the possible harsh results which might result from this omission are to a
great extent mitigated by a broad application of the rule to the
notice of injury provision.57 Thus, a heart attack victim, for example, who becomes disabled but is unaware of the cardiologic nature
of his injury, will not be barred from recovery as long as notice is
given within 120 days of his discovery of his heart attack and its
work-related character. 358 Given the nature of heart attacks, the
acquisition of such knowledge should usually take place well within
the three-year claim petition limitation, even when that limitation
is running from the date of the actual infarction; a reasonably diligent claimant in such circumstances should thus have adequate
time to file a claim, even without the benefit of the discovery rule
3 59
marking the commencement of the limitation period.
The narrow application of the discovery rule does, in some cases,
work to preclude claims for latent injuries. This is amply reflected
in Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Niemann.3 ' 0 The
claimant in this case, a nurse, had been struck in the face by a
deranged patient, and had been treated by her employer for her
facial injuries." 1 Although the pain from the assault subsided, she
continued to have pain in other parts of her body. 2 Due to arguably poor medical diagnoses, the claimant's physician attributed
this latter pain to a pre-existing heart condition. 3 At a point well
beyond the applicable claim limitation period, however, the claimant discovered that her ailment was due to a herniated disc in her
neck suffered in the course of the original incident. 64 The ensuing
tardily-filed claim petition was thus barred, notwithstanding her
prompt filing after the "discovery" of the nature of the injury. The
357. The rule is broadly codified under the notice provision. See infra text accompanying note 393.
358. See, e.g., E.J.T. Const., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47 Pa.
Commw. 492, 493-95, 408 A.2d 226, 227-28 (1979) (E.J.T. I).
359. In such circumstances the claim petition often also serves as notice to the
employer.
360. 24 Pa. Commw. 377, 356 A.2d 370 (1976).
361. Id. at 378, 356 A.2d at 371.
362. Id. at 379, 356 A.2d at 371.
363. Id. at 379 & 380 n.2, 356 A.2d at 371 & n.2, 372.
364. Id. at 380, 356 A.2d at 372.
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commonwealth court, though acknowledging that the facts of the
case were indeed hard,"6 ' rejected any application of the discovery
rule, refusing to adopt the correlative interpretation of the limita3 6
tion applicable in medical malpractice actions.
It is worthwhile to note that the claim in Niemann was governed
by section 315 of the workmen's compensation act before that provision was amended to include a discovery rule.36 7 That latter inclusion, however, does not appear to have made any difference
with respect to non-disease claims. Indeed, in D'Andrea v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,sa 8 a case governed by the
amended act,3 69 the Niemann court's rejection of the malpractice
rule was cited with approval, 370 although the circumstances of
371
D'Andrea are not parallel with Niemann in all respects.
That the Niemann rejection survives sub silentio under the
amended act is reflected in Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation
37
Appeal Board (State Correctional Institute at Graterford),
' a
case which, like Niemann, demonstrates that failure to apply the
discovery rule does limit certain claims for latent injuries, notwith365. Id. at 378 & n.1, 356 A.2d at 371 & n.1 (citing J. Adams, Argument in Defense of
the British Soldiers in the Boston Massacre Trials [December 1770], quoted in BARTLE'r's
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 380 (15th ed. 1980) ("Facts are stubborn things: and whatever may be
our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of
facts and evidence.")).
366. 24 Pa. Commw. at 386, 356 A.2d at 375 (citing Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 48 A.2d 120 (1946), and rejecting application of the rule in Ayers
v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959)).
367. The assault in Niemann occurred on April 14, 1969. 24 Pa. Commw. at 378, 356
A.2d at 371. The discovery rule amendment was effective as of May 1, 1972. See Act of Mar.
29, 1972, P.L. 25, No. 61, § 27.
368. 39 Pa. Commw. 55, 394 A.2d 1086 (1978). See also Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.) Pa. Commw. -, 509 A.2d 945
(1986) (scope of discovery rule in amended section 315 is limited to injury expressly provided therein).
369. The injury occurred on Apr. 30, 1973. Id. at 56 n.1, 394 A.2d at 1086 n.1.
370. Id. at 57, 394 A.2d at 1087.
371. D'Andrea involves rather complicated facts, although the ultimate holding is
rather simple. In short, the court held that the section 315 limitation ran from the date of
the claimant's work-related trauma, notwithstanding the fact that disability was only manifested after a subsequent incident at home. This incident, it was alleged, would not have
occurred but for the work-related trauma. The claimant had argued that the limitation
should run from the time of the incident occurring at home, in which case the claim would
have been timely filed. Under the court's holding the petition was dismissed as untimely
filed, since asserted beyond the applicable period following the work-related trauma. As was
the case in Niemann, the court pointed out, there was "only one compensable accident"
from which to gauge the running of the limitation period, notwithstanding later related developments. See 39 Pa. Commw. at 58, 356 A.2d at 1087.
372. Pa. Commw. -,
499 A.2d 694 (1985).
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standing application of the rule in the notice of injury context. In
Riddick, the claimant, a prison guard, suffered substantial physical
injuries in the course of breaking up a fight among a group of inmates. 3 The claimant's disability was initially uncontested, and
he received total disability benefits for over a year; later, compensation was terminated and then again instituted, at all times the
claim being based on the physical injuries incurred in the attack.37 4 More than three years after the incident, the claimant filed
a petition alleging total disability due to his emotional state, which
was alleged to have resulted from the attack.7 5 Considering the
petition as one for an original injury,3 7 6 the court concluded that
the claim would be barred:
Although the referee also expressed an alternative limitation starting date
on the theory that the three years would not begin to run until the date on
which the claimant became aware of the fact of the job-related mental disability, the claimant, the board, and the employer all agree that the starting
date for the statute of limitations, unlike that with respect to3 7the notice
period, is not related to the time of discovery of the disability.

The court went on to remand the case, however, noting that if the
claim were interpreted as one for "review" of the prior award it
would be timely, since the last payment on that prior award had
been made well within the three-year period.378
In addition to difficult or misdiagnosis cases (Niemann) and latent emotional injuries (Riddick), other types of claims are also
precluded due to the discovery rule's limited application. It may be
safely said, for example, that whenever there is any discernible
trauma the discovery rule will not apply. Thus, in Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board v. Paris Neckwear,379 the notice discovery rule was held not to apply where the alleged injury was a
373.

Id. at

-,

499 A.2d at 695.

-,

499 A.2d at 695-97.

374. Id.
375. Id.
376.

Id. at

377. Id at -, 499 A.2d at 696 (citing Niemann, 24 Pa. Commw. 377, 356 A.2d 370
(1976)). It is worth noting, however, that the discovery rule does apply in the notice context.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 457, 423
A.2d 784, 788 (1980).
It may well be argued that the court in Riddick was not holding that the discovery rule
does not apply in mental disability cases, but was merely abiding by the appeal board's and
litigants' view that this was the law. There is, however, little doubt that the apparent "legal
stipulation" adopted by the court in Riddick is the rule, given the limited scope of the
section 315 discovery rule.
378.

-

Pa. Commw. at

-,

499 A.2d at 697-98.

379. 22 Pa. Commw. 543, 350 A.2d 212 (1976).
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herniated disc, symptoms of which had developed at work in the
course of physical work activities.38 0 Although the claimant had
immediately stopped work, the herniated disc diagnosis was only
arrived at later, with the actual notice conveyed well beyond the
120-day limit from the time of her injury.381 Reversing the appeal
board's holding that the discovery rule was applicable in such a
situation, 82 the court pointed to the wording of the statute as supplying an example of the type of injury-one caused by radiation-to which the notice provision discovery rule was intended to
apply. 383 The distinction made is between those injuries which are
truly insidious in nature, and those catalyzed by a particular
trauma, or, under the facts of Paris Neckwear, by a strain catalyzing immediately discernible injury. Although the case is concededly
one considering the notice discovery rule, the rejection of the rule
to such an injury in the notice context demonstrates its necessary
inapplicability under the more limited discovery rule of the claim
384
petition limitation.
Nor is the discovery rule applicable in cases of initially undetected aggravations of pre-existing injuries. In Young v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 5' for example, the workmen's compensation
appeal board rejected the claimant's contention that, because he
only became aware that his work duties had aggravated his nonwork-related back condition after the limitation period had run, it
would be improper to hold that a claim for the injury would be
barred; the claimant had argued, in contrast, that the discovery
rule should apply. Rejecting this contention, the appeal board, cit380. Id. at 544, 350 A.2d at 213.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 544-46, 350 A.2d at 213-14.
383. Id. at 546, 350 A.2d at 214.
384. See generally infra notes 496-508 and accompanying text.
385. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. Decision (Dckt. No. A-83966, dated Oct.
27, 1983) (unreported), a/I'd sub. nom. Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.), Pa. Commw. , 509 A.2d 945 (1986). In Young the
court made clear that the statutory discovery rule language of section 315 precluded application of the rule to an aggravation-type injury. This necessarily indicates a conviction by
the commonwealth court that only injuries stemming from radiation will receive discovery
rule treatment.
It is interesting to recognize that the Young decision, because based on statutory grounds,
does not address the issue of whether an aggravation injury is truly of such an insidious or
hidden character that discovery rule treatment is merited in this context. As is submitted in
other portions of this article, any decision to apply the discovery rule to "new" injuries
should take into account the nature of the involved injury from a medical/scientific and
practical viewpoint. The mere averment from a claimant that he discovered the injury at a
late point should not govern the decision. See also supra note 334; infra note 409.
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ing Niemann,38 noted that the rule was inapplicable to such a
claim, reaffirming instead the established rule that the limitation
7
was to run from the last date of employment.11
It is submitted that application of the discovery rule to any
claim petition alleging anything other than occupational disease
(or injury due to radiation) would be improper. First, to do so
would be in clear disregard of section 315's clear statutory language; 3 8 indeed, it took thirteen years for a court to overcome the
limited language of the claim petition discovery rule and declare,
in Feiertag,8 9 that the rule was to apply in disease claims. Significantly, that predictable and correct declaration was undertaken in
the most conservative tones, with the court relying on the old
Ciabattoni reasoning rather than adopting a discovery rule encompassing injuries such as those discussed above.
Other analogies seeking establishment of a general discovery rule
which depend upon current application of the rule in the context
of disease claims are similarly imperfect. With respect to disease
claims, it must be kept in mind that another limitation, sections
301(c) of the two acts, is in place to limit the employer's contingent
liability.39 By way of these disease manifestation provisions, the
evidentiary purpose of the statute of limitations is not as weakened
by application of the discovery rule as that purpose might otherwise be. No such additional safeguard exists to protect the employer in case of application of the rule outside the disease context.
Judicial analogizing, furthermore, to practices outside the workmen's compensation system is not unreasonable, but is likewise imperfect. At its inception and in present times, workmen's compensation constitutes the result of an unspoken bargain between
employer and employee. 9 1 The elements of that bargain which
bear directly upon the employer's liability can and should be arrived at by way of legislative consideration and action; thus, if a
386. Id. at 2.
387. See Beaver Supermarket v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa.
Commw. 505, 424 A.2d 1023 (1981) (allocatur denied). See also Divine Providence Hosp. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 75 Pa. Commw. 565, 462 A.2d 917 (1983).
388. See supra text accompanying note 314; supra note 385.
389. 90 Pa. Commw. 567, 496 A.2d 412 (1985). As discussed, however, the Feiertag
court bypassed section 315 of the workmen's compensation act and applied the discovery
rule by way of imputing to the limitation an old disease act case. See supra note 316. Feiertag, then, is not authority for the proposition that the discovery rule, as codified in section
315 of the workmen's compensation act, applies to injuries beyond those resulting from
radiation.
390. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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"discovery" rule is to apply at all beyond its current parameters,
that expansion should be arrived at by way of amendment to the
workmen's compensation act, not by way of extraterritorial judicial
analogizing to the realm of general tort law.
Finally, it may be argued that the broad codification of the discovery rule in the notice context already represents an equitable
balance between the right of claimants to recover for arguably latent, 9 2 non-disease claims, and the need for employers and their
insurance carriers to gain freedom from unpredictable incurrences
of liability.
IV.

SECTION 311-NOTICE OF INJURY LIMITATION

A.

Notice Requirement Provisions

Whether a timely notice of injury has been given by the claimant
is governed by three separate provisions. These sections, 311, 312,
and 313, are found in both the workmen's compensation and occupational disease acts, and are fairly precise correlates. Most claims
for both injury and disease, however, are governed currently by the
provisions of the workmen's compensation act.
Section 311 provides the time limitation, and, as apparent, possesses a discovery rule intended to be applied broadly:
Unless the employer shall have knowledge of the occurrence of the injury,
or unless the employe or someone in their behalf ...

shall give notice

thereof to the employer within twenty-one days after the injury, no compensation shall be due until such notice be given, and, unless such notice be
given within [1201 days after the occurrence of the injury, no compensation
shall be allowed. However, in cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation or any other cause in which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not known to the employe, the time for giving
notice shall not begin to run until the employe knows, or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment. The term "injury" [includes] disabil9
ity resulting from occupational disease.3 s
392. See, e.g., infra note 409.
393. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 631 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Section 311 of the disease act
provides as follows:
Unless the employe or someone in his behalf, or some of his dependents or someone
in their behalf, shall give notice of disability to the employer liable for compensation
under this article, within twenty-one days after compensable disability begins, no
compensation shall be due until such notice be given, and unless such notice be given
within [1201 days after the beginning of compensable disability no compensation shall
be allowed.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1411 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 311 of the Occupational Disease
Act). Compensable disability in the latter provision has been interpreted as indicating the
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Section 312, in turn, provides for the form of notice required:
"The notice referred to in section [311] shall inform the employer
that a certain employe received an injury, described in ordinary
language, in the course of his employment on or about a specified
time, at or near a place specified. 3 94 Because the employer is required to be informed not only that an injury has occurred, but
also of its work-related character,""5 the latter provision and the
cases construing it have been referred to as dealing with the "quality" of notice. 96
Finally, section 313 codifies an agency rule, establishing that notice to certain of the employer's agents will be imputed to the
employer:
The notice referred to in sections [311 and 312] may be given to the immediate or other superior of the employer, or any agent of the employer
regularly employed at the place of employment of the injured employe.
Knowledge of the occurrence of injury on the part of any such agents shall
be the knowledge of the employer. 9

These sections have been subject to considerable interpretation,
notwithstanding the apparent comprehensiveness of the foregoing
scheme. That interpretation is discussed in the following sections.
B. Notice: Characterof the Rule and Nature of the Defense
Pending the verification of the date of an employee's injury, it is
not difficult to ascertain whether a claim petition has been timely
filed, since the date of actual receipt of the document will always
serve as the critical evidence of timeliness. This is not so in the
case of notice of injury, where disputes often arise which must, in
point at which the employee knew or should have known of the work-related nature of his
disease. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
394. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 632 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The correlative section under
the disease act provides as follows: "The notice referred to in section [311] shall inform the
employer that a certain employe became disabled as a result of the occupational disease,
described in ordinary language, in the course of his employment on or about a specified
time." Id. § 1412 (Section 312 of the Occupational Disease Act).
395. See, e.g., Miller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Atlas Powder
Co.), 78
Pa. Commw. 22, 25, 466 A.2d 787, 788-89 (1983).
396. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 8, Bertrand P. Tracey Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Boles), Pa. Commw. -, 500 A.2d 513 (1985).
397. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 633 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The correlative section under
the disease act provides as follows:
The notice referred to in sections [311 and 312] may be given to the immediate or
other superior of the employe, to the employer, or any agent of the employer regularly employed at the place of employment of the disabled employe.
Id. § 1413 (Section 313 of the Occupational Disease Act).
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the end, be resolved by a simple credibility determination by the
referee. As evident from the mandatory language of section 311,
this credibility determination is critical; thus, not surprisingly, it
has been held that where notice is contested the factual issue of
whether notice has been timely and properly transmitted must always be specifically resolved by the referee. 9 8
The importance of this factual finding is reflected in how courts
treat its omission. It is clear, for example, that a court will not
infer from the mere granting of a claim, or from an inconclusive
finding regarding notice, that proper notice was in fact given.399 On
the other hand, a court will excuse the omission of an explicit finding when another finding is tantamount to such an ascertainment. 40 0 And, although the usual dispositional course a court will
40 1
it
take in the absence of a proper notice finding is to remand,
has been held that when "the record [cannot] support a finding of
398. See, e.g., the cases included infra note 401. Cf. McCullough v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Xerox Corp.), Pa. Commw. -,
, 508 A.2d 621, 623 (1986)
(whether notice has been given is issue of fact for referee).
399. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa.
Commw. 92, 96-97, 416 A.2d 651, 654 (1980). In Duquesne Light, the referee concluded that
notice was properly given based upon his finding that the claimant "did not learn" of his
work-related disability until a certain date within 120 days of which the notice had been
communicated. Id. (emphasis in original). The court concluded that such a finding was insufficient to demonstrate the communication of an effective notice of injury, and thus remanded, holding that the required finding need reflect when the claimant should have
known, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, of his disability and its relationship to the
workplace. Id.
400. See, e.g., Vare Bros. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Chiaradonna),
Pa. Commw. ,, 496 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1985). In Vare Bros. no explicit finding
with respect to notice was made, as pointed out by the reviewing court. Still,
a finding of such notice is implied by the referee's findings that at the time of his
injury the worker told the lead man "that he felt a shock going through him" and
that the lead man had "worked for Vare Brothers for 22 years and was a foreman for
17 years."
Id.
401. Port Authority of Allegheny Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hamilton), Pa. Commw. -, 505 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1986) ("Here, where the referee
failed to make a finding on whether the claimant properly gave notice to the employer, we
must remand for findings on this issue."). See Larusso v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd. (E.J.T. Const., Inc), Pa. Commw. ,,501 A.2d 713, 716 (1985) (E.J.T. I1)
(remand required when referee's findings did not conclusively establish "when the workrelatedness of the Claimant's injuries [a heart attack] . . .was known to the Claimant [and]
communicated to the employer or its representatives . . . ."). See also Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Lurtz), 80 Pa. Commw. 19, 22, 470
A.2d 1102, 1104 (1984); N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Henry),
74 Pa. Commw. 460, 464, 460 A.2d 393, 395 (1983); McManus v. Rochester & Pittsburgh
Coal Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 91, 95, 368 A.2d 1365, 1367 (1977); Phillips v. North Am. Coal Co.,
27 Pa. Commw. 103, 106-07, 365 A.2d 453, 455-56 (1976).
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proper notice" the preferable course is simply to reverse the award
of benefits.40 2
In contrast to the claim petition limitation, the notice requirement is a mere affirmative defense, and is thus subject to being
waived if not asserted at some point before the referee. 0 3 In the
days when the appeal board was the ultimate fact-finder, however,
this was not the rule. 404 Thus, for the few claims still asserted
under the disease act, where the board remains in this role, the
waiver doctrine should not apply to preclude assertion of the notice defense before the board.
C.

Purpose of the Notice Requirement; Mandatory Nature

The most important purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the employer from "stale claims"-allegations of disabilities
stemming from old accidents or injuries not subject to a full and
complete verification and investigation. 4 5 This is, of course, the
same "evidentiary" purpose discussed above with respect to true
statutes of limitations. 40 6 Another "purpose" of the notice provi402. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Paris Neckwear Co., 22 Pa. Commw.
543, 547, 350 A.2d 212, 214 (1976). In ParisNeckwear, the referee concluded that the claimant had given notice within 120 days of when she had learned, with reasonable diligence, of
the work-related nature of her herniated disc. The court, however, noted that the discovery
rule-although couched in seemingly expansive terms-was inapplicable to such an injury.
Id. at 546, 350 A.2d at 214. And, because notice had come more than 120 days after the
trauma that caused the herniated disc, the court concluded that any finding of effective
notice, made upon remand, would be inevitably reversed anyway.
403. See Tady v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Republic Steel Corp.), 86 Pa.
Commw. 582, 585, 485 A.2d 897, 899 (1985). It is clear from Tady that the employer does
not waive the notice limitation by failing to specifically plead the defense in its answer.
Unlike the statutes of repose, however, the limitation must be raised at some point before
the fact-finder. There is no case law or theoretical basis which would support the notion
that this time requirement can be raised for the first time on appeal. Indeed, as the Tady
court indicated, the section 311 limitation is not a true statute of limitations at all.
404. Focht v. General Baking Co., 137 Pa. Super. 318, 323, 9 A.2d 185, 187-88 (1939).
405. See Katz v. Evening Bulletin, 485 Pa. 536, 539, 403 A.2d 518, 519 (1979) ("The
notice provision . . . permits an employer to investigate claims while the events in question
are still recent."). See also Bertrand P. Tracey Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Boles), Pa. Commw. -,...
500 A.2d 513, 514 (1985); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 68 Pa. Commw. 24, 27, 447 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1982);
Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 456, 423 A.2d 784,
787 (1980); Rawling v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 385, 387, 414
A.2d 447, 448 (1980); Padilla v. Chain Bike Corp., 27 Pa. Commw. 190, 192, 365 A.2d 903,
904 (1976).
406. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
The diligence and personal certainty purposes of true statutes of limitations are of diminished importance in the notice realm, as evidenced from Chief Justice O'Brien's frustrated
dissent in Bigley v. Unity Auto Parts, Inc., 496 Pa. 262, 275-76, 436 A.2d 1172, 1179 (1981)
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sion is often said to be the warning it provides employers "of dangerous employment conditions . . .[,] thus . . . facilitating their
speedy correction." '0 7 This latter attribute is, perhaps, less a purpose than a result of the provisions' application.
The obvious conflict between the evidentiary purposes of limitation provisions and the application of the discovery rule 8 is a concern which readily presents itself in the notice context. The discovery rule under the workmen's compensation act section 311 is both
couched and interpreted expansively, embracing many of the new
"injury" types which often possess causes which are inherently difficult to ascertain. 0 9 As posited above, however, this significant
weakening of the evidentiary purpose may be viewed as equitable
since the discovery rule has no such broad application to the claim
petition limitation. Outside the context of disease claims, then,
there is still some protection against claims based upon stale
evidence.
More pursuant to its statutory language than its evidentiary pur(O'Brien, C.J., dissenting), in which the fairly subtle distinction between sections 315 and
311 is illuminated:
There are two limitation sections in the Act: the period for notice of injury . . . and
the period for claiming compensation . . . .If, as the majority claims, the prompt
and efficient disposition of claims is not a purpose of the Act, there would be no
underlying reason for the legislature to have included a time limitation for the assertion of a claim for benefits. [The notice requirement] would be sufficient to put the
employer on notice that he may have to investigate the facts surrounding an injury to
an employee in case the employee makes a claim for benefits. [In the present case,]
[a]lthough the employer had notice of the injury, the claim petition was withdrawn,
indicating that no claim for benefits would be pursued. To require the employer to
anticipate ad infinitum that a claim.. . might be forthcoming is an absurd and illogical burden that [the claim petition limitation] was designed to alleviate.
Id. (emphasis added).
407. Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 456-57,
423 A.2d 784, 788 (1980). See also Katz v. Evening Bulletin, 485 Pa. 536, 539, 403 A.2d 518,
519 (1979).
408. See supra notes 317-34 and accompanying text.
409. Under Palowski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Latrobe Brewing), 81
Pa. Commw. 270, 473 A.2d 260 (1984) (allocatur granted), for example, a claimant may recover for disabling aggravation of a pre-existing, non-work-related asthmatic condition upon
an averment that such aggravation was due to workplace conditions. With the discovery rule
notice provision applicable in this situation (which it no doubt is), a timely notice may be
given at any time within the period of the claim petition limitation period. It is entirely
possible, then, that such a claim may be validly brought up to three years after the claimant's last exposure to the alleged work hazard. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying
text. Considering the variety of causative agents which may aggravate asthma, it is difficult
to perceive how investigation and verification of such an injury may be undertaken. While
this is admittedly an "extreme" example, this conceivable scenario clearly demonstrates that
indiscriminate application of the discovery rule weakens the evidentiary purpose supporting
the notice limitation.
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pose,' 10 section 311's limitation provision has always been held to
be mandatory. 1I The net effect of this characterization is that the
referee, appeal board and courts will demand strict compliance
with the time provision. Once the commencement date is determined, whether in the case of a traditional injury or one to which
the discovery rule is applied, the 120 days runs strictly. If notice is
to be submitted by mail directly to the employer, the date of mailing controls. 12 It should be noted, however, that if notice is submitted along with the claim petition, the date when the workmen's
compensation bureau mails the hearing notice to the employer is
deemed the date of notice." 3 Thus, a claim petition mailed on the
119th day would probably not be timely.'
An exception to the mandatory operation of the provisions will
operate in cases where "there is fraud or its equivalent present or
some other act on the part of the employer which prejudices the
claimant .
,,4 In such instances the courts, under an estoppel
"...
410. There is also credible evidence that the underlying purpose embraces the simple
desire for judicial efficiency. See Beck v. Franklin Glass Corp., 136 Pa. Super. 204, 208-09, 7
A.2d 600, 602 (1939):
[E]xcuses for delay and failure to give notice of accidents became so varied and numerous that the provision requiring notice to the employer was rendered practically
useless, and [the] later fixing of the definite time of ninety days [the contemporary
limit] was meant, no doubt, to meet this condition.
Id. (citing SKINNER, supra note 2, at 220 (2d ed. 1930)). See also Berner v. Philadelphia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 100 Pa. Super. 324, 331-32 (1930).
411. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa.
Commw. 92, 95, 416 A.2d 651, 653 (1980); Padilla v. Chain Bike Corp., 27 Pa. Commw. 190,
192, 365 A.2d 903, 904 (1976); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Czepurnyj, 20 Pa.
Commw. 305, 308, 340 A.2d 915, 917 (1975); Canterna v. U.S. Steel Corp., 12 Pa. Commw.
579, 582, 317 A.2d 355, 357 (1974).
412. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 717 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 406 of the Workmen's Compensation Act); id. § 1506 (Purdon 1952) (Section 406 of the Occupational Disease Act).
413. See Arbogast & Bastion v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bauer), 79 Pa.
Commw. 364, 367-68, 468 A.2d 1220, 1221-22 (1984). In Arbogast, the claimant was not precluded from recovery as hypothesized in the rule proposed in the accompanying text; nevertheless, the court's reasoning and holding clearly support the result. Abrogast rejected the
claimant's argument that "the mere filing of the claim petition" was sufficient to provide
notice. Relying on section 406, which provides that notices are deemed served when mailed,
the court held that the proper date when notice was to be considered as communicated was
the date the bureau circulated the petition to the parties. Id. at 368, 468 A.2d at 1222. The
claimant who relies on the claim petition to provide notice is thus at the mercy of the bureau to be prompt in its ministerial tasks. See also Lanzarotta v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 42 Pa. Commw. 284, 288-89 & n.4, 400 A.2d 697, 699-700 & n.4 (1979).
414. For a more complete discussion of the rules involved with these procedural issues,
see infra notes 592-610 and accompanying text.
415. Canterna v. U.S. Steel Corp., 12 Pa. Commw. 579, 582, 317 A.2d 355, 357 (1974);
Moyer v. Edinger, 192 Pa. Super. 450, 455, 162 A.2d 234, 237 (1960).
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notion, will extend the time in which notice may be given.'" The
time marking the commencement point of the 120 days will most
probably be governed in the future by the recent decision in Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Township of
Marple). 17 In Dudley, which actually dealt with the claim limitation provision of the workmen's compensation act, it was held that
in such cases the time period would only begin to run when the
claimant discovers the "fraud or its equivalent.' 14 Although the
law-changing Dudley case arose in a different context, there is no
reason that the principle of estoppel' ' 9 should operate differently
in the notice realm. Indeed, the court which originally injected the
estoppel principle into the notice context did so by way of reliance
on a claim petition case.' 0
All of this, however, may be academic. If the employer has had
an opportunity to engage in either intentional or unintentional
fraud with respect to the claimant's need to report the injury, then
surely the employer possesses actual knowledge of the injury. Because, as evident from the first sentence of section 311, the employer's actual knowledge of the injury vitiates the need for the
employee to give notice, the estoppel question would never need to
be reached. Predictably, there are no cases where the issue is
discussed.
D.

Notice Excused in Death Cases

For death claims stemming from both disease 4 1 and injury 22 no
notice is required; in such cases, the claim petition serves as the
"notice" under the acts. 42 3 This has been the rule for a considerable period of time, although recent cases have not relied upon the
earlier precedents.
The most obvious basis for the rule is that section 311 of the
416. See Canterna, 12 Pa. Commw. at 582, 317 A.2d at 357.
417. 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169 (1984), afl'd per curiam, Pa. , 507
A.2d 388 (1986).
418. Cf. id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173. See also infra notes 706-10 and accompanying
text.
419. See infra notes 689-702 and accompanying text.
420. See Moyer v. Edinger, 192 Pa. Super. 450, 455, 162 A.2d 234, 237 (1960) (citing,
inter alia, Thorn v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 62, 155 A.2d 414, 416 (1959)
(only case cited in support of estoppel notion)).
421. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62
Pa. Commw. 424, 437 A.2d 771 (1981).
422. See Lambing v. Consolidation Coal Co., 161 Pa. Super. 346, 54 A.2d 291 (1947)
(allocatur denied).
423. Cf. Jones & Laughlin, 62 Pa. Commw. at 427-29, 437 A.2d at 773.

1060

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:975

workmen's compensation act "speaks only in terms of 'injury,' "9424
thus impliedly excusing the requirement in cases of death. The
rule also applies in cases in which the death has resulted from an
injury which may have been minor and unreported, and resulting
in death only an extended period of time later. 2 5 In Lambing v.
Consolidated Coal Co.,426 this rule was justified not by reference to
the statutory restrictiveness referred to above, but by invoking the
doctrine of the independence of the widow's claim from that of the
deceased employee. 2 7 This invocation was necessary as a reply to
the employer's argument that the statute, by including as individuals to give notice "some of the defendants,"' 28 implied that notice
was necessary in death cases.2 e
It is arguable that excuse of notice in death cases is at odds with
the evidentiary purpose of the requirement. This argument has
not, however, been persuasive to the courts. In Duquesne Light Co.
v. Gurick, s° for example, the assertion was rejected with the simple declaration that "[c]ertainly, the purpose served by a speedy
investigation in cases of injury is not present in the event of
death."' 1 Although this declaration was realistic and rational, the
employer's argument advanced in a subsequent case perhaps detracts from its accuracy:
[Tihe need of a speedy investigation is present in a death case. The claim is
for an occupational disease under Section 108(n) which requires . . .that
said disease be related to the industry. Certainly a speedy investigation
would give the petitioner an opportunity to investigate and perform tests to
determine how to eliminate the risk. Nearly three years later it is uncertain
if the same condition exists. Therefore, tests for air, for example, would not
be close enough in time to be used in [case of a death claim] case, hence the
[employer] is placed in an unfair position. [In addition] no autopsy was performed in this case and it could have been [had the employer been] given
424. Duquesne Light Co. v. Gurick, 46 Pa. Commw. 150, 154, 405 A.2d 1358, 1360
(1979).

425. Lambing, 161 Pa. Super. at 348-50, 54 A.2d at 293, 295-96 (claimant died more
than ninety days after traumatic injury without ever having given notice of injury; held,
though claimant would have been barred had he filed while still alive, widow was entitled to
death benefits).
426. 161 Pa. Super. 346, 54 A.2d 291 (1947) (allocatur denied).
427. Id. at 353-55, 54 A.2d at 295-96 (citing Rossi v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 145 Pa.
Super. 101, 111, 20 A.2d 879, 881 (1941) (non-notice case)).

428. 161 Pa. Super. at 354, 54 A.2d at 296. That statutory language has survived the
amendment of the statute.
429. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Lambing v. Consolidated Coal Co., 161 Pa. Super.
346, 54 A.2d 291 (1947) (allocatur denied).
430. 46 Pa. Commw. 150, 405 A.2d 1358 (1979).
431. Id. at 154-55, 405 A.2d at 1360.
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prompt notice. 3'

The employer's argument that Gurick should thus be overruled
was, however, ultimately unsuccessful.
E.

Twenty-One Day Clause

Both notice provisions include a clause which has the effect of
relieving the employer from paying compensation if no notice is
given within the first twenty-one days after the injury. 43 3 It is not
clear from modern cases whether the provision was devised to promote diligence in the reporting of injuries by employees, although
this may well have been the case. Such diligence would, obviously,
serve the evidentiary purpose of the requirement.4 3 4
Issues arising with respect to the twenty-one day requirement
are often governed by rules applied directly to other aspects of the
notice provisions. Thus, since subsumed in the general question of
efficacy of notice, the issue of whether notice came within twentyone days is waived if not raised before the referee.4 35 Likewise, because the payment of medical expenses constitutes compensation
under section 311, recovery for medical expenses incurred during
the first twenty-one days cannot be had if notice of the injury is
given after that initial period. 436 Further, because the date of mailing always governs when notice is deemed served, notice submitted
with a claim petition, even if the latter is filed within twenty-one
days, will probably be insufficient to satisfy the twenty-one day requirement. 3 1 Also in accordance with the general rules applicable
to notice, the twenty-one day rule has no application in death
claims.4 3 8 Finally, because actual knowledge by the employer viti432. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62 Pa. Commw. 424, 437 A.2d 771 (1981).
433. See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
434. It is worthwhile to note that at least on one occasion the West Publishing Company editors have mistakenly offered this as a purpose of the twenty-one day requirement;
an inspection of the involved case reveals that the court was actually discussing the 120-day
requirement. See Upper Darby Twp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa.
Commw. 438, 417 A.2d 1319 (1980).
435. Asten Hill Mfg. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa. Commw. 20,
24, 423 A.2d 1135, 1137 (1981).
436. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Diggs, 46 Pa. Commw. 58, 61, 406 A.2d 246, 247-48
(1979).
437. See Arbogast & Bastian v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bauer), 79 Pa.
Commw. 364, 367 & n.7, 468 A.2d 1220, 1221-22 & n.7 (1984). See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
438. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62 Pa.
Commw. 424, 430 & nn.9-10, 437 A.2d 771, 774 & nn.9-10 (1981). As is evident from this
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ates the need for formal notice, in instances where such knowledge
is possessed, the twenty-one day requirement is likewise
inapplicable. 3 9
Where the twenty-one day requirement is not met, section 311
provides that compensation be paid only from the date of actual
this includes benefits for both wage-loss
notice. " 0 As stated above,
441
and medical treatment.
F.

Actual Knowledge Standard; Obvious Work Causationi
Discovery Rule

Where the work-related nature of an injury is "immediately ob44 2
vious" the notice time limit runs from the date of the incident.
Where, on the other hand, the causation is not known to the employee, the limitation runs only from the time of the3 claimant's
discovery of the work-related nature of his disability.4'
Neither commencement theory, however, need be considered
when it is demonstrated that the employer possesses actual knowledge of the injury or disease. This was the rule even before the
amendment of section 312,"' at a time when the provision included a prototypical form to be used to provide notice, thus suggesting that written, formal notice was required.4 4 5 The removal of
opinion, the question of when compensation is to commence is governed by regulations
found in the Pennsylvania Code.
439. See Upper Darby Twp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa. Commw.
438, 441-42, 417 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1980). Note, however, that even if the injury were trivial
and the claimant had no particular reason to give notice within this initial twenty-one day
period, compensation would be denied. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Diggs, 46 Pa. Commw. at
58 n.1, 406 A.2d at 247 n.1.
440. See supra note 393 and accompanying text. See also Culp Ind. Insulation v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 599, 604 & n.3, 426 A.2d 1263, 126566 & n.3 (1981).
441. Duquesne Light Co. v. Diggs, 46 Pa. Commw. at 58 & n.2, 406 A.2d at 247-48 &
n.2.
442. Truskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa. Commw. 315, 317, 424
A.2d 627, 628 (1981).
443. See supra text accompanying note 393. See also Industrial Servs. Contracting,
Inc. v. Wilson, 28 Pa. Commw. 83, 84, 367 A.2d 377, 381 (1977).
444. See Williams v. Temple Univ. Hosp. 174 Pa. Super. 47, 51-52, 98 A.2d 236, 238
(1953) (citing liberal construction due the act, and aversion for defeating meritorious claims
for technical reasons); Wilkinson v. United Parcel Serv., 158 Pa. Super. 22, 29, 43 A.2d 408,
411 (1945) ("It would not come with good grace for an employer who had actual knowledge
of a compensable injury to his employee at the time of its occurrence to endeavor to escape
liability because he had not been served with formal notice of the occurrence of the
injury.").
445. See Dorsch v. Fischer Scientific Co., 136 Pa. Super. 197, 199, 7 A.2d 604, 605
(1939).
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that prototype, and, more importantly, the inclusion of the present
first sentence of section 311 have clearly established that actual
knowledge is the standard. " ""
Whether the employer had actual knowledge, of course, is always
a factual ascertainment for the referee. 7 It is, however, worthwhile to examine instances where actual knowledge has and has
not been found. There are, in addition, certain decisions which
demonstrate that a presumption of actual knowledge will not arise
simply by virtue of the existence of certain allusive facts.
Actual knowledge has been found where the claimant's injury
was treated at the employer's own hospital;4 48 where the employer,
a police department, listed the claimant as injured in the course of
duty;44 9 where the claimant is the employer, notwithstanding the
insurance carrier's total ignorance of the injury;450 where the claimant, after having filed a disease claim under the disease act,
amended the petition for recovery under the workmen's compensaof the injury was obvition act;4 51 and, of course, where incurrence
52
agent.4
its
or
employer
the
to
ous
Other cases demonstrate that the existence of certain facts will
not raise a presumption that actual notice was possessed. The
mere witnessing of a claimant's accident by the employer's supervisory agent, for example, has been held to be insufficient to establish actual knowledge when the claimant's symptoms manifested
themselves only later. 58 Likewise, the employer's actual knowledge
446. See BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 5.40, at 140-41. See also Blass v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Beltrami Enters., Inc.), 77 Pa. Commw. 337, 339-40, 465 A.2d 1094,
1095 (1983); Padilla v. Chain Bike Corp., 27 Pa. Commw. 190, 192 n.3, 365 A.2d 903, 904 n.3
(1976).
447. It has recently been suggested that a referee may, for the purpose of correct ascertainment of whether actual knowledge was had by the employer, consider physician's
reports which would be excluded as hearsay if submitted for their substantive value. See
N.L. Indus., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Henry), 74 Pa. Commw. 460,
463-64, 460 A.2d 393, 394 (1983) (Barbieri, J., remanding case to referee for notice finding
clarification).
448. Williams v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 174 Pa. Super. 47, 51, 98 A.2d 236, 238 (1953).
449. Upper Darby Twp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa. Commw. 438,
442, 417 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1980).
450. Dick's Delicatessen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (DeVirgilio), 82 Pa.
Commw. 444, 450, 475 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1984).
451. Findlay Refractories v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 52 Pa. Commw.
454, 463-64, 415 A.2d 1270, 1274-75 (1980).
Pa.
452. See Vare Bros. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Chiaradonna), 496 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1985); Uditsky v. Krakovitz, 133 Pa. Super. 186,
, -,
Commw. 189, 2 A.2d 525, 526-27 (1938).
453. Novaselec v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 16 Pa. Commw. 550, 552, 332
A.2d 581, 582 (1975) (notice eventually found on other grounds).
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of a prior physical injury will not serve as actual knowledge for a
later claim for consequent emotional injury;"' in the same sense, a
complaint years before of difficulties in performing one's job, especially when coupled with a continuation of work, will preclude an
imputation of actual knowledge to the employer when the claim
petition alleging a related disability is filed later.455 Importantly,
the fact that the claimant's medical bills are paid under an employment-related insurance policy likewise raises no presumption
that the employer possessed actual knowledge of the underlying
injury.' 56 If, additionally, in the course of making such payments
the employer's insurance carrier notifies the claimant of its subrogation interest in any related third-party recovery, that notification will not be interpreted as demonstrating any actual knowledge
4 57
on the employer's part.
While the latter possible indicia of awareness of an injury do not
raise presumptions of actual knowledge under the notice provisions, they may well operate as factors to be weighed in the final
adjudication of the issue. The principle underlying the rejection of
these potential indicia as presumptions is, of course, that however
notice is to be conveyed, it must always reflect knowledge on the
part of the employer not only that the claimant has been injured,
but that the injury is work-related. This prerequisite to the communication of effective notice may be referred to as "quality" of
notice.
G.

Quality of Notice

That the employer must be advised of the work-related nature of
the alleged injury is mandated by sections 312 of the respective
acts. It is thus not sufficient that the employer is told merely that
the employee has been injured or is sick; the required quality of
notice demands that the employer be alerted to the particular
workplace hazard or circumstance which is at the root of the alleged ailment. The articulated standard required to be met in pursuit of satisfying the requirement is that there be "a connection
454. See Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 457,
423 A.2d 784, 789 (1980).
455. See Blass v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Beltrami Enters., Inc.), 77
Pa. Commw. 337, 339, 465 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1983).
456. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. Caves, 22 Pa. Commw. 102, 106, 347
A.2d 761, 763 (1975).
457. See Canterna v. U.S. Steel Corp., 12 Pa. Commw. 579, 584, 317 A.2d 355, 357
(1974).
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between the complaint and the performance of the employee's du-

ties

....

45

Like the determination with respect to whether there has been
actual knowledge on the part of the employer of the injury,
whether the quality of notice has been sufficient is a factual determination. A number of cases demonstrate that claims often fail because the referee simply cannot determine that the employer has
been apprised of any work-related cause of the injury. Where, for
example, the claimant merely informed the employer "that he
would be unable to work for a time [and] did not relate his incapacity to anything concerned with his employment," the claim was
unsuccessful.' 59 Likewise, where the claimant's foreman was aware
that the claimant had suffered a fall but was without knowledge as
to its circumstances, the claim was denied.4 60 Where, in addition,
the claimant was the victim of a purse-snatching in the course of
her employment, the claim was denied, notwithstanding the fact
that her supervisors were summoned to the scene of the crime; the
claimant's testimony was held to be too equivocal to support a
finding that she had suffered a fall and had hurt her knee in the
course of the incident."4 1 The same result was reached where the
claimant's wife called the employer and informed the latter only
that her husband had been hospitalized after a heart infarction,' 2
omitting any comment with respect to his recent work-related
trauma which had resulted in chest pains. 4 3 Another claim was
held to have been properly refused after the claimant's supervisors
testified that claimant had left work complaining merely of back
4
pain. "
That the injury occurred while in the course of work duties,
however, is all that apparently need be conveyed. For example,
that the injury may stem, in the employer's view, from'an aggravation of a pre-existing ailment, or that the injury did not seem to
458. Moyer v. Edinger, 192 Pa. Super. 450, 453, 162 A.2d 234, 236 (1960).
459. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Caves, 22 Pa. Commw. 102, 106, 347
A.2d 761, 763 (1975).
460. Padilla v. Chain Bike Corp., 27 Pa. Commw. 190, 193-94, 365 A.2d 903, 905
(1976).
461. Rawling v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 385, 386-88,
414 A.2d 447, 448-49 (1980).
462. Rinehimer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 66 Pa. Commw. 480, 483,
444 A.2d 1339, 1340 (1982).
463. See id. at 486, 444 A.2d at 1340-41.
464. Miller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Atlas Powder Co.), 78 Pa.
Commw. 22, 25, 466 A.2d 787, 788 (1983).

1066

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:975

logically originate from the alleged work-related cause, does not increase the quality of notice required. Thus, in Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Potomac Edison,"5 evidence sufficient
to support adequate notice was found in the employer's testimony
that claimant informed it that "she had felt a pain in her neck as
she was getting out of the truck and [that] she didn't want to continue working that day any longer. 4 66 Although arguably not a
particularly persuasive communication likely to alert one to a peculiarly work-related incident, the court found it sufficient to
"satisf[y] the . . . statutory requirements[,] [since the] communication did indicate [that] the injury was work-related in that it described the manner in which the injury occurred."' 4 7
H. Effective Receipt of Notice
Notice of injury, by whatever means conveyed, must always
reach the employer or its agents. Thus, a notice of sufficient "quality" is ineffective if conveyed to the wrong person. Although the
current sections 313 of the the two acts provide that notice may be
given to, among others, a superior or "any agent of the employer
regularly employed at the place of employment of the injured employee,' 6 8 it has long been established that this seemingly broad
language will not accommodate notice given to mere fellow employees. The preeminent case cited for the proposition" 9 also rearticulates the general rule established many years before in
Dorsch v. Fisher Scientific Co.:470 An effective recipient of notice
"must be someone whose position justifies the inference that authority has been delegated to him by the employer, as his repre'4 71
sentative, to receive a report of notice of . . . injury.'
Sufficient notice has been found to have been received when the
incurrence of injury has been communicated to the "lead man" of
the employer;' 7 2 to the claimant's district manager; 73 and the em465. 23 Pa. Commw. 193, 350 A.2d 914 (1976).
466. Id. at 196, 350 A.2d at 916.
467. Id.
468. See supra note 397 and accompanying text for full reproduction of section 313.
469. Canterna v. U.S. Steel Corp., 12 Pa. Commw. 579, 317 A.2d 355 (1974).
470. 136 Pa. Super. 197, 7 A.2d 604 (1939).
471. Id. at 200, 7 A.2d at 606. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. (Levine), 68 Pa. Commw. 24, 26, 447 A.2d 1116, 1118 (1982).
472. Vare Bros. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Chiaradonna), Pa.
Commw. -,
-,
496 A.2d 1316, 1318 (1985). See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd. v. Edgewater Steel Co., 23 Pa. Commw. 3, 5, 349 A.2d 775, 777 (1976); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Czerpurnyj, 20 Pa. Commw. 305, 308-09 & n.1, 340 A.2d 915, 918 &
n.1 (1975); Allen v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 180 Pa. Super. 286, 290, 119 A.2d
832, 834 (1956) (allocatur denied).
473. Jones v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 25 Pa. Commw. 546, 549, 360
A.2d 821, 824 (1976).
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ployer's own nurse 74 and doctor." 5 Effective receipt has been
found lacking, meanwhile, in cases where the claimant's alleged inference of authority has been unreasonable. In Ulmer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,7 0 for example, the referee
found that the alleged recipient was an employee "who had certain
departmental merchandising and purchasing responsibilities," but
who nevertheless possessed no supervisory duties;477 notice was not
found and the claim thus denied. Affirming the denial, the court
noted that the record could adequately support a finding that the
employee "did not occupy such a position either de facto or otherwise. '47 Ulmer thus indicates that some degree of diligence is required on the part of the claimant to ascertain whether the intended recipient is in a truly supervisory role. One must thus
question the correctness of the finding of effective receipt in Truskey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,7 where the
claimant testified that he informed a foreman of his injury, but
admitted at the same time that "it was not that foreman's 'responsibility to come out and supervise'" the claimant's work. 80
Like most issues dealing with the notice requirement, the issue
of whether timely notice has been given to the proper recipient is a
question of fact for the referee. 48 1 The general rules discussed previously in this section, however, often operate directly to govern
the result with respect to whether an effective receipt has been
achieved. Thus, in Blass v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board (BeltramiEnterprises),482 it was held that when timely notice is provided to an employer which is a successor corporation to
a defunct, statutorily liable employer, that notice will suffice to
allow the claim against the successor corporation, at least where
474. Blackshear v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 60 Pa. Commw. 529, 531,
432 A.2d 273, 275 (1981).
475. Reed v. Glidden Co., 13 Pa. Commw. 343, 347, 318 A.2d 376, 378 (1974); Flock v.
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 140 Pa. Super. 232, 235, 13 A.2d 881, 882 (1940); Younch v.
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 118 Pa. Super. 396, 400, 180 A. 30, 32 (1935); Klimovige v.
Hazle Brook Coal Co., 111 Pa. Super. 399, 400, 170 A. 357, 357 (1934).
476. 47 Pa. Commw. 607, 408 A.2d 902 (1979).
477. Id. at 609, 408 A.2d at 904.
478. Id.
479. 56 Pa. Commw. 315, 424 A.2d 627 (1981).
480. Id. at 317, 424 A.2d at 629.
481. See Canterna, 12 Pa. Commw. at 579, 317 A.2d at 357.
482. 77 Pa. Commw. 337, 465 A.2d 1094 (1983).
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the latter succeeded the defunct operation in the same business,
"employed the Claimant in exactly the same capacity .

.

. and

used the same insurance carrier. '" 83 In Blass, the governing rule
was that "knowledge[,] rather than formal notice[, is] the standard": ' 84 "timely notice given to the successor corporation necessarily alerts the carrier for the predecessor company and we will impute timely knowledge of the injury to the predecessor company
and its carrier. "485 The same rule was applied by the supreme
8 6 where, although the claimant
court in Katz v. Evening Bulletin,"
notified the foreman of the wrong employer of his injury,48 7 the

claim was allowed since a determination of actual knowledge could
be culled from the record. 88
Pursuant to the explicit language of section 313 and the other
notice sections, which always refer to the employer or its agents, it
has been held that when an employer is a close corporation, the
statute does not require that notice be given to the insurance carrier. The reason that the rule might be otherwise was illustrated in
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board.89 In this case, the claimant was the employee who would
normally handle the insurance matters of' the employer, a threeperson venture.490 The claimant gave notice to the corporate secre-

tary, who took no action on the matter, and the claim was only
filed with the insurance carrier a year later. Under these and similar circumstances, the only party with any adverse interest to the
claim, the insurance carrier, will be without any meaningful notice
of the injury or its circumstances. In the commonwealth court's
consideration of the case, the court rejected the carrier's argument
that it should have received notice within 120 days of the injury,
hinting that if the insurer wished to be protected in such circumstances from stale claims it could have included a provision in its
contract with the employer requiring such notice; 91 the statute,
483. Id. at 340, 465 A.2d at 1096.
484. Id., 465 A.2d at 1095.
485. Id., 465 A.2d at 1096.
486. 485 Pa. 536, 403 A.2d 518 (1979), rev'g, 30 Pa. Commw. 27, 372 A.2d 1262 (1977).
487. 30 Pa. Commw. at 31, 372 A.2d at 1264.
488. 485 Pa. at 541-42, 403 A.2d at 520-21.
489. 68 Pa. Commw. 24, 447 A.2d 1116 (1982).
490. Id. at 26 & n.1, 447 A.2d at 1118 & n.1.
491. Id. at 27 & n.3, 447 A.2d at 1118 & n.3. This was the same response offered more
explicitly by Judge Craig in Dick's Delicatessen v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(DeVirgilio), 82 Pa. Commw. 444, 475 A.2d 1345 (1984), when met with the same assertion
from the insurance carrier. In Dick's Delicatessen, all of the corporate officers were family
members, and it was only a significant period of time after the claimant's disabling heart
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however, according to the court, required only notice to the employer, even if the employer happens to be a one-person
corporation.""2
In addition, although section 438 of the workmen's compensation act provides that "[a]n employer shall report all injuries received by employees . . . immediately to the employer's insurer,"''9 e the want of any modality therein by which this is to be
enforced has been held not to violate the insurer's rights.4 9 ' This
was held to be the case "[b]ecause the insurer can contractually
mandate and enforce prompt notification . . . .
I.

The Discovery Rule Under Section 31146

1. Scope of the Rule
Section 311 of the workmen's compensation act includes a
broadly worded discovery rule:
[I1 cases of injury resulting from ionizing radiation or any other cause in
which the nature of the injury or its relationship to the employment is not
known to the employe, the time for giving notice shall not begin to run until
the employe knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know,
attack that the insurance carrier was alerted to the injury. As in Travelers, the carrier argued "that where ... the claimant is also the employer, the claimant must give notice to
the insurance company in order to permit a prompt investigation of the claim .... " Replying that Travelers had already settled that issue, the court explained the insurer's alternative in seeking protection from such stale or fraudulent claims:
We understand the insurer's concern in these cases where the claimant and the employer, who ordinarily, have interests adverse to one another, are interrelated. Without some provision for the enforcement of the employer's duty to provide the ...
carrier with prompt notification of work-related injuries, the claimant-employer could
sit on his claim indefinitely, later requiring the insurer to defend a claim which it did
not have a meaningful opportunity to investigate ....

The .

.

. carrier can guard

against possible abuse of the [act] by close corporations and sole proprietorships by
conditioning coverage on compliance with mandatory prompt notification provisions
written into the insurance contract. Issues concerning the interpretation and fulfillment of contractual provisions of the policy are not for the workmen's compensation
authorities to decide, but can be litigated in a civil action between the parties to the
contract.
82 Pa. Commw. at 150-51, 475 A.2d at 1349.
492. 68 Pa. Commw. at 28, 447 A.2d at 1119.
493. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 994 (Purdon Supp 1985).
494.

Dick's Delicatessen,82 Pa. Commw. at 450-51 & nn.6-7, 475 A.2d at 1349 & nn.6-

7.
495. Id. at 451, 475 A.2d at 1349.
496. The discussion undertaken at this point is addressed to the discovery rule as
codified in section 311 of the workmen's compensation act. The discovery rule was adopted
judicially in the context of the disease act section 311 in 1945 in Roschak v. Vulcan Iron
Works, 157 Pa. Super. 227, 42 A.2d 280 (1945).
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By the terms of the statute, disease "injuries"498 and those
caused by radiation are governed by this subjective standard. In
addition, other injuries have also been specifically held to be receptive to the notice discovery rule. In E.J.T. Construction, Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 99 for example, the commonwealth court remanded a case in which the referee failed to
make a finding with respect to when the claimant learned "of the
causal relationship between his employment and his heart attack."50 0 The result was the same in Rinehimer v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board, 50 1 in which the disability was again
alleged to have stemmed from a work-related heart attack. 2 It has
also been suggested in dicta that the discovery rule under section
311 applies to emotional injuries. s
Beyond the foregoing cases, however, there is no judicial delineation of which injuries are presumptively receptive to discovery rule
treatment because they possess elusive causes or medical etiologies.50 4 The commonwealth court could have undertaken such an
approach, evaluating by injury type whether the cause of the injury was such that the "nature of the injury or its relationship to
the employment" could truly be said to be elusive in ascertainment. That approach, however, has apparently been shunned. Instead, it is apparently the rule that whenever the cause of injury is
497. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 631 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The statute is reproduced in its
entirety, supra text accompanying note 393.

498.

See, e.g., supra note 409 and text accompanying note 224.

499.

47 Pa. Commw. 492, 408 A.2d 226 (1979) (E.J.T. 1), after remand, Larusso v.

Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (E.J.T. Constr., Inc.), Pa. Commw. -,
501
A.2d 711 (1985) (E.J.T. II).
500. 47 Pa. Commw. at 495, 408 A.2d at 228.
501. 66 Pa. Commw. 480, 444 A.2d 1339 (1982).
502. Id. at 483, 444 A.2d at 1341.
503. See Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 457,
423 A.2d 784, 788-89 (1980) (confused discussion; no notice ultimately found).

504. The appeal board has, however, held that the notice discovery rule applies in
hearing loss cases. See Reddinger v. St. Joe Zinc (Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
Dckt. No. A-85444, Oct. 20, 1983) (unreported decision) (petition for review granted). See
also Cherry v. Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. (Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. Dckt.
No. A-85297, Sept. 13, 1984) (unreported), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Universal Cyclops Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cherry), Pa. Commw. , 509
A.2d 956 (1986). In addition, the commonwealth court has now specifically held that the

notice discovery rule is applicable to aggravation injuries. See Bailey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Pittsburgh Tube Co.),
- Pa. Commw. ,
395-96 (1986) (applying five-part test articulated in disease-claim context).

,

508 A.2d 393,
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not obvious, and an averment is made that the claimant did not
appreciate the nature of the injury, the notice discovery rule will
apply.05° A practical result of this approach is that the court will
very likely remand any case in which such an averment has been
made and in which the referee has not made a specific factual finding with respect to when the claimant knew or should have known
of his injury.506
It must be remembered, however, that notwithstanding the liberalized notice rule, the claim may still be precluded by the claim
505. See Van Patton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Scott Paper Co.), 86
Pa. Commw. 538, 485 A.2d 541 (1984). In Van Patton, the alleged injury was a reoccurrence
of an earlier back injury. The court held that the referee and appeal board were correct in
their conclusion that the claimant had failed to communicate an effective, "quality" notice
to the employer, and affirmed a denial of benefits. The court seemed ready, however, to
remand the case had the claimant argued that he was unaware until a later point of the full
character of his injury:
In light of [the discovery rule included in section 311], we have on occasion been
required to remand a case for a factual determination as to when the notice period
began to run .... No remand is necessary in the instant case [, however,] in light of
the claimant's contention that he was unaware of the injury and notified the employer almost immediately.
Id. at 542 n.3, 485 A.2d at 543 n.3 (emphasis added)., Such broad application of the discovery rule in the notice context is justified, given the expansive language of the section 311
proviso. Nevertheless, the approach undertaken by the commonwealth court seems to be at
odds with an earlier case, authored by Judge Wilkinson, in which an intention is evidenced
to limit the scope of the rule to cases in which the nature of the injury is objectively insidious. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Paris Neckwear, 22 Pa. Commw. 543, 350
A.2d 212 (1976). In Paris Neckwear, the claimant, a textile worker, was forced to stop her
duties because of back pain; the stoppage was followed by her phone call informing the
employer only that she was sick. The claimant never returned to work. Id. at 544, 350 A.2d
at 212-13. Only some four months later was a diagnosis made of claimant's malady as a
herniated disc requiring a laminectomy to be performed. Three months thereafter, the
claimant filed her petition. Id. A quality notice was thus not communicated to the employer
until well after 120 days of the injury. The referee and appeal board nevertheless allowed
the claim, with the latter invoking the discovery rule of section 311. See id. This invocation
of the discovery rule was, however, renounced by the commonwealth court:
[The discovery rule operates] only in cases of injury resulting from causes in which
the nature of the injury or relationship to employment is not known to the employee.
The Act specifically gives an example of such an injury, radiation.
In the instant case, the claimant immediately knew of her injury, a back injury.
Claimant could and should have informed her employer that she suffered a back injury while engaged as a splitter in his plant ....
Id. at 546, 350 A.2d at 214 (citation to section 311 omitted) (emphasis added). But see
Bailey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Tube Co.), Pa. Commw.
-,
508 A.2d 393 (1986) (court leaving no doubt that notice discovery rule applies to aggravation injuries).
506. Cf. Van Patton, 86 Pa. Commw. at 542 n.3, 485 A.2d at 543 n.3. See generally
supra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
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petition limitation, at least in non-disease claims. 0 7 This can, conceivably, produce the paradoxical result that a "valid" notice may
be communicated by the employee but the claim may nevertheless
be barred because asserted after the statute of limitations has
50 8
run.
2.

Commencement of the Limitation Under the Discovery Rule

One of the most heavily litigated issues arising in the notice of
injury realm involves the factual ascertainment of when the employee actually knew of the work-related nature of the incurred
disability. Because this point marks the commencement of the notice period in all disease cases, and, as discussed above, in an increasing number of other injury types, the issue is of obvious importance. What is striking is the number of times the dispute
reaches the appellate courts, when the legal standard governing the
commencement point is fairly straightforward and has not changed
significantly, notwithstanding its 1972 codification, since 1945
509
when it was first articulated in Roschak v. Vulcan Iron Works.
Indeed, a comparison of the test enunciated in Roschak with that
applied in contemporary cases reveals no detectable distinction. 10
The furious appellate court litigation of the matter has subsided
markedly from its late 1970's intensity. From that recent era's harvest, a number of refinements on the discovery rule's operation
may be discerned.
The most frequently cited case articulating the test includes a
recitation of the elements required to converge before the notice
period runs:
507. The limited applicability of the discovery rule under section 315 of the workmen's compensation act has been discussed in a prior section. See supra notes 357-92 and
accompanying text.
508. This result may become more intelligible by considering together one of the
landmark Pennsylvania mental disability cases, Thomas v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 55 Pa. Commw. 449, 423 A.2d 784 (1980), and a recent product of the same genre,
Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (State Corr. Inst. at Graterford), - Pa.
Commw. -, 499 A.2d 694 (1985). In Riddick, the rule is accepted that the section 315
499 A.2d at 696. Yet,
discovery rule does not apply to mental disability claims. Id. at __,
we know from Thomas that the section 311 rule does have such application. Thus, borrowing facts from Thomas, where the event ultimately assigned as the catalyst of the mental
disability occurred in 1970, the claim would automatically be barred by section 315, even
though the claimant only became aware of his emotional disability in October, 1975-his
timely notice thereafter would be a nullity.
509. 157 Pa. Super. 227, 42 A.2d 280 (1945).
510. Compare id. at 237, 42 A.2d at 284, with N.L. Indus., 74 Pa. Commw. 460, 464
A.2d 393, 394 (1983).
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[Summarizing section 311], the notice period does "not begin to run until"
claimant has: (1) knowledge or constructive knowledge (2) of a disability (3)
which exists, (4) which results from an occupational disease, and (5) which
has a possible relationship to his employment. The plain language . . . requires that all five elements conjoin .... .'"

Treating these elements in order, a number of observations may
be made. First, of course, the reference to constructive knowledge
does no more than reflect section 311's language that the notice
period will commence when the employee knows "by the exercise
of reasonable diligence" of the work-related character of the affliction.512 The second and third enumerated elements reflect the requirement that the claimant must have known not that he feels ill
or is in some way incapacitated, but that he is totally disabled-that is, that he has lost all his earning power. 5 13 The fourth
element, meanwhile, evidences the notion that it is not enough, for
example, that a concededly disabled coal miner is informed merely
that his total disability is due to a lung disease; instead, the character of the disease-as relating to a work hazard such as silica
dust-needs to have been conveyed. 14 Finally, the fifth element
modifies the previous requirement and requires that the claimant
be aware that the occupational disease is in fact derived from his
specific employment. 515
511. Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47 Pa. Commw.
74, 77, 407 A.2d 117, 118 (1979). See also Fusarelli v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
61 Pa. Commw. 539, 542, 434 A.2d 855, 856 (1981). And see Horne v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Owens-Corning Fiberglass) (slip op. Pa. Commw. July 8, 1986).
512. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 284 (5th ed. 1979).
513. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
35 Pa. Commw. 610, 612, 387 A.2d 174, 176 (1978) (although claimant was suffering from
severe enough lung ailment in 1974 that he was entitled to and did receive black lung benefits, claimant could not be considered disabled therefrom under act until 1976, when all
earning power ended). See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 47 Pa. Commw. 74, 82, 407 A.2d 117, 119-20 (1979). And compare Airco Speer Carbon
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa. Commw. 274, 278-79, 392 A.2d 360, 362-63
(1978) (although claimant maintained that he gave notice to employer in June, 1973, after
being informed by physician of his "total disability," referee and appeal board finding to
such effect reversed, because claimant continued to work in mines for two months thereafter; claimant could not be disabled under the act in such circumstances).
514. See, e.g., Industrial Servs. Contracting, Inc. v. Wilson, 28 Pa. Commw. 83, 85, 367
A.2d 377, 378 (1977) (although claimant, who had worked as an arc-welder and miner, was
forced to leave job in October, 1973, to seek medical treatment for acknowledged respiratory
ailment, it was not until October, 1974, when claimant was diagnosed and informed of occupational diseases, that notice limitation commenced).
515. It is not enough, for example, that the claimant is aware that he is totally disabled from a disease known as anthracosilicosis, an ailment defined under the act as an
"occupational disease." He must, instead, understand that the ailment stems from his work
in the coal mines.
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Rarely does the omission of one of the latter elements from the
factual matrix work to establish that the claimant did not satisfactorily "discover" the incurrence of the disease, most likely because
of the obvious interrelation of the various elements. This may be
discerned by way of a general examination, undertaken below, of
instances in which the absence of timely notice was asserted in the
course of resisting disease claims.
A recurrent argument advanced to challenge the timeliness of
notice has been that sufficient indicia existed to compel the conclusion that the claimant should have known that he was totally disabled months or even years before notice was communicated. Because the ultimate finding in this respect is one of fact for the
referee, sometimes these indicia will work as evidence to tip the
balance in the employer's favor and produce the finding that the
claimant has slept on his rights. Repeated appellate court decisions, however, have established that such indicia neither form
presumptions nor constitute conclusive evidence which must be accepted by the referee as a matter of law. A principle reason for this
is the failure of such evidence to establish conclusively the conjoining of all five elements.
Such indicia vary in their nature and in their intrinsic persuasiveness. The fact, for example, that the claimant was suspicious
that he was disabled, "or even [that] he possessed certain knowledge of a disease or disability," 16 is not sufficient where a full
showing has not been made that he was aware of the work-related
nature of the disease or disability.517 Likewise, the fact that the
claimant applied for and/or is receiving federal black lung benefits
is only evidence that the claimant may have been aware of his
work-related disability.5 18 (This is so especially in cases where the
516. Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47 Pa. Commw. at
83, 407 A.2d at 121.
517. Id.
518. Duquesne Light Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 53 Pa. Commw. 92,
97-98, 416 A.2d 651, 654 (1980) ("although the fact that one has applied for federal black
lung benefits is not conclusive proof that a claimant had knowledge of his disability ... it
may have some bearing on the issue of notice.").
See also Colt Indus. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 463, 472,
426 A.2d 743, 747-48 (1981):
Even if we assume. . .the claimant was told that he had "Black Lung Disease and
emphysema," there were several inferences the referee could draw from that. The
referee could infer that the claimant did not understand what he was told at that
time. Or, the referee could infer that the claimant understood he had anthraco-silicosis but did not understand he was totally disabled by it.
Id. (Preliminary emphasis added); Mathies Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
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latter benefits are applied for while the claimant is still working).5 19 Further, even in instances where the claimant has been
found to have been under treatment for serious lung disorders,
knowledge of disability will not necessarily be imputed, upon testimony that the full extent and etiology of his illness was not immediately conveyed to him.52 0 In such cases, the testimony of the
claimant's physician is obviously vital, and is often revealed to be
the pivotal evidence demonstrating the claimant's delayed discovery of the full character of his ailment in the face of substantial
evidence that his full awareness of work-related disability accrued
much earlier." '
Bd., 40 Pa. Commw. 120, 126, 399 A.2d 790, 792-93 (1979) ("failure of the Claimants to
notify the Companies of their disability contemporaneously with their filing for Federal
Black Lung Benefits is not fatal in and of itself to their present claims."); Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. 610, 613, 387 A.2d 174,
176 (1978) ("The date of the Federal Black Lung award is only one of several factors which
the trier of fact may consider in determining the extent of claimant's knowledge.").
For a recent case in which application for and receipt of black lung benefits played a role
in establishing that early knowledge of the disability was possessed by a claimant, see Tady
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Republic Steel Corp.), 86 Pa. Commw. 582, 586,
485 A.2d 897, 899-900 (1985).
519. See Jones & Laughlin, 35 Pa. Commw. at 613, 387 A.2d at 176.
[U]nder the facts of this case, the date of the Federal Black Lung award could not
conceivably be the date of disability for the purposes of receiving workmen's compensation in Pennsylvania. The Federal award commenced in . . . 1972, while Claimant
continued to work in the mines until . . . 1973, and continued in other work until the
middle of 1976. In Pennsylvania it has been held that disability "should be regarded
as being synonymous with 'loss of earning power.'"
Id. (citations omitted); Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47
Pa. Commw. 74, 84 n.4, 407 A.2d 117, 121 n.4 (1979).
See also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa.
Commw. 466, 470, 393 A.2d 1076, 1078 (1978):
Employer emphasizes . . . the fact that the claimant had, in 1970, filed for [black
lung benefits] to demonstrate the claimant knew of his disability well [in the past],
making his notice untimely. Accepting this line of argument would require [adoption
of the] proposition that someone can be totally disabled yet continue to work at his
current job.
Id. (citation omitted). And see Andring v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Keystone
Coal Mining Corp.), - Pa. Commw. -, 508 A.2d 1324 (1986) (employer received timely
notice for purposes of workmen's claim when it received notice of claimant's "initial finding" of black lung eligibility from government, notwithstanding fact that eligibility requirements for the two programs differ).
520. See, e.g., Bethlehem Mines Corp., 66 Pa. Commw. 404, 407, 444 A.2d 1313, 1315
(1982); Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 47 Pa. Commw. 74,
79, 407 A.2d 117, 119 (1979); Duquesne Light Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
53 Pa. Commw. 92, 93-94, 416 A.2d 651, 652 (1980); Colt Indus. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 463, 472, 426 A.2d 743, 744 (1981).
521. Cf. generally Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 492
Pa. 1, 421 A.2d 1060 (1980), rev'g, 48 Pa. Commw. 131, 408 A.2d 1200 (1979). See also
Arcadia Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Kubalic), 79 Pa. Commw. 148,
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APPEAL PROVISIONS

The ensuing discussion presents in more detail the appeal provisions of the workmen's compensation act and those of the rules of
appellate procedure applicable in workmen's compensation practice.52 2 Also considered is section 406 of the workmen's compensation act, 523 which clarifies when "papers and notices" are to be
served, an issue which is especially crucial in the realm of these
brief jurisdictional appeal periods.
It is important to note that the jurisdictional posture of the statutes discussed reflects a doctrine common to all Pennsylvania appeal provisions. 5 2" Thus, for example, a case construing the jurisdictional ten-day appeal provision of the unemployment
compensation act has been applied as authority in the workmen's
compensation context. 52 5 Likewise, after the supreme court declared an exception to the strict appeal nunc pro tunc doctrine
under one of the rules of appellate procedure, 2 the exception was
thereafter properly applied to the workmen's compensation act
section providing for appeal from the referee's decision. 521 As part
of this pervasive doctrine, the workmen's compensation appeal
52
provisions are unaffected by the notion of liberal construction
which permeates, as a general rule, the construction of the substantive aspects of the law.
150-51 & nn.1-2, 468 A.2d 906, 907 & nn.1-2 (1983); Shenango Steel Corp. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 46 Pa. Commw. 3, 8-9, 405 A.2d 1086, 1088 (1979).

522. In an earlier portion of this article, the theoretical basis of jurisdictional limitations was discussed, as was the nature of the appeal nunc pro tunc, the procedure by which
the normally harsh operation of jurisdictional provisions may be avoided. See supra notes
170-84 and accompanying text.
523. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 717 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
524. Thus, for example, cases decided under the now defunct section 427 of the workmen's compensation act (providing the appeal period allowed from the board to the commonwealth court) are still good law to the extent that they deal with the nuances of whether
under its replacement, rule of appellate procedure 1512, the jurisdiction of the latter court
has been achieved.
525. Branch v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa. Commw. 374, 377, 393
A.2d 55, 57 (1978) (citing Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Digiacomo, 24 Pa.

Commw. 326, 327, 355 A.2d 604, 605 (1976)).
526.

See Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979) (construing PA.

R.A.P. 903 (Purdon Supp. Pamph. 1985)).
527. See Tony Grande, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Rodriguez), 71
Pa. Commw. 566, 568, 455 A.2d 299, 300 (1983) (construing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 853
(Purdon Supp. 1985)).
528. Banks v. McClain, 156 Pa. Super. 512, 515, 40 A.2d 905, 906 (1945).
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Appeal Provisions of the Workmen's Compensation and

Occupational Disease Acts
Section 423 of the workmen's compensation act sets forth the
grounds for appeal from a referee's decision and provides that an
aggrieved party "may. . . take an appeal. . . within twenty days
after notice of a referee's award or disallowance of compensation
shall have been served upon him." 2 9 The language of the correlative section of the disease act is the same.53 0 Both provisions also
include a proviso, added in 1919, providing that "[t]he board may,
upon cause shown, extend the time provided in this article for taking such appeal or filing of answer or pleading." ' '
Although the statutory language of the two appeal provisions
utilizes the word "may," rather than "shall," section 423 has, from
the inception of the act, been held mandatory in operation and jurisdictional in character. 2 Courts have thus indicated that, if the
section is violated, the board simply has no power to entertain the
appeal.5 33 If it is found in the appellate court that the time limita529. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 853 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Section 423 provides in its
entirety as follows:
Any party in interest may, within twenty days after notice of a referee's award or
disallowance of compensation shall have been served upon him, take an appeal to the
board on the ground: (1) that the award or disallowance of compensation is not in
conformity with the terms of this act, or that the referee committed any other error
of law; (2) that the findings of fact and award or disallowance of compensation was
unwarranted by sufficient, competent evidence or was procured by fraud, coercion, or
other improper conduct of any party in interest. The board may, upon cause shown,
extend the time provided in this article for taking such appeal or for the filing of an
answer or other pleading.
Id.
530. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1523 (Purdon 1952). Section 423 of the disease act
provides in its first paragraph precisely as does its counterpart in the workmen's compensation act, supra note 529. The second paragraph provides as follows:
In any appeal the board may disregard the findings of fact of the referee, and may
examine the testimony taken before such referee, and if it deem proper may hear
other evidence, and may substitute for the findings of the referee such findings of fact
as the evidence taken before the referee and the board, as hereinbefore provided may,
in the judgment of the board, require, and may make such disallowance or award of
compensation or other order as the facts so founded by it may require.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1523 (Purdon 1952).
531. Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642.
532. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (discussion of Wise v. Borough of
Cambridge Springs, 262 Pa. 139, 104 A. 863 (1918)). The terminological point is made if
only in acknowledgment that the use of "may" is often thought to indicate a legislative
intent that operation of the statute is to be merely "directory," rather than mandatory. Cf.
Bailey v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901, 904, 905 & n.3 (W. Va.
1982).
533. See Dinges Transfer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 15 Pa. Commw.
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tion of the section has been exceeded, the appeal will be
quashed,3 4 even sua sponte,535 notwithstanding the fact that the
appeal to the appellate court may have been timely.
Section 423 is not to be confused with section 413, which allows
the referee to review at any time a standing notice of compensation
payable or agreement "if it be proved that such notice [of compensation payable] or agreement was in any material respect incorrect." 36 When the receipt of compensation is the result of a referee's award, on the other hand, section 423 controls. If the
claimant or employer is dissatisfied with the award, that section's
strictures must be complied with; an allegation that a litigated issue (or one that should have been litigated) was resolved erroneously will thus be rejected as res judicata, even when the claimant
is receiving compensation under an award. 53 7
In addition, it should be remembered that the "award" referred
to in the statute applies to the original award, and not to subsequent amendments with respect to matters not pertinent to the
substantive aspects of the appeal. Thus, in a case in which a referee amended an unappealed award of partial disability some ten
months later to include provisions for the payment of physicians'
fees, no appeal of the partial disability finding by the claimant was
53 8
allowed.
Perhaps less predictable than the latter rule, given the general
tenet that rules of procedure and "pleading" in workmen's compensation are to be liberally construed,53 9 is the consistent refusal
of courts to honor timely but misdirected or technically defective
appeals. In such cases, section 423 will often operate, in the end, to
prevent any appeal. In Riley Stoker Corp. v. Workmen's Compen468, 471, 326 A.2d 668, 669 (1974) (discussing section 423, "The opinion of the Board indicates that it was under the mistaken impression that it had the discretionary authority to
disregard the statutory time limit for appeals. The Act confers no such authority upon the
Board.").
534. See Riley Stoker Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw.
533, 536, 308 A.2d 205, 206 (1973).
535. Compare Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. Budd Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 249,
250-51, 370 A.2d 757, 758 (1977) (discussing now defunct section 427) with Riley Stoker
Corp., 9 Pa. Commw. at 536, 308 A.2d at 206-07.
536. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 77, § 771 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
537. Cf. Bardo v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 34 Pa. Commw. 322, 325, 383
A.2d 570, 571 (1978).
538. Yeager v. United Natural Gas Co., 197 Pa. Super. 25, 30, 176 A.2d 455, 457 (1961)
(rehearing denied).
539. See infra note 637.
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sation Appeal Board,5 ° for example, the court refused to acknowledge that the claimant's letter to a referee, asking for "reconsideration or an appeal," and coming eleven days after the latter's award,
could be construed as a timely appeal. This refusal stemmed from
the clear language of section 423, which indicates that appeals are
to taken to the board.8 4 ' In Washington v. Workmen's Compensa54 s similarly, the claimtion Appeal Board (HarrisburgHospital),
ant's appeal was refused after he was found to have filed with the
board only a letter advising it of a desire to appeal, 54 3 rather than
a formal appeal stating "specific exceptions to determinations by
the referee sufficiently complete to frame the issue or issues
" 544

The final clause of section 423, indicating that "upon cause
shown" the appeal period may be extended, has proved ineffective
to provide, as is occasionally asserted, M
" the appeal board with plenary authority to grant appeals nunc pro tunc in any circumstances beyond those for which they have been traditionally
granted. 54 This is most likely a correct result, as the addition of
540. 9 Pa. Commw. 533, 308 A.2d 205 (1973).
541. Id. at 536, 308 A.2d at 206. The properly prosecuted appeal ultimately came well
after the 20 day period. See also McBride Transp. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 50 Pa. Commw. 593, 598, 413 A.2d 470, 472 (1980) (employer's contention that letter to
referee constituted "appeal to Board is wholly without merit.").
542. 69 Pa. Commw. 255, 450 A.2d 803 (1982).
543. Id. at 258, 450 A.2d at 804.
544. Id. at 258, 450 A.2d at 805 (quoting 34 Pa. Code § 111.14(a)). That section, which
must be read in conjunction with section 423, provides in its entirety as follows:
In all cases before the Board the parties or their counsel shall appear to present
their cause. In cases involving disfigurement or commutation the claimant shall appear in person. The briefs of the moving party should be filed one week before argument. The answering brief should be offered at the hearing. Briefs should be filed in
triplicate with the Board and served upon the opposing party and their counsel, if
represented. Appeals should state the specific exceptions to determinations by the
referee and shall be sufficiently complete to frame the issue or issues on appeal.
Id.
It may be noted that in the case discussed in the accompanying text the submitted letter
was postmarked 21 days after the decision of the referee. Assuming that the decision was
mailed or communicated to the claimant on the day of promulgation, the notice would have
been untimely in any case, even if the letter were to have been found to have an effective
method of appeal. See 69 Pa. Commw. at 256-57, 450 A.2d at 804. See also generally Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Johnson, 20 Pa. Commw. 231, 233, 341 A.2d 539, 540
(1975) (letter to Board by claimant intended as appeal not effective as appeal to commonwealth court, notwithstanding timeliness) (implied).
545. See Nardicchio v. Abbott's Dairies, 86 D. & C. 568 (1953). See also Tony Grande,
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Rodriguez), 71 Pa. Commw. 566, 568, 455
A.2d 299, 299 (1983).
546. See Wertman v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 169, 17273, 426 A.2d 205, 206 (1981).
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this clause was no doubt intended only to allow the board to grant
extensions of time requested within the original appeal period. 7
The ability of the board to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc, as suggested above, is guided under the same principles that control the
courts' discretion to do so.
B. Applicable Appellate Rules Governing Time for Appeals
For many years the applicable provisions regarding appeals of
decisions of the workmen's compensation appeal board were contained in the act. Now, however, the controlling provision is rule of
appellate procedure 1512, which mandates that "[a] petition for
review . . . shall be filed with the prothonotary of the appellate

court within 30 days after the entry of the order."5 8 From the order of the commonwealth court, to which all such appeals are currently taken, the provision controlling appeal to the supreme court
is rule 903, likewise allowing thirty days.""
For the limited claims still brought under the disease act, appeals from the board are taken to the court of common pleas, 550
and the act still provides for the time in which exceptions to the
board's decision must be filed.5

1

Thereafter, rule 903 operates to

552
allow thirty days to appeal to the commonwealth court.
It is well established that rules 903 and 1512 are jurisdictional 85
The rule was the same, of course, for the repealed section 427,

547. Cf. Devlin v. Grabler Mfg. Co., 151 Pa. Super. 216, 30 A.2d 138 (1943):
It is the general rule that statutes requiring appeals to be taken. .. within a certain
time are mandatory and jurisdictional . . . .Where there is a statutory provision to
extend the time or grant relief, a party, to be entitled to an extension of time or to
relief. . . must apply for such extension or relief in the manner and within the time
. . .fixed by the statute[.]
Id. at 220, 30 A.2d at 140 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
548. PA. R.A.P. 1512 (Purdon Supp. Pamph. 1985).
549. Id. 903.
550. Thirty days are allowed. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5571(b) (Purdon 1981)
(Section 5571(b) of the Judicial Code).
551. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1527 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
552. See supra note 549.
553. For cases so holding for Rule 903, see, e.g., Murphy v. Brong, 321 Pa. Super. 340,
344, 468 A.2d 509, 511 (1983) (numerous cases collected); for cases so holding for Rule 1512,
see, e.g., Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 505 Pa. 8, 11, 476 A.2d 364,
365 (1984); Criniti v. Department of Transp., 34 Pa. Commw. 512, 515, 383 A.2d 993, 995
(1978).
554. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 873 (1952). See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v.
Budd Co., 29 Pa. Commw. 249, 250, 370 A.2d 757, 758 (1977); Steven Kulovits Trucking v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 16 Pa. Commw. 417, 419, 332 A.2d 892, 893 (1975);
General v. E. Roseman Co., 10 Pa. Commw. 569, 572, 312 A.2d 609, 611 (1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 461 Pa. 284, 336 A.2d 287 (1975).
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which was contained in the act. It should be noted that, unlike the
workmen's compensation appeal board, the commonwealth court
possesses no power to allow extension of the appeal period, even
upon cause shown, when the request is made within the original
period authorized for appeals. 555 As is the case with section 423,
the strictness of the appeal provisions of the rules of appellate procedure may be avoided only by pursuing an appeal nunc pro tunc.
C. Appeals nunc pro tunc
1. TraditionalDoctrine
Like the general doctrine that appeal provisions are jurisdictional, the nunc pro tunc appeal exception is pervasive in its operation in Pennsylvania law. Interestingly enough, however, an early
workmen's compensation case has proved to be an enduringly popular case articulating the general standard. Quoting the most
archaic of cases, the supreme court in Wise v. Borough of Cambridge Springs556 held that the strictures of jurisdictional appeal
provisions would be relaxed and appeals nunc pro tunc allowed
"[w]here a party has been prevented from appealing by fraud, or
by the wrongful or negligent act of a court official

....

,5 The

555. PA. R.A.P. 105(b) (Purdon Supp. Pamph. 1985):
Enlargement of Time. An appellate court for good cause shown may upon application
enlarge the time prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may
permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the court may not
enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal, a petition for allowance of appeal, a
petition for permission to appeal, or a petition for review.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Altieri v. Board of Probation and Parole, 88 Pa. Commw.
592, 495 A.2d 213 (1985). But see COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § 211 (1985):
Upon receipt by the chief clerk from a pro se party of a written communication which

evidences an intention to appeal, the chief clerk shall timestamp the writing with the
date of receipt. The chief clerk shall advise the party by letter (1) as to the procedures necessary to perfect the appeal, and (2) that the date of receipt of the pro se
communication will be preserved as the date of the filing of the appeal, on condition
that the party files a proper petition for review within thirty days of the date of the
letter from the chief clerk.
Id. Under this rule the pro se communication must have been postmarked within the origi-

nal period.
556.

262 Pa. 139, 104 A. 863 (1918).

557. Id. at 144, 104 A. at 864 (quoting Singer v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. Co., 254 Pa.
502, 505, 98 A. 1059, 1060 (1916) (citing, in turn, Zeigler's Petition, 207 Pa. 131, 56 A. 419
(1903)). Although Wise was decided before the 1918 amendment to section 423, the section
under consideration, which added a proviso allowing extension of time for "cause shown," is
not thought to affect the nunc pro tunc appeal standard under the workmen's compensation
act. See supra note 547.
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standard was further illuminated in Nixon v. Nixon:55s "[Tihe occasion must be extraordinary and must involve fraud or some
breakdown in the court's operation through a default of its officers,
whereby the party has been injured."'1 59 With the exception of the

recently developed Bass doctrine,560 discussed below, this standard
for the allowing of the nunc pro tunc appeal has survived to the
present.
This has proven no less the case, predictably, in the realm of
workmen's compensation. In practice, such appeals are not granted
with frequency.561 The actual refusals often reflect the court's abiding rejection of arguments that nunc pro tunc appeals should be
allowed in cases of self-represented claimants, who are ignorant of
the need to strictly conform with procedural rules, and in cases of
claimants-or employers-who have fallen victim to attorney negligence. In the case of self-represented claimants, no relief was afforded where the claimant's attorney "withdrew on the day of the
referee's hearing thus leaving him without representation [and
without awareness] of the procedural or substantive consequences
of his plight."562 Nor was relief afforded where the pro se claimant
attempted to appeal, within twenty days, by addressing his request
for "reconsideration or an appeal" to the referee, rather than to
the board.56 3 The limits of the doctrine apply in this same way to
self-represented clients under the rules of appellate procedure." 4
Refusal to allow nunc pro tunc appeals after law office "breakdowns" stems from the enduring rule that the litigant's attorney is
deemed the be "the mere agent of the client.

. .

and the neglect of

558. 329 Pa. 256, 198 A. 154 (1938) (rehearing denied) (non-workmen's compensation
case).
559. Id. at 260, 198 A. at 157. Failure in the course of pursuing an appeal nunc pro
tunc to aver the requisite circumstances will, of course, result in a dismissal. See Tankin,
Inc. v. Williams, 2 Pa. Commw. 361, 277 A.2d 835 (1971). See also Dinges Transfer v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. 468, 470, 326 A.2d 668, 669 (1974). Where,
however, the record does not conclusively indicate whether an appeal has been timely pur-

sued, a remand would be in order. See Hill v. City of Philadelphia, 24 Pa. Commw. 611, 61213, 357 A.2d 227, 227 (1976).
560. Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979).
561. Cf. Drafts v. Bennet Shelburne Co., 26 Pa. Commw. 76, 79, 362 A.2d 464, 465
(1976) ("appeals nunc pro tunc are rarely permitted ....").
562. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. Gaines, 24 Pa. Commw. 307, 308-09, 355
A.2d 595, 596 (1976) ("Mere hardship is insufficient cause.").
563. Riley Stoker Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 533,
536, 308 A.2d 205, 206 (1973).
564. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keys, 313 Pa. Super. 410, 460 A.2d 253 (1983) (allocatur denied).
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one [is] the neglect of the other." 6 5 Complementing this rule, and
more to the point with respect to the allowance of tardy appeals, is
the fact that attorneys are not for this purpose considered "court
officials" 56 under the Wise rule, thus excluding such miscarriages
from the orthodox rule. The rule in this sense, of course, works
against both employer and claimant. In Wertman v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board,56 7 for example, the claimant was refused nunc pro tunc relief after his attorney's secretary failed to
mail the appeal in a timely manner.5 6 8 In Morgan v. Pittsburgh
Business Properties,Inc.,56 9 on the other hand, the employer was
barred from appeal after its attorney had, due to an alleged secretarial error, filed an effective and timely appeal, but from the
5 70
wrong decision.
Appeals granted due to a finding of fraud are rare, but an example of a nunc pro tunc allowance pursuant to this ground in the
workmen's compensation context is found in Drafts v. Shelburne
Co. 571 Drafts actually constitutes a case of constructive fraud, since
there was no indication of any malicious perpetration.7 Pursuant
to a notice of compensation payable, the insurer had been mailing
benefit checks to the claimant; however, all notices and correspondences relating to an ensuing termination petition were addressed
to the claimant at his employer's address. The claimant never
learned of the termination petition until the cessation of benefits,
which followed after a referee granted the termination petition in
lieu of any contest from the claimant." 3 Allowing the nunc pro
tunc appeal, the court held that
the "equivalent" of fraud is present inasmuch as the carrier knew (1) that
Drafts was represented by counsel (the benefit checks were mailed to
Drafts' attorney); (2) the address at which Drafts' counsel (and hence
Drafts) could have been reached; and (3) that the various documents and
notices were not being received by Drafts, since the postal authorities were
returning all of these items with the notation that Drafts had moved and
565. Ward v. Letzkus, 152 Pa. 318, 319 (1871) (quoting Houk v. Knop, 2 Watts 72, 72
(1833)). See also Yeager v. United Natural Gas Co., 197 Pa. Super. 25, 29, 176 A.2d 455, 456
(1961) (rehearing denied).
566. See Bass v. Commonwealth, 485 Pa. at 260, 401 A.2d at 1135. See also Commonwealth v. Rick, 75 Pa. Commw. 514, 517, 462 A.2d 902, 904 (1983).
567. 57 Pa. Commw. 169, 426 A.2d 205 (1981).
568. Id. at 171, 426 A.2d at 205-06.
569.
570.
571.

198 Pa. Super. 254, 181 A.2d 881 (1962).
Id. at 257-58, 181 A.2d at 882-83.
26 Pa. Commw. 76, 362 A.2d 464 (1976).

572.

Id. at 80-81, 362 A.2d at 466.

573.

Id. at 79, 362 A.2d at 465.
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57
not left a forwarding address. 4

That the claimant may have learned, well into the appeal period,
of the termination proceedings, was held in addition to be of no
consequence in denying the appeal, the court concluding that "a
claimant is entitled to a full 20-day appeal period, and not just a
'57 5
portion of [the] 20 days.
Instances in which conduct has been found to constitute fraud,
constructive or intentional, in the context of true statutes of limitations will be considered of the same character, of course, when
occurring in cases of appeals. 7 8
2.

Break from Orthodoxy: Bass v. Commonwealth

In Bass v. Commonwealth,5 " the supreme court modified this
established doctrine and held that a nunc pro tunc appeal would
lie where a showing was made that the non-timely filing was the
result of "non-negligent failure [, which] was corrected within a
very short time, during which any prejudice to the other side of the
controversy would necessarily be minimal. ' '578 Although Bass dealt
with rule 903 of the appellate procedural rules, the commonwealth
court has recently applied the doctrine to section 423 of the workmen's compensation act in Tony Grande v. Workmen's Compensa574. Id. at 80, 362 A.2d at 466.
575. Id. Cf., however, Branch v, Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa.
Commw. 374, 376, 393 A.2d 55, 57 (1978). In Branch, the claimant's attorney was not informed by the compensation authorities of hearings scheduled on a termination petition
filed by the employer with respect to the claimant's ongoing payments. The claimant did,
however, receive notice from the referee of the decision reached terminating benefits. Refusing any appeal nunc pro tunc several months after such notification, the court acknowledged that "administrative negligence may have prevented claimant from receiving notice of
the hearings," but held that such negligence was obviated by claimant's actual knowledge of
the decision. See id. at 377, 393 A.2d at 56-57. Actual knowledge of the pertinent facts
should thus always forestall a nunc pro tunc appeal asserted on the grounds of fraud, intentional or otherwise. Cf. Kopp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Doylestown Processing Co.), 78 Pa. Commw. 292, 297, 467 A.2d 425, 427 (1983) (Barry, J., concurring) (cessation
of checks should be considered actual notice to claimant of termination proceedings, compelling diligence on claimant's part to protect rights).
576. Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 47, 1 A.2d 839, 843 (1938)
(describing nunc pro tunc appeal issue addressed in Wise as "a situation parallel" to issue
of whether statute of repose was to be tolled in case of fraud). See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Gaines, 24 Pa. Commw. 307, 309, 355 A.2d 595, 596 (1976) (addressing
standard to be applied in granting of appeal nunc pro tunc, court cites statute of repose
case (Palmer v. City of Pittsburgh, 9 Pa. Commw. 526, 308 A.2d 179 (1973)). See generally
infra notes 689-702 and accompanying text.
577. 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979).
578. Id. at 260, 401 A.2d at 1135-36.
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tion Appeal Board (Rodriguez).5 79
Bass has had a limited impact in its intended province of appellate procedural rules. Cases in which the doctrine has been applied
reflect the fairly rare circumstances which attended the original
decision. In Bass, the appeal was filed four days late due to a secretary's sudden illness. Although the involved law office possessed
a procedure to ensure that deadlines were not missed due to such
illnesses, it was this very secretary who was assigned to implement
the procedure. 8 0 These facts were sufficient to compel the court to
conclude that the late filing was excusably "non-negligent." Following this model, it has been held that the mechanical failure of a
law clerk's automobile, preventing his timely arrival at the post office before its closing to mail an appeal, resulting in only a two-day
delay, were facts sufficient to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc under
Bass.5 81 In Tony Grande, likewise, a nunc pro tunc appeal was allowed where, ten days into the appeal period, the claimant's attorney underwent an "unpredicted and unavoidable hospitalization"
582
for a serious heart condition, precluding a timely filing.
The fairly consistent factual pattern discernible in cases decided
under Bass was, however, broken in Walker v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review.5 83 In Walker, the claimant alleged
as his reason for a late appeal the failure of the postal service to
properly forward his mail, thus resulting in his own ignorance of
the decision against him. 84 Remanding the case, the court noted
that "an untimely appeal may be allowed where the untimeliness is
not the result of the negligence of the appellant." ' 5 Although the
case does not on its face establish a new rule beyond Bass, Walker
has since been invoked by the commonwealth court to support a
general rule that in any case in which the untimeliness of the appeal is due to a third party not the agent of the appellant, a nunc
579. 71 Pa. Commw. 566, 568, 455 A.2d 299, 300 (1983). Whether the doctrine in this
realm may be carried over to the claim petition and notice of injury limitation contexts,
however, is questionable. In Hunsicker v. Connor, 318 Pa. Super. 418, 465 A.2d 24 (1983),
for example, the superior court rejected any application of the doctrine to the personal injury statute of limitations, holding that "[w]e do not read Bass as applying to legislatively
mandated limitations for commencing actions." Id. at 423-24 & n.3, 465 A.2d at 27 & n.3.
580. 485 Pa. at 258, 401 A.2d at 1134-35.
581. Perry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 74 Pa. Commw. 388, 390,
459 A.2d 1342, 1343 (1983).
582. 71 Pa. Commw. at 568 & n.2, 569, 455 A.2d at 299 & n.2, 300.
583. 75 Pa. Commw. 116, 461 A.2d 346 (1983).
584. Id. at 117, 461 A.2d at 347.
585. Id. The appeal in Walker was over a month late.
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pro tunc appeal will lie.5 " The requirement that no prejudice have
accrued to the appellee during the delay, however, no doubt survives the modification.
There is no doubt, however, that the general rule articulated in
Wise and Nixon continues to be good law.5 17 This is borne out
most often in cases where the Bass doctrine is advanced outside its
original parameters. Thus, a common pleas court was reversed after it cited Bass for the proposition that, because the claimant's
attorney was an "officer of the court," his negligent failure to file
an appeal merited relief by way of an appeal nunc pro tunc.58 8 Rejecting the trial court's interpretation of Bass, the court invoked
Nixon and held that the former case "left intact the long standing
rule that mere negligence by counsel which results in an untimely
appeal is not grounds for the allowance of an appeal nunc pro
tunc. ' ' c59 Likewise, where the plaintiff asserted that an appeal nunc
pro tunc should lie due to the fraud of his own attorney, the court,
again citing Nixon, held that such grounds were not adequate for
relief under the reasoning of Bass.590 Additionally, Bass has been
found not to apply under any circumstances when asserted in the
context of statutes of limitations. 9 1
586. See Roderick v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 Pa. Commw. 329, 332-33, 463 A.2d
1261, 1263 (1983) (citing Walker, "it has also now been held that where the appellant himself has not been negligent, negligent acts by a third party not part of the litigation process
will also excuse an untimely filing and permit an appeal to be taken nunc pro tunc."). See
also Finney v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 81 Pa. Commw. 101, 103 n.3, 472
A.2d 752, 753 n.3 (1984); Wert v. Department of Transp., 79 Pa. Commw. 79, 81-82, 468
A.2d 542, 544 (1983).
587. See generally In re Vacation of Portion of Dorney Park Rd., 503 Pa. 67, 70-71,
468 A.2d 462, 463-64 (1983).
588.
(1983).
589.
590.
(1984).

Department of Transp. v. Rick, 75 Pa. Commw. 514, 517, 462 A.2d 902, 903
Id. at 517, 462 A.2d at 904.
Hentz v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 85 Pa. Commw. 358, 360, 481 A.2d 998, 999-1000

591. Hunsicker v. Connor, 318 Pa. Super. 418, 424 & n.3, 465 A.2d 24, 27 & n.3 (1983).
Invocation of the doctrine is not necessary when there has been fraud or misrepresentation
under the orthodox rule. The facts in such cases often reveal that an attorney has, due to no
negligence of his own, failed to prosecute a timely appeal. Although this may seem like a
Bass situation, it is the established doctrine that permits nunc pro tunc appeals in such
cases. See, e.g., Tarlo v. University of Pittsburgh, 66 Pa. Commw. 149, 152, 443 A.2d 879,
880 (1982). Interestingly, however, under the facts of Tarlo the dissent viewed the attorney's
conduct as negligent and viewed the majority as applying Bass. See id. at 153, 443 A.2d at
881 (Crumlish, P.J., dissenting).
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D. Rules Governing Service
1. Appeals from Referee to Appeal Board
Section 406 of the workmen's compensation act592 often works in
tandem with section 423 to govern whether the appeal under the
latter section was timely. The section provides, as does the corresponding section of the disease act, sa 3 that
any notice or copy shall be deemed served on the date when mailed, properly stamped and addressed, and shall be presumed to have reached the
party to be served; but any party may show by competent evidence that any
notice or copy was not received, or that there was an unusual or unreasonable delay in its transmission through the mails.'"

Where the party alleging tardy or total lack of receipt of an adverse referee's decision is successful under the foregoing provision,
the specific modality by which the appeal is allowed is not an appeal nunc pro tunc in the previously discussed common law sense.
Instead, section 406 continues on to provide that the remedy is "allowance . . . to assert any right given him by this act," 5 9 5 -in
short, the ability to pursue the statutorily granted right of appeal.
Application of section 406 is not, of course, limited to the appeal
process, but is generally applicable throughout the workmen's compensation act. 596
Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of the statute,
courts have had to elucidate the rule in the course of settling appeal time disputes. An explicit calculation is found in Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board v. Budd Co. 59 7 In this case, the rule
is confirmed that appeal periods (as suggested in section 406) run
from the date of the mailing of the decision;5 98 the litigant, in turn,
592.
593.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 717 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
Id. § 1506 (Purdon 1952).

594. Id. § 717 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
595. Id.
596. See, e.g., Arbogast & Bastian v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bauer),
79 Pa. Commw. 364, 367-68, 468 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1984) (court discussing section 406 in
context of notice provision); Kopp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Doylestown
Processing Co.), 78 Pa. Commw. 292, 295, 467 A.2d 425, 426 (1983) (court discussing section
406 in context of statute of repose). Cf. Rockwood Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. 499, 503, 326 A.2d 665, 667 (1974) (filing of claim petition "is
perfected when it is mailed within the period of limitation and receipt or eventual loss occurring thereafter is irrelevant.").
597. 29 Pa. Commw. 249, 370 A.2d 757 (1977).
598. Id. at 251, 370 A.2d at 540. See also General v. E. Roseman Co., 461 Pa. 284, 288,
336 A.2d 287, 289 (1975), rev'g, 10 Pa. Commw. 569, 312 A.2d 609 (1973); Snead v. Megill,
202 Pa. Super. 386, 388, 195 A.2d 846, 847 (1963); Banks v. McClaln, 156 Pa. Super. 512,
515, 40 A.2d 905, 906 (1945).
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must "mail his appeal within [the prescribed number of days] of
that date to be timely."59' 9 In counting the days, the first day, just
alluded to, is excluded, and the last day is included.6 00 Where,
however, the last day is a legal holiday, it is omitted entirely from
the calculation. ° ' This is apparently the case even though at the
present time mail will be received and postmarked by the postal
service 365 days of the year.
In consonance with the language of the statute, the postmark on
the envelope containing the notice of the referee's decision constitutes evidence forming the presumption with respect to the date of
mailing.6 02 In lieu of such evidence, the records of the Bureau of
Workmen's Compensation should be admissible for the same purpose under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.60 3 It is
6 0°
evident, however, from Sinclair v. Henry Shaffer Lumber Co.,
that both of these rather persuasive forms of substantiation may
be overcome by an appellant exercising the statutory right to rebut
the presumption of mailing and show "unreasonable delay." In
Sinclair, one of the few cases in which this proviso has proven effective, both the employer's notice and the Bureau's records indicated a decision mailing date of February 2, 1955.05 The claimant's appeal from the decision was received two days after the
expiration of the then applicable period and was hence presumptively barred. Invoking the proviso, however, both the claimant
and his attorney testified that they had received their respective
599. General, 461 Pa. at 288, 336 A.2d at 289. The court in so holding was construing
the now repealed section 427 of the act, which allowed the litigant 20 days to appeal from
the board to the commonwealth court. The still-controlling case which establishes the same
rule for section 423 is Mapp v. City of Philadelphia, 433 Pa. 517, 519, 252 A.2d 684, 685
(1969) (quoting the reverse side of the "Referee's Decision" form, court holds that "[aln
appeal will be considered as filed within the prescribed time if it is mailed to the Board...
on the twentieth day after such notice.") (emphasis in original), rev'g, 212 Pa. Super. 319,
243 A.2d 479 (1968).
600. Steven Kulovits Trucking v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 16 Pa.
Commw. 417, 419, 332 A.2d 892, 893 (1975); Iannotta v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 11 Pa.
Commw. 156, 158, 312 A.2d 475, 476 (1973).
601. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. Johnson, 20 Pa. Commw. 231, 232, 341
A.2d 539, 540 (1975) (decided in recognition of General, 461 Pa. 284, 336 A.2d 287 (1975)).
See also Spillane v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 26 Pa. Commw. 536, 537, 364
A.2d 1386, 1386-87 (1976) (Sunday excluded when last day of period) (claim petition case).
602. See, e.g., Snead v. Megill, 202 Pa. Super. 386, 388, 195 A.2d 846, 847 (1963).
603. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (Purdon 1982) (decisions of referees are circulated
through the bureau; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 714 (Purdon Supp. 1985)).
604. 180 Pa. Super. 243, 119 A.2d 682 (1956).
605. Id. at 235-36, 119 A.2d at 683.
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notices a substantial period of time later. 606 The trial court, accepting this testimony as compelling a conclusion of unreasonable
delay, found "that the notices to the claimant and his counsel...
were not mailed until February 7, 1955."' °1 The latter rather unlikely conclusion appears to have been upheld by the appellate
court, however, only as a strained act of deference to the judgment
of the court of common pleas.
2.

Appeals from Appeal Board to Commonwealth Court

Although sections 406 and 427 governed the intricacies of workmen's compensation appellate court appeals for many years, those
sections were displaced in 1978 by the rules of appellate procedure.
Section 1512, as has been discussed, provides that a petition for
review "shall be filed with the prothonotary of the [commonwealth
court] within 30 days after the entry of the order.108 Rule 108(a),
in turn, works as a general corollary to section 406 and provides
that
[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed in the rule, in computing any period of
time under these rules involving the date of entry of an order by a court or
other governmental unit, the day of entry shall be the day the clerk of the
government unit mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties .... 01

Successful compliance with the thirty day period, in turn, is governed by rule 1514(a), which provides that
[i]f the petition for review is transmitted to the prothonotary by means of
first class mail, the petition shall be deemed received for the purposes of
Rule 121(a) (filing) on the date deposited in the United States Mail, as
shown on a U.S. Postal Service Form 3817 certificate of mailing. 10

VI.

OTHER STATUTES OF REPOSE

Considered in the ensuing section are three limitations which
work to procedurally limit the right to obtain an award of compensation. By virtue of this operative effect, these time limitations
have been designated as "statutes of repose." In the case of sec606. Id. at 236, 119 A.2d at 683.
607. Id. at 236-37, 119 A.2d at 683.
608. PA. R.A.P. 1512(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. Pamph. 1985).
609. Id. 108(a)(1).
610. Id. 1514(a). It should be noted, however, that where it may be discerned that the
petition was mailed in a timely fashion, the failure to obtain the postal service form will not
bar the appeal. See Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 505 Pa. 8, 12-15,
476 A.2d 364, 365-67 (1984).
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tions 413 and 434, which govern the ability of the claimant to reopen a claim, the discussion is limited to the background and essential operation of the provisions. Because the circumstances
under which all the limitations of the act may be tolled are essentially the same, this issue has been dealt with separately in the
succeeding portion of this article.
A.

Time for Rehearing

Section 426 of the workmen's compensation act provides that
the board may grant a rehearing "upon cause shown," adding as a
time limitation that "such rehearing shall not be granted more
than eighteen months after the board has made [an] award, disallowance, or other order or ruling, or has sustained or reversed any
action of the referee." '' Section 426 of the disease act612 provides
essentially the same, and has received the same treatment in terms
of its time limitation provision.2 3
The original rehearing provision possessed no limitation period
611. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Section 426 provides in its
entirety as follows:
The board, upon petition of any party and upon cause shown, may grant a rehearing of any petition upon which the board has made an award or disallowance of compensation or other order or ruling, or upon which the board has sustained or reversed
any action of a referee; but such rehearing shall not be granted more than eighteen
months after the board has made such award, disallowance, or other order or ruling,
or has sustained or reversed any action of the referee. Provided, however, That nothing contained in this section shall limit or restrict the right of the board, or a referee
to review, modify, set aside, reinstate, suspend, or terminate, an original or supplemental agreement, or an award in accordance with the provisions of section [413] of
this article.
Id.
612. The correlative provision under the disease act is found at id. § 1526 (Purdon
Supp. 1985), and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The board, upon petition of any party and upon cause shown, at any time before
the court of common pleas of any county of this Commonwealth to which an appeal
has been taken under the provisions of section [427] of this article, shall have taken
final action thereon, may grant a rehearing of any petition upon which the board has
made an award or disallowance of compensation or other order or ruling, or upon
which the board has sustained or reversed any action of a referee; but such rehearing
shall not be granted more than eighteen months after the board has made such
award, disallowance, or order or ruling, or has sustained or reversed any action of the
referee.
Id.
For a case discussing the basis for granting a rehearing, see Young v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.(Britt & Pirie, Inc.), 72 Pa. Commw. 471, 475, 456 A.2d 1150, 1152 (1983)
(numerous cases collected).
613. See Tulay v. General Foam Corp., 40 Pa. Commw. 229, 234 n.2, 397 A.2d 45, 47
n.2 (1979) (court minimizing difference between two sections 426 of the acts).
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at all beyond the requirement that the rehearing be granted by the
board before the common pleas court took final action on the same
case,6 14 if indeed an appeal had been taken from the board's decision. In 1927, however, the provision was amended to include a
one-year limitation couched in the same language recited above.6 15
The provision was promptly held to embrace the same purpose as
the claim petition limitation, "enabl[ing] employers to know the
period of time they could be called upon to respond to just claims,
so that they might not be constantly expecting stale claims of
doubtful merit."6 16 Likewise, the limitation was held to be
mandatory in operation, possessing as it did the same imperative
17
language as the section 315 limitation.
Later, under the influence of Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 16
the superior court announced section 426 to be a statute of repose." e This designation, which has endured in both the workmen's compensation62 0 and disease act 62 1 realms, involves the same
theoretical implications discussed earlier. Thus, for example, it is
accurate to state that when the eighteen month period expires it is
not merely the "remedy" which is lost, but the very right to secure
a rehearing.6 22 Likewise, the rule is clear that the limitation need
62 3
not be pleaded in order to be later invoked.
614. See Section 426 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended by Act of June
26, 1919, P.L. 642, 665 § 6 [1919].
615. See Act of April 13, 1927, P.L. 186 [19271.
616. Dolan v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. Super. 74, 79, 161 A. 763, 765 (1932) (quoting
Horn v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 274 Pa. 42, 44, 117 A. 409, 410 (1922)).
617. 106 Pa. Super. at 77, 79, 161 A. at 764, 765:
The words of the statute, "shall not be granted," are clear and precise, and are capable of only one interpretation, and that is, that the board does not . . . have any
power to grant a rehearing more than one year after it has sustained or reversed any
action of the referee.
The language of section 426. . .is just as imperative as that in section 315, and the
mandatory character of the time limitation must be recognized in the former as well
as in the latter.
Id. (citations omitted).
618. 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931).
619. Cosenza v. General Baking Co., 147 Pa. Super. 591, 596, 24 A.2d 735, 737 (1942).
620. See Johnson v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 224,
321 A.2d 728, 731 (1974).
621. See Tulay v. General Foam Corp., 40 Pa. Commw. 229, 235-36, 397 A.2d 45, 48
(1978).
622. See, e.g., Tulay, 40 Pa. Commw. at 236, 397 A.2d at 48; Moss v. City of Philadelphia, 209 Pa. Super. 317, 320-21, 228 A.2d 47, 49 (1967).
623. See Cosenza, 147 Pa. Super. at 596, 24 A.2d at 737. See also Overmiller v. D.E.
Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 570, 159 A.2d 245, 249 (1960); Gnall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Mines Corp.), 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 527, 462 A.2d 930, 931
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A frequently disputed issue under section 426 has been whether
the rehearing had to be granted within the eighteen month period,
or whether the petition merely need have been filed to satisfy the
limitation. The latter rule, of course, voices the universally accepted doctrine. 2 4 Nevertheless, the provision has always provided
that a "rehearing shall not be granted more than eighteen months
after the board [has reached its previous decision], ' ' 25 thus giving
rise to the argument that the board is precluded from acting beyond the eighteen month period, even when the petition has inarguably been filed in a timely fashion.6 26 Such an irrational rule
has never been adopted, although the argument has frequently surfaced since its initial rejection in 1933.27
With respect to the commencement of the period, the eighteen
months run from the date of the involved order. It has now been
(1983). The Gnall court, citing Overmiller, held that the employer had not waived the statute of repose limitation included in section 434 of the act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1001
(Purdon Supp. 1985), even though it was never raised before the referee. One must thus
look with suspicion upon the latent implication in Schiller v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 48 Pa. Commw. 336, 338, 409 A.2d 531, 532 (1980), that the employer might have
waived the rehearing limitation had it not brought the matter up before the referee. See id.
624. See 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 261 (1948):
The commencement of an action. . . suspends the running of the statute as to that
particular action, during its pendency. . . and lapse of time after commencement of
the suit does not bar enforcement of the right . . . even though . . . the actual contest over the claim is not concluded . . . until after the expiration of the statutory
period, since it is not required by the statute that the action be prosecuted to finality
within the prescribed period.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, Roberts v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 159 Pa.
Super. 472, 48 A.2d 91 (1946) (allocatur denied)).
625. See supra notes 611-12.
626. See Marinho v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 108 Pa. Super. 560, 562-63, 165 A. 506, 507
(1933).
627. The Marinho court rejected the argument, noting the inequity that would result
from its application:
Where the claimant acts within [the applicable period], he has done all that he can
do, and his right to relief should not be defeated because the board falls to act within
the year. This would make his right to relief dependent upon the speed or dilatoriness of the board. The filing of the petition within the year tolls the running of the
statutory limitation just as the filing of an original claim petition within the year
protects the claimant.
Id. at 564, 165 A. at 507.
See also Johnson v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 224, 321
A.2d 728, 731 (1974) ("the limitation for filing a petition for a rehearing run[s] to the date
the petition is filed, rather than to the date of the Board's action thereon."); Overmiller v.
D.E. Horn & Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 568, 159 A.2d 245, 247 (1960) ("it is the date of filing
the petition, and not the date of the board's action thereon, which ordinarily governs.");
Roberts v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 472, 476, 48 A.2d 91, 93 (1946)
(allocatur denied) ("The pendency of the suit operates to suspend the statute as to all parties thereto so far as the subject matter of the suit is concerned.").
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made clear that an appeal from that same order will not toll the
rehearing petition period. This rule is entirely consistent with the
current wording of the statute of the compensation act, which provides only that "[a] rehearing shall not be granted more than eighteen months after the board has [acted]. ' 62 8 The issue was alive,
however, when the first clause of the act provided (as it does similarly under the current disease act section 426) that a rehearing
could be granted "at any time before the Commonwealth Court, to
which an appeal has been taken . . . shall have taken final action
thereon .
"..."629 Faced with this tolling argument in Tulay v.
General Foam Corp.,630 the court held that the statute, when read
together with the limitation proviso, "clearly assumes that the
eighteen month period runs concurrently with an appeal to court,
thus indicating that the taking of an appeal does not toll the limitation period." 3 ' As was suggested above, the matter must now be
considered a non-issue under the workmen's compensation act section, as the statutory language supporting the argument has been
removed. The Tulay decision remains good law in the disease act
context to defeat the argument.
Older case law should still govern, however, to preclude the
board from taking action on a petition after final disposition of a
case brought under the workmen's compensation act which has
been appealed to the commonwealth court.6 32 This rule encompasses cases in which the petition has been filed before the disposition;6 33 the petition in such cases has no operative effect other than
to toll initially the eighteen month period. In order for the board
to take action on an appealed case, it must take such action before
the court's decision. 3 4 This is the case, it should be noted, even
where that decision is one to dismiss for failure to perfect an appeal due to untimely filing.6 35 These rules should endure notwith628. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 871 (Purdon 1985).
629. See Johnson, 14 Pa. Commw. at 224, 321 A.2d at 730-31; see also BMRERI, supra
note 2, § 6.24(8)(a), at 116.
630. 40 Pa. Commw. 229, 397 A.2d 45 (1978).
631. Id. at 237, 321 A.2d at 48.
632. Cf. Gonzales v. O'Donnell's Broad Street Bar, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 170, 175-76,
203 A.2d 583, 586 (1964) ("a petition for rehearing permitted by the act would be invalid if
the appeal were determined by the Court of Common Pleas before the board acted.");
Thomas v. James J. Skelly, Inc., 204 Pa. Super. 166, 169, 203 A.2d 339, 341 (1964) ("The
board, under the act ha[s] no power to grant a rehearing where the court ha[s] taken final
action on the appeal.").
633. Id. at 169, 203 A.2d at 340-41.
634. Id. at 169, 203 A.2d at 341.
635. Balin v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 40 Pa. Commw. 538, 540, 397
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standing the 1978 elimination of the statutory language pursuant
to which they were articulated. 6 It is surely a dictate of common
sense to disallow further administrative rulings after appellate
court relief has been sought and the court has in fact acted. 3 7
B.

Time for Reinstatement

Section 413 of the workmen's compensation act' 3 8 is a broadA.2d 876, 877 (1979).
636. As to the disease act, the language persists, so the cases are good law in that
context.
637. Cf. Hawkey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 56 Pa. Commw. 379, 385,
425 A.2d 40, 43 (1981) (Blatt, J., dissenting) (objecting to court's interpretation of defective
appeal as "non-appeal," dismissal of which was thus not truly court disposition of appeal
under act, dissent maintains that court should not "grant ad hoc relief to a petitioner whose
counsel mistakenly pursues appellate action before he exhausts his administrative remedies
").
by seeking a rehearing ....
It may be noted as a collateral matter that, pursuant to the liberal view toward pleading
under the act, an untimely petition for rehearing may be considered under the appropriate
circumstances as a petition for review and thus allowed if, of course, within the more generous three year limitation. Such facts were present, for example, in Moss v. City of Philadelphia, 209 Pa. Super. 317, 320-21, 288 A.2d 47, 49-50 (1967). See also Gleyze v. Hale Coal
Co., 149 Pa. Super. 18, 20-21, 26 A.2d 141, 143 (1942). See generally Dunmore School Dist.
v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 89 Pa. Commw. 368, 371, 492 A.2d 773, 775 (1985).
What is required for this to work, of course, is a finding that what the claimant was attempting to demonstrate was truly grounds for review of the award in the first place. Cf.
Moss, 209 Pa. Super. at 321, 228 A.2d at 49 ("The particular section of the statute under
which a petition is filed is not material, provided that a proper ground for action under an
appropriate section is proved."). Because the grounds for a rehearing are limited, this will
not always, of course, be the case. See Gleyze, 149 Pa. Super. at 21, 26 A.2d at 143.
The liberal pleading rule can, in addition, work the other way. See Lako v. Schlessinger,
208 Pa. Super. 85, 91, 220 A.2d 665, 667-68 (1966) (reinstatement petition treated as petition for rehearing).
638. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Section 413 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
A referee . . . may, at any time, modify, reinstate, suspend, or terminate a notice
of compensation payable, an original or supplemental agreement or an award of the
department or its referee, upon petition filed by either party with the department,
upon proof that the disability of an injured employe has increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased, or that the status of any dependent has
changed. Such modification, reinstatement, suspension, or termination shall be made
as of the date upon which it is shown that the disability of the injured employe has
increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or finally ceased, or upon which it
is shown that the status of any dependent has changed: Provided, That, except in the
case of eye injuries, no notice of compensation payable, agreement or award shall be
reviewed, or modified, or reinstated, unless a petition is filed with the department
within three years after the date of the most recent payment of compensation made
prior to the filing of such petition: And provided further, That any payment made
under an established plan or policy of insurance for the payment of benefits on account of nonoccupational illness or injury and which payment is identified as not
being workmen's compensation shall not be considered to be payment in lieu of work-
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ranging provision governing when an award, agreement or notice of
compensation payable may be modified, reinstated, suspended, or
terminated. The section operates as a true statute of limitations
governing a claimant's rights when benefits, however originated,
have been terminated or suspended. In such instances, payments
stop and the claimant must, within a certain period of time provided by section 413, re-assert the right to further compensation or
be forever barred therefrom with the same conclusiveness as is the
case with the original claim. 39
Although the first clause of section 413 would suggest that the
reinstatement petition may be filed at any time, this is not the
case. " 0° Instead, two further provisos control the time limit. The
first provides "[t]hat, except in the case of eye injuries, no notice
of compensation payable, agreement or award shall be reviewed, or
modified, or reinstated, unless a petition is filed . . .within three
years after the date of the most recent payment of compensation
made prior to the filing of such petition. '6 41 The second proviso
states that
where compensation has been suspended because the employe's earnings
men's compensation, and such payment shall not toll
the running of the Statute of
Limitations: And provided further, That where compensation has been suspended because the employe's earnings are equal to or in excess of his wages prior to the injury
that payments under the agreement or award may be resumed at any time during the
period for which partial disability is payable, unless it be shown that the loss in earnings does not result from the disability due to the injury.
Id.
639. In other words, section 413 in this context is a statute of repose. See Harrington
v. Mayflower Mfg. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 130, 132, 96 A.2d 180, 181 (1953) ("the provision of §
413 ... is not a technical statute of limitations ... which must be affirmatively pleaded as

a defense. It is strictly a statute of repose ....")(citing, inter alia, Ratto v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749 (1931)).
See also Joseph v. Bossert, 185 Pa. Super. 36, 41, 138 A.2d 256, 259 (1958) (referring to
operation of section 413, statute, if applied, would result in "complete extinguishment of
[the] right to further payments ....").
640. The open filing language survived the 1927 amendment which added the statute
of limitations discussed subsequently in the text. See Harrington,173 Pa. Super. at 132, 96
A.2d at 181; Falls-Overfield Voc. School Dist. v. Davis, 8 Pa. Commw. 63, 66-67, 301 A.2d
118, 120-21 (1973) (detailing enactment of 1927 amendment). See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 22 Pa. Commw. 498, 503-04, 349 A.2d 920,
923 (1976); Joseph v. Bossert, 185 Pa. Super. 36, 38, 138 A.2d 256, 258 (1958).
The rule is still applicable when payments are being made and when, for example, the
employer seeks a termination of benefits or the claimant or employer seek a modification.
The open filing language, however, is on its face irreconcilable with the limitation periods
where such periods are applicable. See Harrington, 173 Pa. Super. at 132, 96 A.2d at 181
(because irreconcilable, "the clause last in position, the one-year limitation, must prevail.")
(citing Statutory Construction Act).
641. See supra note 638.
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are equal to or in excess of his wages prior to the injury that payments
under the agreement or award may be resumed at any time during the period for which compensation for partial disability is payable, unless it be
shown that the loss in earnings does not result from the disability due to
the injury. 2

Under both provisions the last payment of compensation governs
the commencement of the applicable period. The precise nature of
a "payment of compensation" is thus clearly vital in determining
the operation of these provisions.6 4 3 Two basic rules in this respect,
however, may be mentioned at this point. First, payments of medical expenses, even made directly pursuant to the act's provisions,
do not constitute compensation for purposes of section 413.6 Second, the controlling standard in determining whether a payment of
compensation has been made is to inquire whether it was either a
payment directly under the award or agreement, or a payment "in
lieu of compensation"-in short, one intended to compensate the
claimant for an acknowledged work-related loss of earning
64 5
power.
Once the determination of whether a "last payment" of compensation (or one in lieu thereof) has indeed been made, the commencement date of the reinstatement period is not difficult to calculate. 4 6 Where the last payment is made pursuant to a
suspension, 4 7 however, the statute gives rise to other calculation
problems. In terms of applicability, it should be noted that the
statute's provision for reinstatement "at any time during the period for which partial disability is payable" (currently 500 weeks),
642. See id.
643. See generally infra notes 776-807 and accompanying text.
644. Pliscott v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 292, 296, 305
A.2d 918, 920 (1973) (quoting Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 201 A.2d 276
(1964)).
645. Hickey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 153 Pa. Super. 45, 47, 33 A.2d 285, 286 (1943). See
also City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw. 424, 428,
310 A.2d 701, 703 (1973). That this is the controlling standard is reflected in the proviso,
also found in section 315, that payments "made under an established plan or policy of insurance" intended to compensate for "nonoccupational illness ...

and .

.

. identified as not

being workmen's compensation" are not to be deemed "payment[s] in lieu of workmen's
compensation" sufficient to toll the statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772 (Purdon Supp.
1985). See infra notes 776-807 and accompanying text.
646. This date is probably the date of the cashing of the check, rather than that of the
employer's or insurance carrier's issuance of the document. Hartung v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa. Commw. 240, 242, 410 A.2d 1301, 1302 (1980) (final receipt case).
See also Kopp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., (Doylestown Processing Co.), 78
Pa. Commw. 292, 295, 467 A.2d 425, 426 (1983) (date of last payment, not notice of termination against benefits governs commencement point of limitation). But see infra note 622.
647. See supra note 638 and accompanying text.
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is limited to instances where compensation is suspended due to actual restorationof earning capacity.648 Thus, where compensation
is ostensibly "suspended" pursuant to an employer's termination
petition alleging only that the claimant's disability has ceased, the
three-year limit, rather than that of the 500 weeks, applies." 9
Where the employer puts forth the dual allegation that the disability has ceased and that earning capacity has been regained, the
result may be different, governed ultimately by the referee's conclusion with respect to the circumstances surrounding the claimant's ability to return to work.
Actual calculation of the period in which the reinstatement petition may be filed in such circumstances must take into account
whether a portion of the 500-week period has already been taken
advantage of by the claimant. In two circumstances the full 500week period will be available to the claimant upon suspension. The
first situation exists where the claimant is receiving total disability
and the suspension is ordered (or agreed upon) when the claimant
thereafter returns to work but concededly possesses some residual
disability not manifested in a loss of earning power.6 50 The second
situation arises where the claimant has indisputedly suffered a
work-related injury for which medical payments may or may not
have been made, but which is attended at no time by a loss of
earning power. At that time, or at a time within three years of the
injury, a suspension may be sought, even though no disability pay648. See D & T Brooks, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa. Commw.
223, 227, 392 A.2d 895, 898 (1978) ("the exception for suspensions engrafted by case law and
restated by the legislature applies only to suspensions due to a return to earning power
rather than a change in disability."). See also id. at 227 n.5, 392 A.2d at 898 n.5
(illustration).
Cf. Economy Decorators, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Federici), Pa. Commw. -,
-, 506 A.2d 1357, 1359 (1986) ("Where there is a disability with a
resultant loss of earning power but the employee receives as much for his services as he
earned before the injury, payments of compensation must be suspended when the disability
is not reflected in loss of wages.").
649. Where, for example, the referee is convinced that the claimant could return to
work, but maintains doubt as to the permanency of his recovery, denominating the order
terminating benefits as one for suspension does not grant to the claimant the more generous
500-week reopening limitation period. This result is clearly demanded by the statute, which
allows the extended period only where the "employe's earnings are equal to or in excess of
his wages prior to the injury .
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 772 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
650. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 512 (Purdon Supp. 1985):
[Compensation for partial disability] shall be paid during the period of such partial
disability. . . but for not more than five hundred weeks. Should total disability be
followed by partial disability, the period of five hundred weeks shall not be reduced
by the number of weeks during which compensation was paid for total disability.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ments have been made."' In instances where partial disability has
been received, the latter amount in terms of weeks paid is subtracted from the 500 week period.65 2 Prior periods of suspension,
however, are not included in the subtracted measure; it is only the
"number of weeks during which such disability actually exists and
6 53
compensation [is] paid" that is subtracted from the 500 weeks.
C.

Time for Setting Aside of Final Receipt

Section 434 of the workmen's compensation act provides that a
final receipt of compensation may be set aside "at any time within
three years from the date to which payments have been made...
if it be shown that all disability due to the injury in fact had not
terminated"" as of the date of the claimant's signing of the re651. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 62 Pa.
Commw. 502, 506, 437 A.2d 92, 94 (1981) ("If an employee does not incur an immediate
wage loss for an observable physical disability, the protections granted by the act can only
be achieved by issuing a suspension order, which allows the employee up to 500 weeks in
which to monitor the course of his disability."). And compare STANDER, supra note 44, at
305:
[Plartial loss of hearing is not compensable as a specific loss under the Act. . . . The
only way in which compensation may be awarded for partial loss of hearing is when it
results in either total or partial disability, and is accompanied by a loss of earnings or
earning power. Without such a loss, claimant is entitled only to a suspension of
compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
652. D & T Brooks, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 38 Pa. Commw. 223,
227, 392 A.2d 895, 898 (1978) (refers to former 350 week period). See also Palmiere v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (East End Trucking),
- Pa. Commw. -,
496 A.2d
918 (1985).
653. 38 Pa. Commw. at 227, 392 A.2d at 898 (citing Modern Cooler Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. 22, 333 A.2d 811 (1975)). Offered as the reason
for the rule:
Where, as here, the employer is relieved of the payment of compensation during the
course of this period, when the claimant resumes full earning power, albeit with a
continuing disability, the period of suspension inures entirely to the benefit of the
employer and he should not thus be heard to complain if subsequently within the
statutory time for payment, the changed status of the employe's earning power revives his liability.
38 Pa. Commw. at 228, 392 A.2d at 898.
654. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1001 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The rarely applied correlative
provision of the disease act provides the same. See Section 434 of the Occupational Disease
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1534 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (still provides for only two-year
period).
For many years, clear and convincing evidence was required of the claimant in order for
the final receipt to be set aside, even after the section was amended to remove such language. The burden has now been changed; the "claimant need only provide 'sufficient credible evidence.'" Lesneski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., - Pa. Commw. -,
-,
503 A.2d 73, 75 (1985). For an explanation of the change, see Sheibley v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (ARA Food Servs. Co.), 86 Pa. Commw. 28, 483 A.2d 593 (1984)).
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ceipt. No case specifically denominates section 434 as a statute of
repose, but it has without doubt experienced such a construction. 5 Indeed, in Gnall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board (Bethlehem Mines Corp.),"' it was held that the employer
could raise the limitation for the first time on appeal before the
appeal board, 5 7 a principal statute of repose attribute. 58
As under section 413, payments of medical expenses do not constitute payments of compensation for purposes of indicating the
commencement date of the section 434 limitation. 59 Likewise, the
"date to which payments have been made" language refers to the
date to which payments of compensation or those in lieu thereof
have been made. 6 0 Pursuant to this same language, furthermore, it
is this date and not the date of the signing of the final receipt
which defines the limitation commencement point."' The precise
date appears to be that on which the benefit check is cashed,
rather than issued, if this is the method of payment undertaken by
the employer or insurance carrier.6 " 2
655. See Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 359, 201 A.2d 276, 277
(1964) (allocatur denied) ("The legislature made the filing of the petition within the specified time an express condition of the right to obtain an additional award of compensation,
and intended that the failure to file it within the specified time should operate as an absolute bar of the right.").
656. 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 462 A.2d 930 (1983).
657. Id. at 527-28, 462 A.2d at 931 (citing Stewart v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 50 Pa. Commw. 479, 413 A.2d 437 (1980) (final receipt case); Overmiller v. D.E. Horn &
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 562, 159 A.2d 245 (1960) (rehearing case)).
658. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
659. Pliscott v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 292, 296, 305
A.2d 918, 920 (1973); Dennis, 203 Pa. Super. at 362-63, 201 A.2d at 279.
660. Hickey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 153 Pa. Super. 45, 48, 33 A.2d 285, 286 (1943)
(section 315 case). Cf. Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw.
424, 429, 310 A.2d 701, 703-04 (1973) (principles regarding the nature of payments in their
limitations-tolling aspect apply equally in claim petition and setting aside of final receipt
contexts).
661. Auerbach v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Auerbach), 80 Pa. Commw.
301, 306, 471 A.2d 596, 599 (1984); Pliscott v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa.
Commw. 292, 295, 305 A.2d 918, 920 (1973).
662. Hartung v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa. Commw. 240, 242, 410
A.2d 1301, 1302 (1980). But see Urick Foundry Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Aarno), 91 Pa. Commw. 24, 26 n.2, 496 A.2d 883, 885 n.2 (1985). In Urick Foundry, the
court announced, in dicta, that "Hartung cannot be read as equating the date of payment
with the date the check is cashed." Id. at 26 n.2, 496 A.2d at 885 n.2. Judge Doyle's explanation is persuasive and may well become the rule upon later consideration of the issue by the
court:
A check is a negotiable instrument which is payable on demand on or after the date
specified on its face ....
It follows, therefore, that when compensation payments are
made by check, absent any fraud or intentional delay in transmittal, payment has
been made as of the date of the check.
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In many instances, a final receipt will have been obtained upon
the employee's return to work when it would have been more
proprietous for the parties to have stipulated to a supplemental
agreement, thus allowing the 500-week reinstatement period of section 413 to apply. 6 3 Once the final receipt is signed, however, the
modality by which the case may be re-opened is the petition to set
aside the final receipt. 66 4 There is no time bar, of course, in such
circumstances as long as the petition is filed within three years of
the signing of the final receipt; however, the more generous 500week period will have been sacrificed, along with, until recently, a
lesser substantive burden of proof required to re-open the claim. 6 5
Such a factual situation was present in Hartung v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board,6 6 in which the claimant argued that
"because it has been shown that claimant worked while disabled,
the final receipt does not prevent [him] from qualifying for reinstated disability under section 413 . . ., a disability right which
was in abeyance from the time he returned to work.""6 7 Although
the argument is perhaps compelling, the Hartung court was constrained by the wording of section 413, which refers only to suspensions and not to final receipts, to reject the argument.6
VII.

TOLLING OF TIME LIMITATIONS

A.

Introduction

Although the time limitations discussed in the foregoing sections
of this article possess various theoretical bases and operative characteristics, the circumstances required to coalesce in order for a
limitation period to be tolled are for the most part the same
throughout the statutory scheme. Indeed, in the course of the maturation of the two acts, Pennsylvania courts drew freely on prior
constructions of interpreted provisions to establish the tolling rule
to be applied when the issue arose in the case of an uninterpreted
Id. (emphasis in original).
663. Cf. id. at 244 n.3, 410 A.2d at 1303 n.3.
664. Cf. Marshall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 426, 429
n.2, 418 A.2d 769, 770 n.2 (1979) (MarshallI) (although referee referred to petition as one
for reinstatement, final receipt had been signed, and hence section 434 necessarily
governed).
665. See supra note 654.
666. 49 Pa. Commw. 240, 410 A.2d 1301 (1980).
667. Id. at 244, 410 A.2d at 1302-03.
668. Id. at 244, 410 A.2d at 1303. For the text of section 413, see supra note 638.
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limitation."6 9 At present, it is still not uncommon to find a court
offering as authority for the tolling of one provision a case construing another limitation altogether. 7 0 A principal reason for this
practice is the shared mandatory nature of all the limitation provisions, a characteristic which demands strict judicial application.
Only limited circumstances are sufficient to cause a tolling or permit an extension of the time period.
It has always been said of mandatory limitations that "courts
have no power to extend" their operation "as a matter of indulgence;" that "[s]omething more than mere hardship is necessary to
justify an extension of time"; 7 1 or simply that "in the absence of a
legally sufficient justification, a tribunal has no authority to consider a late petition. ' 67 2 In practice, there are only two "legally sufficient justifications": by way of an estoppel of the employer due to
certain forms of conduct, 7 5 or by way of extension of the limita' ' 74
tion itself because of payments "in lieu of compensation. 1
It is worthwhile to note first, however, the circumstances which
are not sufficient to toll the limitation periods. First, it is clear that
the commonly regarded "disabilities" have no effect on the running
of the statutes of limitations. Thus, where the claimant is imprisoned during the entire period in which to seek, for example, a rein669. See, e.g., Demmel v. Dilworth Co., 136 Pa. Super. 37, 39, 7 A.2d 50, 54 (1939)
(allocatur denied) (applying claim petition standard in final receipt context); Guy v. Stoecklin Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 47, 1 A.2d 839, 843 (1938) (applying jurisdictional provision standard in statute of repose context). See also Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw. 424, 429, 310 A.2d 701, 704 (1973) (declaring that claim petition
cases "holding that payments by an employer to an employee which are intended to compensate for loss of earning power, not to pay for services rendered by the employe, toll the
running of the statute, are good authority in [final receipt] cases."). See also id. at 430 n.4,
310 A.2d at 704 n.4.
670. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Auerbach), 80 Pa.
Commw. 301, 305, 471 A.2d 596, 598 (1984) (court citing claim petition case for standard to
be applied in tolling setting aside of final receipt limitation); Gnall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Mines Corp.), 75 Pa. Commw. 525, 527-28 & n.4, 462 A.2d
930, 931 & n.4 (1983) (court citing rehearing case for proposition that final receipt period is
mandatory); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 22 Pa.
Commw. 498, 505, 349 A.2d 920, 924 (1976) (court citing claim petition cases for standard to
be applied in tolling reinstatement limitation).
671. Wise v. Borough of Cambridge Springs, 262 Pa. 139, 143, 104 A. 863, 864 (1918)
(appeal provision). See also Lewis v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 159 Pa. Super. 226, 229,
48 A.2d 120, 122 (1946) (statute of repose); Palmer v. City of Pittsburgh, 9 Pa. Commw. 526,
530, 308 A.2d 179, 181 (1973) (allocatur denied) (statute of repose).
672. Gnall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Mines Corp.), 75 Pa.
Commw. 525, 528, 462 A.2d 930, 931 (1983).
673. See infra notes 689-737 and accompanying text.
674. See infra notes 750-807 and accompanying text.
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statement or modification of an award or agreement, any assertion
that extra time should be allotted for re-opening the claim after
release will be rejected. 7 5 Likewise, in Riddick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (State Correctional Institute at
Graterford),676 the correlative rule was affirmed that a claimant's
677
mental incompetency will not work to toll the limitation period.
It is likewise clear that a claimant's minority has no tolling effect,
whether the claimant be the actual injured worker or the injured
employee's dependent. 7 s
Underlying the rejection of these disabilities as circumstances
sufficient to toll or extend the limitations is the simple failure of
any of the compensation provisions to specifically make exceptions
for them. 79 It has been the long-standing approach of Pennsylvania courts not to afford a tolling effect to any disability without
specific statutory authority, 0° and this approach has been carried
over into the construction of the workmen's compensation
681
limitations.
As discussed in the preceding section regarding the appeal provisions of the acts,68 ' the doctrine established in Bass v. Common675. Stevenson v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 146 Pa. Super. 32, 35, 21 A.2d 468, 469
(1941) ("no consideration of public policy can be invoked to perpetuate a convict's right to
compensation without action on his part, for the period of eight years. The Commonwealth
is not so solicitous of a prisoner maintained at the expense of the State."), aff'd on other
grounds, 344 Pa. 561, 26 A.2d 199 (1942).
676. __
Pa. Commw. -, 499 A.2d 694 (1985).
677. Id. at , 499 A.2d at 696-97 (rejecting approach of other jurisdictions).
678. See Landis v. Zimmerman Motors, Inc., 29 Pa. Commw. 227, 229-30, 370 A.2d
412, 414 (1977). This has been the rule from the early days of the act. See SKINNER, supra
note 2, at 693 (4th ed. 1947) (citing Price v. State Fund, 16 W.C.B. 332 (1933)).
679. See Riddick, Pa. Commw. at , 499 A.2d at 697 ("this court cannot
[make any exception for disability] without legislating and thus usurping the lawmaking
function which the constitution confers only upon the legislators elected to perform it.");
SKINNER, supra note 2, at 693 (4th ed. 1947) ("the statute runs against a minor.., because
the right is a purely statutory right and there is no exception in the Act extending the time
for filing petitions by minor dependents.").
680. See, e.g., Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 382, 385 (1866). See also Von Colin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 367 Pa. 232, 234, 80 A.2d 83, 84 (1951). Indeed, as the Riddick court noted, the
approach has been essentially codified outside the workmen's compensation context. See
__

Pa. Commw. at -

, 499 A.2d at 697 (quoting 42

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 5533 (Purdon

1981)).
681. Reliance on this approach under the workmen's compensation act may seem inappropriate, but as posited in an earlier portion of this article, such reliance is entirely
appropriate, since there is nothing in the statute of repose theory that would prevent the
court from deciding to toll the statute of limitations in cases of disabilities such as insanity.
See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
682. See supra notes 522-610 and accompanying text.
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wealth 685 of "non-negligent, non-prejudicial delay" as reason for allowing an appeal nunc pro tunces ' constitutes the only relaxation
to date in construction of mandatory limitation statutes. The rule
has been applied under the workmen's compensation act,"" but,
notably, only in the context of section 423, the appeal provision
contained in the act. The question still remains, therefore, whether
the doctrine can be applied to extend the time in which petitions
seeking compensation under the statutes of repose may be
brought.
There is, however, doubt as to the applicability of the Bass rule
outside the context of appeal provisions. There is first the conceptual problem: the court's invocation of its organic powers to allow
an appeal nunc pro tunc,6 8 as in Bass, has little to do with the
decision of whether or not to permit the extending of a statute of
repose, the expiration of which extinguishes any right to pursue
the claim.68 7 Second, of course, the very desire to relieve the claimant of a brief, harshly operating limitation is not present in the
case of the statutes of repose; compared to the fleeting twenty or
thirty-day appeal limits, the three year limitation periods are already generous, and the perceived need reflected in Bass to forgive
litigants for non-negligent nominal delays surely is non-existent in
the realm of these limitation provisions. Finally, when applicability
of the doctrine was advocated recently under the personal injury
statute of limitations, the superior court flatly retorted that the
doctrine was to have no applicability in the context of "legislatively mandated limitations for commencing actions." 8
B.

Tolling by Employer Conduct

Conduct by the employer, insurance carrier, or certain third parties which misleads the employee with respect to his or her potential claim will operate to extend the period of time within which
683. See supra notes 577-91 and accompanying text.
684. 485 Pa. 256, 401 A.2d 1133 (1979).
685. See Tony Grande, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Rodriguez), 71
Pa. Commw. 566, 455 A.2d 299 (1983).
686. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
687. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
688. Hunsicker v. Connor, 318 Pa. Super. 418, 424 n.3, 465 A.2d 24, 27 n.3 (1983). In
Hunsicker, the plaintiff's attorney had failed to file a malpractice action in a timely fashion.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the tardy filing should be excused "because of counsel's
manic depressive condition." Id. at 423, 465 A.2d at 27. Although hinting that the failure
may have been "non-negligent," the court went on to reject, as recited in the text, the applicability of Bass. Id. at 424 & n.3, 465 A.2d at 27 & n.3.
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the claimant may act. In the case of appeals, a finding that an employer or bureaucratic official has committed such an act will allow
the court to invoke its powers and grant an appeal nunc pro
tunc.6 89 In the context of statutes of repose, such conduct will result in the employer or insurance carrier being estopped from asserting that the claimant has exceeded the time limitation."' 0
Where such a course of behavior has prevented the employee from
giving timely notice of injury, the latter estoppel notion is also said
to apply. 9 1 Such cases should rarely occur, however, because actual knowledge of the injury on the part of the employer relieves
the claimant from compliance with the time requirement; 92 if the
employer is aware of the injury, the limitation is thus irrelevant,
and consideration of any subsequent misleading act would be
spurious.
Conduct regarded as misleading the employee may be entered
into either intentionally 693 or unintentionally.6 4 As recently re-affirmed by the supreme court, the employer's actions must in any
case "fraudulently or deceptively [lull] the claimant into inaction"
by instilling in him or her "a false sense of security . . .that a
claim has been or will be processed."6 95 In all such cases, the bur689.

See supra notes 566-91 and accompanying text. See generally Bardo v. Work-

men's Compensation Appeal Bd., 34 Pa. Commw. 322, 326, 383 A.2d 570, 571 (1978).
690. Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 47, 1 A.2d 839, 843 (1938)
("quasi estoppel should be equally effective against a party who is responsible for the
delay.").
691. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Diggs, 46 Pa. Commw. 58, 61 n.3, 406 A.2d 246, 248
n.3 (1979).
692. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 631 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 311 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). See also supra notes 442-57 and accompanying text. Actual
knowledge of the injury, however, does not toll the claim petition period or any of the other
statutes of repose. These time limitation periods are mandatory. See supra note 166 and
accompanying text. See also supra note 261. Only an averment of fraud, intentional or otherwise, may estop the employer from raising the limitation. But see infra notes 733-37 and
accompanying text.
693. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Krause), 77 Pa. Commw. 420, 425, 465 A.2d 1342, 1345 (1983) (knowing substitution of
unemployment compensation benefits).
694. See, e.g., Thorn v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 63-64, 155 A.2d
414, 416-17 (1959).
695. Taglianetti v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hosp. of Univ. of Pa.), 503
Pa. 270, 273, 469 A.2d 548, 549-50 (1983), aft'g, 63 Pa. Commw. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981). An
alternative articulation of this dichotomy is that an estoppel will be applied when "fraud or
its equivalent" is present. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Gaines, 24 Pa.
Commw. 307, 309, 355 A.2d 595, 596 (1976) (appeal provision); Palmer v. City of Pittsburgh,
9 Pa. Commw. 526, 532, 308 A.2d 179, 182 (1973) (allocatur denied) (quoting Thorn v.
Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 155 A.2d 414 (1959) (statute of repose)).
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den is upon the claimant to show by clear and precise evidence69 6
that the employer or insurance carrier has engaged in such conduct."'7 Whether that conduct has occurred is a question of fact 698
to be determined by the referee. 99 Not surprisingly, then, where
the issue has been properly raised and preserved on appeal, the
appeal board or court will remand if the referee's findings with respect to the issue are not framed in such a manner as to facilitate a
proper review.1°° In all cases, the conduct must always occur
within the applicable limitation period from the time of the injury
or last payment. 70 1 Later acts by the employer, even intentional
acts of misleading, will not revive the right to compensation and
then immediately toll the limitation. °2
70 3
1. Effect of Estoppel: Recommencement of the Limitation

For many years it was held that when conduct was such as to
suspend the running of a limitation, the time period would re-commence upon the last misleading act of the employer or insurance
carrier.7 04 The rule was probably developed by the courts in light
696. See Landis v. Zimmerman Motors, Inc., 29 Pa. Commw. 227, 231, 370 A.2d 412,
414 (1977). See also Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Griffith, 28 Pa. Commw. 623,
628, 368 A.2d 1371, 1374 (1977); Climax Molybdenum v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 15 Pa. Commw. 249, 252, 325 A.2d 822, 823 (1974); Sweeney v. Reading Co., 146 Pa.
Super. 539, 544, 23 A.2d 66, 68 (1941) ("Clear proof of fraud, coercion or other improper
conduct will estop an employer from invoking the limitation ....
").
697. This must still be the evidentiary criteria in such circumstances when a final receipt is sought to be set aside. Although the commonwealth court in Sheibley v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. (ARA Food Servs. Co.), 86 Pa. Commw. 28, 483 A.2d 593 (1984),
eliminated the "conclusive proof" requirement under section 434, this clearly applies only to
the quality of evidence needed to show that all disability had not subsided at the time of the
signing of the receipt; it has nothing to do with the quality of evidence needed for estoppel
to apply.
698. Carpinelli v. Penn Steel Castings Co., 209 Pa. Super. 390, 395, 227 A.2d 912, 914
(1967).
699. See generally Universal Cyclops Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 176, 182, 305 A.2d 757, 761 (1973) (allocatur denied).
700. See Tim-Bar Paper Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 42 Pa. Commw.
124, 126, 400 A.2d 245, 246 (1979); Meyers v. Lehigh Valley Transp. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 569,
573, 10 A.2d 879, 881 (1940).
701. Auerbach v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Auerbach), 80 Pa. Commw.
301, 305, 471 A.2d 596, 598-99 (1984).
702. Cf. Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 113, 116,
401 A.2d 882, 883-84 (1979) (payment of compensation made beyond statute of limitations
did not revive right to file for benefits).
703. The following discussion does not apply to appeal provisions, where the avoidance of the time limitation bar is by way of the appeal nunc pro tunc, rather than by way of
estoppel.
704. See Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 50, 1 A.2d 839, 844 (1938):
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of the correlative statutory provision establishing the last payment
of compensation as the point at which the period would run when
a claimant was injured and being paid monies by the employer.70 5
In Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Township of Marple)76 however, the last misleading act doctrine was
replaced with a "discovery" rule. Under Dudley, the period only
recommences when "the claimant knows, or with reasonable diligence could know, of [the] deception. ' 70 7 Although the court recognized that in the medical malpractice field, from which the new
standard was borrowed, there was authority suggesting that "'active fraud' [was] required for the tolling of the statute pending discovery, 70 8 it went on to make clear that all employer "statements
or actions" which had been held to toll the compensation limitations would be receptive to discovery rule treatment. 70 9 It is thus
clear that the last misleading act doctrine has been overruled in its
application to both intentional and unintentional misrepresentation. There is, further, no reason to believe that the new doctrine
should not apply to all of the limitations of the act, although the
Dudley court seems to have intentionally couched its holding in
terms limited to the claim petition limitation with which it was
7 10
dealing.
One unforeseen new argument directed at tolling of the limitation provisions may well result from Dudley. Under the claim petition, reinstatement petition, and final receipt limitations of the act,
there is provision for suspension of the running of the statute until
the last payment of compensation is made.7 11 As pointed out
above, when the last payment "in lieu" of compensation is made,
the limitation begins to run in much the same way as it would afThe legislature thought that one year was a reasonable time within which to bring
such actions and under the circumstances we think that the same limitation should
be applied to run from the date of the [misleading] conversation between the claimant and the officer of the defendant company.
Id. See also Tarnoski v. Kanarr Corp., 12 Pa. Commw. 488, 492, 317 A.2d 904, 906 (1974);
Mucha v. M.L. Bayard & Co., 177 Pa. Super. 138, 140, 108 A.2d 925, 927 (1954) (allocatur
denied).
705. See infra notes 749-807 and accompanying text.
706. 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169 (1984), aff'd per curiam, Pa. 507
A.2d 388 (1986).
707. Id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173.
708. Id. at 241 n.10, 471 A.2d at 173 n.10 (emphasis added).
709. See id.
710. See id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173. In changing the rule, the court actually brought
the workmen's compensation rule into line with the general rule, including that applied to
other Pennsylvania-construed statutes of repose.
711. See generally infra notes 749-897 and accompanying text.
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ter the employer, under the old rule, had committed its last misleading act. It may thus be thought that the Dudley rule should
apply in the context of these last payment provisions, since in
many circumstances, these very non-statutory, "in lieu" payments,
made to an employee after an injury, are alleged to have lulled or
misled the potential claimant into believing that a formal claim
need not be brought. 71" The technical success of such an argument
would necessitate a situation in which the employer has made payments in lieu of compensation and the employee testifies that,
while no misleading declaration was made by the employer, the
latter's payments of money nevertheless led the claimant to believe
that the employer recognized its own liability, initiated the compensation itself, and thus relieved the claimant of the necessity of
doing so. If the testimony were deemed credible, the claimant
would then have the opportunity to succeed in a claim even if
brought beyond three years of the last payment, notwithstanding
the statutory bar.
While Dudley may presumptively facilitate the assertion of the
foregoing argument,7 13 there is much to ultimately bar its success.
First, as a practical matter, it will be difficult to convince the factfinder that the claimant has only reasonably learned, some three
years after the cessation of payments, that he or she has been misled with respect to the employer's posture regarding the underlying
claim. 1 Further, there is limited authority which suggests that
712. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Olivetti Corp., 26 Pa. Commw.
464, 466, 364 A.2d 735, 736 (1976) (claimant receiving sickness and accident benefits
thought that he was receiving workmen's compensation, and only became aware of the true
nature of payments beyond the statutory time limit). Cf. Carpinelli v. Penn Steel Castings
Co., 209 Pa. Super. 390, 395, 227 A.2d 912, 914 (1967) (payments held to have misled claimant; actual status as payments "in lieu of compensation" or as additional union benefits not
decided); Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202 Pa. Super. 616, 618, 198 A.2d 399,
400 (1964) (payment of wages to claimant during period following work-related injury "during part of which. . . no services were performed by the claimant. . . unintentionally lulled
the claimant into a [false] sense of security.
...); Omo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 5 Pa. D. &
C.2d 49, 51-53 (1955) (claimant alleging that full wages paid to him, when working with
intervals of suspension due to work-related injury, were payments "in lieu of compensation"
sufficient to toll claim period limitation; court held that "certainly the fact that claimant
was continued in his usual position at his regular rate of pay was no deception.").
713. One could, however, argue that as Dudley refers only to "acts or statements," 80
Pa. Commw. at 241, 471 A.2d at 173, the notion that payments are brought within the scope
of the rule is presumptively barred.
714. Still, application of the discovery rule under the disease provision of the workmen's compensation act must be said to have resulted in compensation awards based on
credibility determinations which themselves strain credibility. See, e.g., Republic Steel
Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 54 Pa. Commw. 113, 117, 420 A.2d 37, 38-39
(1980) (notwithstanding fact that claimant applied for and received black lung benefits, and
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when payments of compensation cease, a general duty arises to
"inquire about [the right] to a hearing"71 on the matter, since the
cessation itself indicates a possible change of attitude regarding
the claim on the employer's part. In addition, the cessation of payments constitutes an affirmative act which makes a discovery rule
inappropriate, as the doctrine depends upon a latent condition of
some sort which causes the potential plaintiff or claimant to be
unaware of any injury, and hence of any need to pursue a claim.7 16
Certainly the sudden deprivation of disability benefits, presumably
due for a work-related injury, makes the discovery rule inapplicable. Finally, the very presence of the statutory provisions indicating that the limitation periods are to commence upon the last payment of compensation suggests that the legislature already took
into account that the receipt of "in lieu" payments may mislead or
confuse the employee, and simply decided that the general limitation period provided enough time for the situation to be discovered
7 17
and the claim asserted.
2.

Conduct Sufficient to Create Estoppel

The factual circumstances leading to estoppel and allowing nunc
pro tunc appeals 7 18 vary considerably. However, one rule must be
acknowledged which works as a threshold matter to derail arguments that a misleading or deceptive act has been committed
which should estop the employer from asserting the limitation.
That rule relieves the employer from affirmatively apprising the
employee of his or her compensation rights, 19 including, most releretired with severe breathing problems after 48 years in the mines, referee found that claimant only learned of work-related lung disability upon physician's report received at late
date).
715. Kopp v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Doylestown Processing Co.), 78
Pa. Commw. 292, 297, 467 A.2d 425, 427 (1983) (Barry, J., concurring) (reinstatement petition context).
716. See generally notes 706-10 and accompanying text.
717. But see Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 22
Pa. Commw. 498, 500-06, 349 A.2d 920, 922-25 (1976). In the cited case, payments of compensation under a supplemental agreement had been made. More than two years (the contemporary limitation period) after their cessation, the claimant filed a reinstatement petition. The limitation was held to be tolled, notwithstanding the statutory provision, after a
finding of "unintentional lulling" was made. Id.
718. See also supra notes 556-91 and accompanying text.
719. Taglianetti v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 503 Pa. 270, 274, 469 A.2d
548, 550 (1983), aff'g, 63 Pa. Commw. 456, 439 A.2d 844 (1981). See also 503 Pa. at 277 n.2,
469 A.2d at 552 n.2 (Larsen, J., dissenting). See also Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa.
Super. 357, 361, 201 A.2d 276, 279 (1964). Cf. McCutcheon v. I.T.E. Imperial Corp., 12 Pa.
Commw. 386, 388, 316 A.2d 657, 658 (1974) (existence of statute directing Secretary of La-
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vantly, the time within which they must be pursued. The employer's simple statement, under this rule, that the employee possesses no entitlement to benefits will not constitute a misleading
act working to toll the limitation.72 0 It is clear, likewise, that the
rule applies with equal force to public-sector employees, 2 ' individuals normally regarded as possessing extraordinary employment
rights.
Under present law, then, the employer must do something more
than merely deny the existence of the employee's rights or its own
liability 722 before the claimant can successfully assert that he has
been lulled into a false sense of security. Estoppel will arise in
cases where, for example, the employer tells the employee that the
claim has been filed for him; 712 where the claimant's inquiries as to
the status of the claim are met with assurances of future action;72 4
or where the employer has instituted non-in lieu payments of monies, either intentionally-to avoid the full workmen's compensation
burden 7 2 -or simply as a matter of course. 726 Estoppel will also be
easily found, of course, in cases of fraud.7 27
bor and Industry to prepare brochure informing employees of compensation rights not
thought to imply any affirmative duty).
720. See Taglianetti, 503 Pa. at 272, 469 A.2d at 549-50.
721. Palmer v. City of Pittsburgh, 9 Pa. Commw. 526, 532, 308 A.2d 179, 182 (1973).
722. See id. ("informing a claimant from the beginning that he has no claim or that
his claim will not be paid is not in itself deceptive or misleading conduct on the part of the
employer."); Fulton v. Philadelphia Rustproof Co., 200 Pa. Super. 467, 471, 190 A.2d 459,
461 (1963) (allocatur denied) ("the employer did nothing to make the claimant believe that
his claim would be paid or taken care of. On the contrary . . . the claimant was informed
from the very beginning that his claim was not compensable. . . and would not be paid.").
723. See, e.g., Herringshaw v. Travelers Aid Soc'y, 206 Pa. Super. 219, 220-21, 212
A.2d 914, 916 (1965) (claimant told by employer that claim report was filed and that compensation would be paid); M. Gordon & Sons, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
14 Pa. Commw. 288, 291, 321 A.2d 396, 398 (1974) (allocatur denied) (employee told twice
that "the papers had been filed and that 'it was going through.' "). See also Horton v. West
Penn Power Co., 119 Pa. Super. 465, 180 A. 56 (1935).
724. See, e.g., Mucha v. M.L. Bayard & Co., 177 Pa. Super. 138, 139-40, 108 A.2d 925,
926 (1955) (allocatur denied); Behanna v. Meyers, 163 Pa. Super. 200, 201, 60 A.2d 608, 609
(1948); Guy v. Stoecklein Baking Co., 133 Pa. Super. 38, 41-42, 1 A.2d 839, 840-41 (1938).
725. See e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Krause), 77 Pa. Commw. 420, 425-26, 465 A.2d 1342, 1345 (1983) ("the substitution of unemployment compensation for workmen's compensation, knowingly as in this case, inducing
inaction and delay . . . must result in tolling the filing limitation.") (final receipt case).
726. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Olivetti Corp., 26 Pa. Commw.
464, 466, 364 A.2d 735, 736 (1976) (non-occupational sickness and accident payments; false
sense of security found not in receipt of payments, but in nurse's act of providing forms to
claimant and helping claimant to complete them); Carpinelli v. Penn Steel Castings Co., 209
Pa. Super. 390, 395, 227 A.2d 912, 914 (1967) ("additional benefits under union contract").
727. See, e.g., Demmel v. Dilworth Co., 136 Pa. Super. 37, 7 A.2d 50 (1939) (allocatur
denied). Cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Iwaskewycz, 7 Pa. Commw. 211, 215, 298 A.2d 62, 64 (1972)
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Less dramatic or obvious cases in which estoppel has been found
involve confused employer procedures or administrative miscarriages. Thus, where a claimant was provided with the wrong form
with which to file a claim, resulting ultimately in a later tardy filing under the proper petition, the limitation was held not to apply
to bar the claim. 28 Similarly, where an uncontested claim was fatally delayed due to collapse of the employer's personnel office procedure, an unintentional lulling was found and no bar was applied.7 29 In addition, the reinstatement limitation was held not to
apply after it was found that the workmen's compensation bureau
had lulled the claimant into believing that it was taking "the necessary action . . . to protect his rights. '730 It should be
remembered, however, that, pursuant to the "no duty" rule,"' a
claimant's own confusion with respect to his compensation rights
will not work to suspend any of the compensation limitations.73 2
A third category of circumstances, which has been said to create
the grounds for estoppel and which is not so easily delineable into
the intentional or unintentional lulling camps, embraces instances
where an injury has occurred and either payments of medical expenses are made or direct treatments are administered by the employer. In such situations, of course, the payments themselves will
not toll the limitation period,7 33 but it has been suggested that
where the employer has "undertaken an examination or treatment
of [the employee's] injury, [it] may well [come] under an obligation
to notify him of its attitude toward a potential compensation
claim. 73 4 It may be noted immediately that this constitutes a
deviation from the general rule that the employer possesses no
such duty; still, although the roots of the doctrine are rather old, as
(foreman's assurances to worker of foreign origin on five or six occasions that compensation
would be paid held to be "unintentional deceptions").
728. See Blackburn v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 206 Pa. Super. 222, 225, 213
A.2d 159, 162 (1965).
729. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Rudolph, 19 Pa. Commw. 625, 63031, 339 A.2d 128, 129-30 (1975).
730. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. State Workmen's Compensation
Ins. Fund, 22 Pa. Commw. 498, 501, 349 A.2d 920, 922 (1976).
See also Mackanitz v. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry., 157 Pa. Super. 359, 362-66, 43 A.2d 586,
588-89 (1945) (although insurance carrier vacillated with respect to its willingness or ability
to pay compensation, held, claimant did not sustain burden of proof of showing lulling).
731. See supra note 719 and accompanying text.
732. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Popatek, 18 Pa. Commw. 158, 15960, 334 A.2d 317, 318 (1975).
733. See infra notes 763-75 and accompanying text.
734. Tarnoski v. Kanarr Corp., 12 Pa. Commw. 488, 492, 317 A.2d 904, 906 (1974).
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are its last actual applications," 5 this limited duty exception remains in the law.73 6 In terms of its practical operation, however,
the doctrine does not operate to automatically toll the limitation
period when such circumstances are found to have occurred, but
merely works to call to attention that in such circumstances the
opportunity for misleading may be enhanced, and that special
scrutiny of the employer's representations is in order.73 7 As always,
the determination of whether an unintentional lulling has actually
occurred is a factual determination.
3. Conduct Sufficient to Create Estoppel: FraudulentObtaining
of the Final Receipt
The limitation statute in section 434 of the workmen's compensation act may be tolled, of course, by the fraudulent or constructively fraudulent forms of employer conduct discussed above. In
addition, under section 434 the employer may be estopped from
asserting the limitation if the claimant "proves that the receipt
was procured by means of fraud, intentional or unintentional, or
[by] other improper action of the employer.7 37" For many years,
this was specifically provided for by statute, 739 but after the re735. In Tarnoski, id., the rule was recited but not applied. The doctrine was, however,
applied in Angermier v. Hubley Mfg. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 422, 213 A.2d 171 (1965), and
Meyers v. Lehigh Valley Transp. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 569, 10 A.2d 879 (1940).
736. The most recent judicial acknowledgment came by way of dicta in Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Griffith, 28 Pa. Commw. 623, 629 n.5, 368 A.2d 1371, 1374 n.5
(1977).
737. It is true that the original formulation of the doctrine seems to amount to a rule
of law. "After the insurance company moved to have claimant examined, it devolved upon it
to make a prompt report to claimant as to its attitude in order that he might protect his
rights by consulting counsel or filing his claim if it denied liability." 138 Pa. Super. at 573,
10 A.2d at 881. Nevertheless, the court went on to remand the case "to establish when
claimant was told that his claim would not be paid, to show the circumstances surrounding
his examination ..., and to disclose the conduct of the insurance carrier subsequent
thereto." Id. at 573, 10 A.2d at 881. The court apparently did not view itself as establishing
a concrete rule. But see Angermier v. Hubley Mfg. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 422, 427, 213 A.2d
171, 174 (1965) (court strictly applying rule).
In any case, the modern cases articulating the rule suggest that the overall circumstances
will control the determination of whether the failure to affirmatively apprise the employee
of the employer's posture vis-a-vis the claim will result in tolling. See Griffith, 28 Pa.
Commw. at 629 n.5, 368 A.2d at 1374 n.5 ("a failure to notify may estop the employer
.
);Tarnoski,
..
12 Pa. Commw. at 492, 317 A.2d at 906 (the employer "may [be] under
an obligation to notify . . ...
") (emphasis added).
738. Auerbach v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Auerbach), 80 Pa. Commw.
301, 304, 471 A.2d 596, 598 (1984).
739. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1001 (Purdon 1952), which provided, in pertinent
part, as follows: "the board, or a referee . . . may, at any time within two years from the
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moval of the statutory language 710 the courts continued to apply
the rule. The burden of proof demanded is that the claimant make
the showing by clear and precise evidence, the same standard used
when the limitation is sought to be suspended in the lulling context discussed above. 7 1 Because the principle applied is now one of
estoppel, it is appropriate that the rule applied in Dudley v. Work7 2
men's Compensation Appeal Board (Township of Marple) 4
should now apply to make the limitation recommence after a
fraudulent procurement only when the claimant knows, or reasonably should know, of the fraud.
As is generally the case, there is no duty on the employer's part
to affirmatively inform the claimant as to his rights with respect to
the final receipt. 743 This has led to unfortunate results, as employers will often seek final receipts when they are wholly inappropriate given a claimant's condition.1 " At a minimum, however, notwithstanding the rule relieving the employer from such an
obligation, some responsibility rests on it or the insurance carrier
to see to it that the claimant's signing of the final receipt is "not
prompted by a misunderstanding of its legal effect. 1 74 Thus, in
Climax Molybdenum v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board,746 an unintentional deception was held to have been committed when the employee was told that the signing of the final
receipt was for no more than the last compensation check. 747 Nevertheless, it is settled that the claimant's simple testimony that he
date to which payment is made as evidenced from [a] final receipt. . . set [it] aside. . . if it
be conclusively proven that such receipt was procured by fraud, coercion, or other improper
conduct . . . ." Id.
740. The deletion was made by the 1972 amendments. See Act of Feb. 8, 1972, P.L. 25,
No. 12, § 3.
741. See Mager v. H.H. Robertson Co., 27 Pa. Commw. 478, 480, 367 A.2d 414, 415
(1976). Indeed, in Mager, the court borrowed the standard from the "Old Chestnuts" of the
"lulling" theory cases. See id. (citing, inter alia, Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super.
357, 201 A.2d 276 (1964)).
742, 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169 (1984), afj'd per curiam, - Pa. , 507
A.2d 388 (1986). See supra notes 706-09 and accompanying text.
743, See Climax Molybdenum v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 15 Pa.
Commw. 249, 252, 325 A.2d 822, 823 (1974). See also Stewart v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 50 Pa. Commw. 479, 482, 413 A.2d 437, 439 (1980) (implied).
744. See, e.g., Hartung v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 49 Pa. Commw. 240,
241-43 & n.3, 410 A.2d 1301, 1302-03 & n.3 (1980). If a suspension, rather than a final receipt, is obtained the period for reopening the claim may be extended considerably. Id. See
supra notes 647-63 and accompanying text.
745. Schrein v. Fleischmann's Vienna Model Bakery, Inc., 148 Pa. Super. 155, 160, 24
A.2d 661, 663 (1942).
746. 15 Pa. Commw. 249, 325 A.2d 822 (1974).
747. Id. at 252-53, 325 A.2d at 824.
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"did not know what he was signing" is not sufficient to create an
estoppel. 48
C.

Tolling by Payments

The running of the limitations governing the claim,7 49 reinstatement,7' 50 and setting aside of final receipt7 51 petitions will also be
effected when "payments of compensation" are found to have been
made. On such occasions, the limitation begins to run only from
the date of last payment, rather than from, for instance, the date
of the injury, supplemental agreement or suspension, or of the
signing of the final receipt.
This pervasive rule actually embraces two types of payments.
First, the "payments of compensation" referred to in sections 315
and 413, and the simple "payments" of section 434 apply, pursuant
to their plain meaning, to payments made under the formal agreement or award obtained directly under the provisions of the act.
Second, those same references have application to payments "in
lieu of compensation." The latter term of art encompasses payments received by the employee which are intended by the employer to compensate the employee for a loss in earning
748. Auerbach v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Auerbach), 80 Pa. Commw.
301, 303, 471 A.2d 596, 598 (1984). Nor will coercion sufficient to toll the limitation be found
when "delivery of the final compensation check and [/or] reinstatement on the job" are only
allowed by the employer after the claimant signs the final receipt. See Mager v. H.H. Robertson Co., 27 Pa. Commw. 478, 480-81, 367 A.2d 414, 416 (1976):
If the employe is not then able to work or is unwilling to state that he is, he has the
choice to, and should, remain on compensation; and, even if his return to work
proves to have been premature [he will have the applicable limitation period] in
which to petition to set aside the final receipt.

Id.
749. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (Section 315 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act). Section 315 is reproduced in its entirety, supra note 227. For purposes
of the following discussion, the latter section provides as follows:
Where, however, payments of compensation have been made in any case, said limitations [the three year period governing original and death claims] shall not take effect
until the expiration of three years from the time of the making of the most recent
payment prior to date of filing such petition.

Id.
750. Id. § 772 (Section 413 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). Section 413 is reproduced in its entirety, supra note 638. The provision reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "no
notice of compensation payable, agreement or award shall be reviewed, or modified, or reinstated, unless a petition is filed . . . within three years after the date of the most recent
payment of compensation made prior to the filing of such petition." Id.
751. Id. § 1001 (Section 434 of the Workmen's Compensation Act). See supra text
accompanying note 654. In portions relevant to this discussion, the section provides that "a
referee. . . may, at any time within three years from the date to which payments have been
made, set aside a final receipt ....
" Id.
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power 75--in short, payments made in consonance with the theory
of disability underlying the act. 753 As discussed below, 754 a predictable complement to this latter rule exists: where payments have
been made without the intent to compensate the employee for a
work-related loss of earning power, the payments will not work to
extend the running of the limitation period.755
Because a matter of statutory mandate, it is apparent that the
"tolling" involved when payments have been made has nothing to
do with estoppel. That equitable theory applies where the employer has committed "fraud or its equivalent" 756 in the misleading
of the claimant with respect to the status of his potential claim.
The distinction is of some weight, as payments of compensation or
monies in lieu thereof are sometimes advanced as having misled
the claimant as to the employer's view of its statutory liability or
the posture in other respects of the employer vis-a-vis the claim,
promoting, in turn, the argument that it should be estopped from
asserting the limitation. The distinction, in the past, was inconsequential, since the "last payment" under the statutory language of
the limitation provisions could be easily equated with the "last
misleading act" of the employer under the estoppel notion; thus,
under whatever theory brought, the claimant would have the same
period of time within which to assert the delayed petition. With
the ruling in Dudley v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
(Township of Marple),757 however, it was held that in cases of estoppel the limitation is only to run after the employee has knowl752. See Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202 Pa. Super. 616, 619-20, 198
A.2d 399, 401 (1964) ("payments which were intended to compensate for loss of earning
power" will "extend the statutory period for filing petitions.").
753. See generally Killian v. Heintz Div., Kelsey Hayes, 468 Pa. 200, 205, 360 A.2d
620, 623 (1976); Scott v. C.E. Powell Coal Co., 402 Pa. 73, 75-76, 166 A.2d 31, 33-34 (1960).
In addition, provision is specifically made in all three statutes for extension of the limitation when a claimant has received benefits under the Heart and Lung Act. See Act of June
28, 1935, P.L. 477, No. 193 [19351, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 637-38 (Purdon 1952 & Supp.
1985). The latter act provides that when certain state government employees are incapacitated due to certain respiratory ailments, such employees are to receive their "full rate of
salary, as fixed by ordinance or resolution, until the disability arising therefrom has ceased."
Id. § 637 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
754. See infra notes 776-807 and accompanying text.
755. See, e.g., Thorn v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 65, 155 A.2d 414,
417 (1959) (payments made by employee "beneficial association" to which claimant had
paid dues not "payments of compensation" under the act).
756. See supra notes 689-737 and accompanying text.
757. 80 Pa. Commw. 233, 471 A.2d 169 (1984), afl'd per curiam, __
Pa. ,507
A.2d 388 (1986).
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edge or constructive knowledge of the misleading,7 58 a point which
could be well beyond three years (the current limit) of the last
payment. The issue has been discussed above in some detail,7 5 9 but
it will be submitted again at this point that Dudley, decided under
an equitable notion, plays no role in the case of payments tolling,
even where such payments are alleged to have been misleading,
since extension of the limitations due to payments is already authorized by statute, precluding application of the discovery rule.
Two reasons underlie the rule that the limitations are to be suspended where payments or payments in lieu have been made, and
that the limitations commence upon the last payment made. First,
of course, that payments have been made in any event indicates
that the employer recognizes (either voluntarily or as the result of
an adverse administrative decision) that the claimant is suffering a
work-related disability. Because a principal reason for the existence of statutes of limitations is to protect the employer from
claims based upon stale evidence, 60 it is sensible to suspend the
limitation in the face of the employer's acknowledgement of the
disability, so very manifest in the sheer making of payments. If
that acknowledgement ends, as indicated by the cessation of payments, the statutory scheme returns the parties to the status quo,
allowing the full period of time for the claimant to assert the claim,
and grants repose to the employer upon its expiration.
This latter notion, that it is a matter of fairness to allow a claimant the full period to assert the claim, constitutes the practical reason for the rule. As Professor Larson explains, using a one-year
statute of limitations in his example:
the general idea is that an employee who has been receiving compensation
for eleven months cannot reasonably be expected to have made a claim during that period, and should not, upon cessation of voluntary payments at
the end of the eleventh month, be allowed only one month in which to file
his claim.7hl

As Larson further suggests, most controversies arising under this
common rule involve the ascertainment of whether payments are
indeed compensation such as to cause a suspension of the limitation period.7 62 This issue is investigated in the ensuing portions of
758.

Id. at 241, 471 A.2d at 171.

759. See supra notes 711-17 and accompanying text.
760.

See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.

761.

LARSON,

supra note 144, at § 78.43(a). See also Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co., 271 Pa.

265, 38 A.2d 341 (1921).
762. See id.
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this article.
1. Payments of Medical Expenses: Not Payments Sufficient to
Toll
Although payments of medical expenses may be considered compensation for some purposes of the act," 3 they are not so construed in the context of tolling of the statutes of limitations. 7"'
This construction stems from the earliest days of the system, when
the matter was squarely addressed in Paolis v. Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co.7 6 5 In Paolis, the claimant had been injured, and
his hospital bills were paid by the employer pursuant to the predecessor to the present section 306(f). 7 1 The claimant waited, however, for more than a year-the contemporary claim limitation period-before filing a claim petition. In response to the employer's
setting up of the bar, the claimant asserted that the section 315
proviso, that the period was only to commence upon the last payment of compensation, encompassed the medical payments which
had been made.767 The court, however, rejected this assertion, and
held that the legislature had intended that a distinction exist between "compensation," which was consistently provided for in the
statutory scheme in specific schedules, and "costs," such as the
hospital bills in issue, which were specifically provided for in a sep7 8
arate provision. 1
This statutory framework pursuant to which the court drew its
conclusion has been greatly modified in the subsequent decades.
Still, as the author has attempted to verify in the note accompany763. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Diggs, 46 Pa. Commw. 58, 61, 406 A.2d 246, 247-48
(1979) (payment of medical expenses under section 306(f) of the act [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §
531(1) (Purdon Supp. 1985)], is compensation for the purposes of section 311, demanding
that timely notice be given before its receipt could be obtained).
764. Pliscott v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 292, 296, 305
A.2d 918, 920 (1973).
765. 265 Pa. 291, 108 A. 638 (1919).
766. Id. at 292, 108 A. at 638.
767. Id. at 293, 108 A. at 638.
768. Id. at 294-95, 108 A. at 639:
It is clear [that] the "compensation" specified in those sections [, including, among
others, correlates to the modern sections 511 and 516,] does not refer to the payments
for "reasonable surgical, medical and hospital services, medicines and supplies,"
under [what is now section 306(f)], but only to those to be made to the injured employe, or in the case of his death to his widow, children or dependents[;] hence, as
they include "all compensation payable under this article," . . . they necessarily determine what the Legislature meant by the use of that word in [article three of the
act] . ...
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ing the preceding paragraph, no change in the relevant provisions
has been made which would render the court's reasoning obsolete.
Indeed, although Paolis is by and large a forgotten case, the last
judicial acknowledgement of the rule adopted the Paolis reasoning
76 9
by implication.
Although this rule is thus based upon a judicially-ascertained
legislative intent, the doctrine's popular familiarity stems from the
exposition, in Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co.," 0 of its laudable
effects:
The appellant asks us to reverse this long established principle. To do so
would be a grievous mistake. Since the early days of workmen's compensation, the insurance carriers have been liberal in paying medical and hospital
bills beyond those required by the statute. . . . The insurers pay for this
treatment to help injured employes regain their health, which minimizes
their future disability and reduces the liability of the insurance carrier for
future compensation payments."'

It has recently been posited, however, that this articulation of the
rule's beneficent effect is an anachronism, in light of the 1972
amendment to section 306(f) which imposed upon the employer
permanent liability for medical expenses due to work-related injuries, in contrast to the ninety-day limit which was in place when
Dennis was decided." 2 Under the latter provision "[tihere was a
valid reason to encourage the voluntary payment of medical. Now
that medical is payable for the life of the claim, there is no such
773
reason."
769. See Pliscott, 9 Pa. Commw. at 296, 305 A.2d at 920 (quoting Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 363, 201 A.2d 276, 279 (1964) ("The rule that medical payments do not toll the statute of limitations was established by the supreme court on the
basis of the statute [in Paolis].")).
770. 203 Pa. Super. 357, 201 A.2d 276 (1964).
771. Id. at 362-63, 201 A.2d at 279.
772. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 531 (Purdon 1952) with id. § 531 (Purdon
Supp. 1985). In truth, the issue of whether "permanent" liability for medical expenses was
in fact imposed by the 1972 amendment has never been resolved by the commonwealth
court. The amendment deleted the 90-day maximum period of liability, leaving section
306(f) without any articulated time limitation: "The employer shall provide payment for
reasonable surgical and medical services ... as and when needed[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
While this would seemingly impose permanent liability, the appeal board has held that the
three-year time limitation on setting aside of the final receipt precludes not only the opportunity to reopen the disability claim, but to pursue medical expenses as well. See Fuhrman
v. Clemens Supermarket (Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board Dckt. No. A-87244,
dated Dec. 27, 1984) (petition for review granted) (argued April 8, 1986).
773. McConnell v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
Dckt. No. A-86678, decided Apr. 5, 1984) at 3. The board went on to remand the case for
findings "as to whether the Defendant paid any medical expenses of the Claimant which
would toll the statute of limitations." Id.
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Nevertheless, while the magnanimous language of Dennis may
have lost some of its allure, because the rule itself stems from
Paolis as a matter of supreme court construction of the act, the
unrelated amendment of section 306(f) cannot operate as grounds
to overturn the rule; regardless of the period in which liability for
medical expenses is imposed upon the employer, such payments
are as unlike "compensation" as ever. Additionally, the Dennis
court's explanation of the laudable effect of the rule is not completely obsolete. Consider the mischievous results, in this respect,
if it were conclusively held that payments of medical expenses
were sufficient to toll the limitations period. A working claimant
could, for example, undergo a minor and possibly spurious medical
treatment near the close of every three year limitation period of
the reinstatement and final receipt provisions, thereby indefinitely
extending the opportunity to bring a petition to re-open the claim.
The obvious result would be to forbid any repose or personal certainty to the employer as against future liability.774 A practical result would be understandable recalcitrance by the employer to
submit to payments of such expenses, action which would in turn
result in burdensome and needless litigation. Faced with this general specter, employers would no doubt contest meritorious expense claims, creating precisely the same undesirable situation
which Dennis recognized as being avoided by the traditional
rule. 775
2. Payments "In Lieu" of Compensation: Payments Sufficient to
Toll
When payments are made with the intent to compensate an employee for a concededly work-related disability, they will be
deemed "in lieu" of workmen's compensation and will extend the
limitation period commencement point, just as if they had been
formal payments under the act.7 76 As may be likewise recalled, the
"in lieu" designation arises from and is interchangeable with the
"payments" language of the three critical statutes of repose.7 7
While it is true that the doctrine was first clarified in the context
of the claim limitation provisions,7 7 8 it is beyond question that the
774. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
775. See supra text accompanying note 771.
776. See supra notes 752-53 and accompanying text.
777. See supra text preceding note 752.
778. See Tinsman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 118 Pa. Super. 516, 523, 180 A.2d
175, 177 (1935):
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same theory pervades without deviation throughout construction
of the three limitations."9
The question of whether a payment in lieu of compensation has
been made is one of fact for the referee's determination.7 10 The
burden is upon the claimant to demonstrate that the "monies were
paid and received as compensation under the Act and not as wages
for employment," 8 1 and the submitted evidence "must clearly appear" in the record. 782 A threshold issue to be determined is when
the payment was made. No payment made beyond three years of
the last payment, regardless of its nature, can revive the right to
compensation and toll the limitation.7 83 This rule is, of course, the
result of the statute of repose theory. 84
An often forgotten characteristic7 18 of the payment in lieu of
compensation is that it must have been made by the employer with
the intent to compensate for a work-related disability. No better
evidence exists that this is the rule than the supreme court decision which first clarified the rule, Chase v. Emery Manufacturing
Where section 315 refers to "payments of compensation" as extending the time
within which the limitations provided for in the act shall take effect, it means payments by way of wages, benefits, relief, or other voluntary or informal compensation,
apart from the act . . .or payments made under an agreement not approved by the
board, or under a premature or invalid agreement ....
Id. See also Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 113, 116,
401 A.2d 882, 884 (1979) ("Section 315 . . . provides for an extension of time for filing a
petition for compensation when an employer pays an employee compensation in lieu of
wages after a work-related injury.").
779. See Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw. 424, 429,
310 A.2d 701, 704 (1973) ("section 315 cases holding that payments by an employer to an
employe which are intended to compensate for loss of earning power, not to pay for services
rendered by the employe, toll the running of the statute, are good authority in section 434
[final receipt] cases.").
780. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Niemann, 24 Pa. Commw. 377, 385, 356
A.2d 370, 374-75 (1976); Wilson v. United News Transp. Co., 215 Pa. Super. 317, 323, 261
A.2d 338, 341 (1969) (refers to board as fact-finder; pre-1972 amendment case); Hickey v.
Cudahy Packing Co., 153 Pa. Super. 45, 48, 33 A.2d 285, 286 (1943) (refers to board as factfinder; pre-1972 amendment case).
781. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. 76, 78, 342
A.2d 828, 829 (1975); Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Niemann, 24 Pa. Commw.
377, 385, 356 A.2d 370, 375 (1976).
782. Niemann, 24 Pa. Commw. at 385, 356 A.2d at 375; Cotton v. John Wood Mfg.
Co., 126 Pa. Super. 528, 531, 191 A. 189, 190 (1937). See also Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co., 271
Pa. 265, 268, 113 A. 840, 841 (1921); Elkins v. Cambria Library Ass'n, 82 Pa. Super. 144, 148
(1923).
783. Palm v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cluett, Peabody & Co.), 78 Pa.
Commw. 63, 66, 466 A.2d 1108, 1110 (1983); Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 113, 116, 401 A.2d 882, 884 (1979).
784. See id.
785. See infra note 787 and accompanying text.
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Co.: 78 6 "'[Playment of compensation' . . . means an amount received and paid as compensation for injury or death of an em7 7
ployee, occurring in the course of employment."s
A factual ascertainment that a payment in lieu of compensation has been made
thus cannot be based simply on the evidence that payments were
made to the employee while the latter was incapacitated and not
working.7 8s Instead, the employer must be found or inferred to
have made the payments pursuant to acknowledgement of a workrelated injury of the employee. This makes sense, since this is the
7 89
very theory of disability under the act.
The complementary rule to that of the enduring doctrine established in Chase is that payments made not to compensate for the
work-related injury will not toll the limitation periods.7 90 Indeed, a
variation of the rule is codified in provisos to sections 315 and 423.
After providing that when payments have been made the limita786. 271 Pa. 265, 113 A. 840 (1921).
787. Id. at 268, 113 A. at 841 (emphasis added).
Although this rather critical element of the rule is often omitted from its current formulation, see, e.g., Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202 Pa. Super. 616, 619-20, 198
A.2d 399, 401 (1964), it has appeared in enough decisions to compel the conclusion that the
original supreme court mandate is still properly honored. See Helstrom v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 43 Pa. Commw. 113, 116, 401 A.2d 882, 884 (1979) (limitation tolled
after employer paid employee compensation "in lieu . . . after a work-related injury.")
(emphasis added); Temple v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 445 Pa. 539, 545, 285 A.2d
137, 140 (1971) (Justice Barbieri quoting Chase verbatim); Cotton v. John Wood Mfg. Co.,
126 Pa. Super. 528, 531, 191 A. 189, 190 (1937) ("The testimony ... was sufficiently direct
and positive to establish that the payments were voluntary and in the nature of informal
compensation to an injured employee, who . . . 'couldn't do a capable day's work'" after
serious and dramatic injury recognized by employer).
788. See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. 76,
80, 342 A.2d 828, 830 (1975) (fact that claimant was paid wages notwithstanding absence
from work for three days could not raise inference that monies were in lieu of compensation); Elkins v. Cambria Library Ass'n, 82 Pa. Super. 144, 146, 148 (1923) (fact that claimant was paid full wages notwithstanding occasional absences from work due to injury did
not raise inference that monies were in lieu of compensation when employer's customary
policy was to pay full wages when employees were "off sick").
Cf. SKINNER, supra note 2, at 693 (4th ed. 1947) ("The payment must be for 'compensation' and not merely the payment of wages during the time the employe may have been
idle.").
789. See supra notes 752-53 and accompanying text.
790. See, e.g., Temple v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 445 Pa. 539, 545, 285 A.2d
137, 140-41 (1971) (sick leave payments, because employment benefits, were not payments
"in lieu of compensation").
See also Palm v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Cluett, Peabody & Co.), 78 Pa.
Commw. 63, 65-66, 466 A.2d 1108, 1110 (1983) (disability benefits received by claimant in
lieu of life insurance payments due at death held by referee not to be "in lieu" of compensation under workmen's compensation law; case disposed of by court on other grounds without
resolution of issue).
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tion only runs from the date of their cessation, the provisos of the
cited sections state
[tihat any payment made under an established plan or policy of insurance
for the payment of benefits on account of non-occupational illness or injury
and which payment is identified as not being workmen's compensation shall
not be considered to be payment in lieu of workmen's compensation, and
such payment shall not toll the running of the Statute of Limitations.'

The proviso is notoriously absent from section 434, the setting
aside of final receipt limitation." 2 Nevertheless, because the proviso does no more than express the general rule that payments not
made in lieu of compensation will not toll the limitations, 793 there
is every reason to believe that the general import of its terms applies to the final receipt limitation.
Although the employee has the burden of demonstrating that
monies received are payments in lieu of compensation, a sufficient
inference of receipt of such payments will arise from continuing
payments made during a period of a claimant's disability. 79 '
Where, for example, a fraction of or an amount equal to a claimant's wages is paid after the employee becomes disabled-by
whatever cause-the inference will arise that the payments are in
lieu of compensation; 7 5 that is, repeating our definition, that they
791.

See

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 77, § 602 (Purdon Supp. 1985); id. § 772. See supra notes

227 & 630.

Other states maintain precisely the same rule as developed in Pennsylvania case law and
as partially codified in the provisions of the act. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(j)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (excepting from tolling effect "payments made under any group
plan which would have been payable irrespective of an accidental injury under this act.").
See also Brock v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 444 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725, 84 A.D. 645, 647 (1981)
("payments by an employer which result solely from a finding of disability regardless of its
cause are not advance payments of compensation."); Zanni v. Rudolph Poultry Co., 105 N.J.
Super. 325, 329, 252 A.2d 212, 214 (App. Div. 1969) ("[w]here the party's conduct indicates
that the payments are not pursuant to a statutory obligation, they do not toll the statute.").
792. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1001 (Purdon Supp. 1985).
793. Cf. BARBIERI, supra note 2, § 6.15, at 48 (referring to 1972 amendments to proviso
stating: "and which payment is identified as not being workmen's compensation ....",
"This seems to make very clear what had been pretty much spelled out previously in the
cases.").
794. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. 76, 80,
342 A.2d 828, 830 (1975).

795. This doctrine was first articulated in the seminal case of Creighton v. Continental
Roll & Steel Foundry Co., 155 Pa. Super. 165, 38 A.2d 337 (1944). Creighton, as has often
been pointed out, did not involve a statute of limitation, but instead dealt with the nature
of payments made by an employer for which a credit could later be received after a compensation award was granted. See Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. at 79, 342 A.2d at 830 ("the statute
of limitations was extrinsic to the issue in Creighton ....").Such credits are received
when payments have been made and have been determined, after litigation, to be sufficient
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have been paid by the employer in recognition of the claimant's
work-related injury. 796 It is clear, however, that there is no per se
rule providing that whenever payments are made to an admittedly
idle and disabled worker the payments are to be deemed in lieu of
compensation: the inference can always be rebutted.7 97 That no per
to toll the statute of limitations. Creighton, with its definition of "in lieu" payments evident
in the excerpted material below, has become, and remains (rightly or wrongly) a "leading
case" in the statutes of limitations realm:
The decisions hold that when an employee is totally disabled and the employer, while
denying any liability for workmen's compensation, nevertheless pays the employee
regular, stated amounts, weekly or monthly, either out of its own general funds, or
out of sick or accident benefits or relief funds contributed by it, not as wages or salary
for work performed, but in relief of the employee's incapacity to labor, on it being
determined that the employee is entitled to workmen's compensation, the amount
paid by the employer discharges its liability for compensation for the weeks in which
its payments to him equalled or exceeded the compensation payable. . . .It is only
where the employee is not totally disabled and actually performs some labor for
which he is paid wages or salary . . . that such payments will not extend the time
within which the claim petition must be filed or discharge the employer's liability for
compensation for the weeks in which its payments equalled or exceeded the compensation payable.
155 Pa. Super. at 173-74, 38 A.2d at 341 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
To distill this often-invoked quotation, it may be said that Creighton holds that where
payments are made by an employer to a totally disabled worker later found to be entitled to
compensation, those payments may be deducted, as payments in lieu of compensation, from
the employer's statutorily-determined liability. Where payments are made to, for example, a
worker who is only partially disabled, and who continues to work, on the other hand, his
wages are easily viewed as compensating him for his labor, and thus are not payments in
lieu which the employer is to take credit for against his compensation liability.
Reading the Creighton language quoted above, however, one is impressed with the idea
that a rule of law is being stated. This may have been all well and good for determining
when a credit was due, but hardly appropriate to determine sufficiency to toll a limitation,
which, as has been established in the accompanying text, is a question of fact for the factfinder, dependent upon its ascertainment of the employer's intent in making the payment.
See supra notes 785-89 and accompanying text.
Payments in lieu for purposes of tolling, and for purposes of determining the credit due
are thus not one and the same, and Creighton must thus be read with scrutiny. Indeed, this
is precisely what courts have done, it is submitted, in establishing only that an inference of
a payment in lieu of compensation sufficient to toll a limitation period will arise under
Creighton. See Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. at 80 & n.4, 342 A.2d at 830 & n.4. There is some
evidence, however, that Creighton is being read too broadly in recent days. See infra note
804.
796. The inference stems, perhaps, from an unspoken refusal on the part of the courts
to believe that an employer would make totally gratuitous payments to an employee who
suffers from a non-work-related injury. Cf. Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202
Pa. Super. 616, 620, 198 A.2d 399, 401 (1964) ("These [payments] were of a gratuitous nature since [claimant] did not work or earn any wages during this period. For this reason
alone we must conclude that 'there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the
petition in this case was filed within the time allowed by the statute.' ") (emphasis added)).
797. See Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Kennedy, 21 Pa. Commw. 76, 80,
342 A.2d 828, 830 (1975) ("Surely a payment for a completed pay period in which a claimant
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se rule exists is not only demonstrated from clear judicial inferences otherwise, but such a rule would be, of course, fundamentally
at odds with the role of the fact-finder in ascertaining the intent of
the employer in making the payments.7 98
With these precepts in mind, one may seek to reconcile the cases
deciding the issue of whether payments in lieu have been made.
Where the alleged payments had been made not by the employer
at all, for example, but out of a union fund exclusive of the employer's control, no payments in lieu were found 9 9 Nor was a payment in lieu of compensation found in an employer's subrogation
interest waiver in a widow's third party action seeking recovery for
her husband's fatal work-related injury.8 00 Both of the cited cases
evidence situations in which a demonstration of the employer intent required in an in lieu payment situation would indeed have
been difficult.
Where, however, following an employee's serious, inarguably
work-related injury his employer placed him on light duty at full
wages, payments in lieu were found to have been made.80 1 The
same was found, additionally, where an employer paid a recently
injured employee full wages while in the hospital for back surgery,
immediately following a period of light duty work.8 02 Payments in
lieu of compensation were also found where an employer paid
monies to an injured claimant "until [the employer] got [the matter] straightened up with the insurance company, until they
started to pay."803 In all of these cases, however, it must be
stressed that the conclusion was drawn not pursuant to the simple
fact that payments were not in the nature of wages (monies inis not working would raise, in absence of rebutting evidence, a sufficient inference of compensation to carry a claimant's burden .... ").
798. See supra notes 785-89 and accompanying text. See especially Wilson v. United
News Transp. Co., 215 Pa. Super. 317, 323, 261 A.2d 338, 341 (1969).
799. See Thorn v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 191 Pa. Super. 59, 65, 155 A.2d 414, 417
(1959).
800. See Wilson, 215 Pa. Super. at 321-24, 261 A.2d at 341-42.
801. See City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 10 Pa. Commw.
424, 428, 310 A.2d 701, 703 (1973) (city's practice of paying disabled workers following injuries "and the lack of any [other] explanation for the city's beneficence, provide ample support for the [fact-finder's] finding that the city's payments" were in lieu of compensation).
802. See Miller v. Springfield Twp. Highway Dept., 202 Pa. Super. 616, 620, 198 A.2d
399, 401 (1964) ("The payment of full wages during the period of hospitalization was not for
services rendered and . . . it may [thus] be considered as payment of compensation.").
803. Schrecengost v. O.K. Heilman Trucking Co., 174 Pa. Super. 299, 303, 101 A.2d
417, 419 (1953) ("[The payments] were intended to compensate him for loss of earning
power and were as much workmen's compensation as if paid as such by agreement."). See
also Somerton v. Bell Tel. Co., 111 Pa. Super. 264, 268-71, 169 A. 579, 581-82 (1933).
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tended to compensate for services rendered), but in the context of
a factual matrix which included evidence, found persuasive by the
fact-finder, that the employer recognized the work-related character of the disability. The author will thus posit again that there is
no rule supported by precedent to the effect that any payment
made "not wages or salary" is conclusively, as a per se matter or as
a rule of law, a payment in lieu of compensation.80 4 The conclusion
804. But see Marshall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 79 Pa. Commw. 128,
130, 468 A.2d 1164, 1166-67 (1983) (Marshall II), appeal dismissed as improvidently
granted, 505 Pa. 504, 481 A.2d 609 (1984). In Marshall II, an employee had received sickness and accident benefits following his retirement, which itself had been preceded by a
signing of a final receipt of compensation received due to a work-related injury. Although
the claimant left his employment because he was physically unable to continue his work due
to the prior injury, he was told by the employer that he was not entitled to workmen's
compensation. He was told, however, that he could receive sickness and accident benefits
under the employer's non-occupational insurance plan and at their expiration apply for disability pension benefits with the company. At the expiration of the sickness and accident
benefits, the claimant sought a reinstatement of benefits (actually a setting aside of the final
receipt). He was unsuccessful (1) because the petition was filed two years (the contemporary
period under section 434) after the last payment of formal compensation and (2) because
the referee had found that the benefits paid after the claimant's retirement were not payments "in lieu" of compensation, since the employer had denied any liability for further
workmen's compensation. In addition, there was no allegation that the employer had misled
the claimant or lulled him into a false sense of security. See Reproduced Record at 55a,
Marshall v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 505 Pa. 504, 481 A.2d 609 (1984) (decision of appeal board, dated May 4, 1978).
In its first consideration of the case, however, (43 Pa. Commw. 426, 418 A.2d 769 (1979)
(Marshall /)), the commonwealth court overturned the referee's decision and appeal board's
affirmance thereof, holding that "[blecause claimant's monthly disability pension payments
are not wages or salary, Creighton . . . require[s] that the payments toll the running of the
statute." Id. at 431, 418 A.2d at 771 (referring to Creighton v. Continental Roll & Steel
Foundry Co., 155 Pa. Super. 165, 38 A.2d 337 (1944)).
It is to be recalled at this point, however, that Creighton requires nothing, but merely
creates an inference with respect to the status of monies paid as payments in lieu of compensation, an inference rebuttable by the employer as to its intent in making the payments.
See supra notes 794-98 and accompanying text. Perhaps the Marshall I court's language
may be dismissed as only a conclusion based upon its statement that "it is... undisputed
that the disability which ultimately brought about [the] retirement was the [original] injury
.
43.. Pa. Commw. at 431, 418 A.2d at 771. Nevertheless, one must be suspicious that
the court was viewing Creighton as dictating a per se rule, which that case surely does not.
See supra note 797.
The case was appealed again after remand, however, on the grounds that even if the disability pension benefits were "in lieu" payments sufficient to toll the limitation period, they
had been received well beyond the two years from the last formal payment. Due to the
delay, the pension payments were asserted to be irrelevant, because the limitation had run
and extinguished the very right to compensation. Cf. Reproduced Record, supra, at 138a
(exceptions taken to referee's decision on remand). Apparently accepting this as true, the
court nonetheless held that the limitation had been tolled, because within two years of the
last formal payment of compensation the sickness and accident payments had commenced.
These payments, the court insisted, like the pension benefits, were "not wages or salary and
• . . therefore . . . did toll the statute of limitations." (citing Creighton, 155 Pa. Super. 165,
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is one for the fact-finder.
And, indeed, the existence of such a rule would be most undesirable. A per se rule would greatly discourage the willingness of employers to make payments out of non-occupational insurance funds
for the fear that no repose against future liability could ever be
achieved due to the tolling effect of the payments."s 5 To a great
extent the employer is protected by the provisos of sections 315
and 413,808 and those provisos should be read expansively to establish the protection throughout the limitation provisions. It is to be
case do no more than
recalled, however, that the provisos in any
80 7
established.
already
rule
general
the
voice
CONCLUSION

In the realm of workmen's compensation, the last twenty years
have been attended by a massive increase in the number of claims
filed,80 8 and more generous and attractive benefit levels provided
by the legislature.8 09 Additionally, the judiciary has created a new
panoply of disease and injury "forms" for which compensation may
be paid.81 0 In light of these developments, the law and policy of the
time limitations of the workmen's compensation and occupational
disease acts necessarily assume added importance. Rather clearly,
the increased potential liability indicated by swelling numbers of
claims, at least from an employer or insurance carrier perspective,
38 A.2d 337 (1944) (emphasis added)). With this naked statement, the court was apparently
again applying a per se rule, declaring a tolling effect out of the context of the particular
circumstances surrounding the payments, and ignoring the fact-finder's conclusion regarding
those circumstances (i.e., that the employer denied the work-related character of the
disability).
What is to be drawn from this treatment? Perhaps little. The court may simply have been
intent on awarding benefits to a claimant who never should have signed a final receipt, and
who should have sought a resumption of compensation immediately upon his retirement to
protect his right to full workmen's compensation benefits. Nevertheless, this naked and literal application of Creighton sets a dangerous precedent which may work to displace the
case from merely providing an inference, elevating it instead to a rule of law. As we have
seen, this would be contrary to decades of interpretation of the "payments" language of the
statutes of repose.
805. Cf. Dennis v. E.J. Lavino & Co., 203 Pa. Super. 357, 362-63, 201 A.2d 276, 279
(1964).
806. See supra text accompanying note 791.
807. See supra note 790 and accompanying text.
808. See BmmRI, supra note 2, at 62 (Supp. 1983) (noting that number of claims
filed in Pennsylvania tripled between 1972 and 1982).
809. See id. (noting that benefit rate for total disability rose from $94 per week in
1972 to $284 per week in 1982).
810. See generally Richman, supra note 334, at 372-80.
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demands a rational and consistently applied limitations law to
mark the outer boundaries of liability. The unfolding of new injury
types, meanwhile, calls for careful consideration of the proper limitation theory which is to be applied; most of these new injuries,
notably, have been judicially developed only after the legislature's
last consideration of the scope of the discovery rule under section
315.
In the first part of this article, the theoretical bases of the various time limitations were examined in an attempt to organize a
rational classification scheme." ' Although that effort might be
viewed as another example of an attempt to classify that which is
inherently resistant to classification, in the microcosm of workmen's compensation time restrictions not only is such a classification possible, but important in recognition of the recent developments in the area. Each of the classified limitation types arose
from manifestly distinguishable judicial and legislative notions;
these notions, in turn, embrace policy concerns which should be
recognized in the course of limitations law construction and development. Occasional failure to recognize the diverse limitation categories has already created confusion in terminology, 1 2 and, in addition, runs the risk of defeating the goal of achieving a rational
81 3
and consistent body of law.
From the second part of this article at least one fairly remarkable and important conclusion may be drawn. That conclusion embraces the realization that however often courts invoke and recognize the vital evidentiary and repose purposes of statutes of
limitations,1a they are just as willing on occasion to totally disregard these purposes. 1 The most obvious reason for that course of
conduct is, no doubt, the entirely justifiable conviction that the
workmen's compensation scheme constitutes remedial legislation,
meant essentially to enhance the possibility of employee recov811. See supra notes 33-220 and accompanying text.
812. See, e.g., note 217 and accompanying text.
813. See generally supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text.
814. See, e.g., supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
815. See, e.g., D & T Brooks, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 38 Pa.
Commw. 223, 227, 392 A.2d 895, 898 (1978) (500-week period for reinstatement of compensation after suspension of payments not reduced by periods of actual suspension, thus creating indefinite period of potential liability). See also Bailey v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Pittsburgh Tube Co.), Pa. Commw. - ...
508 A.2d 393, 395 (1986)
(discovery rule held applicable to notice limitation in context of aggravation of back injury
without regard to evidentiary concerns, and without regard to whether injury was of truly
insidious character). See generally supra notes 408-09 and accompanying text.
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ery.81 e Nevertheless, the courts too often ignore the concerns that
claims cannot be effectively investigated and verified, and that repose or insurance carrier "certainty" may be difficult or impossible
to achieve. These concerns should be increasingly recognized as
workmen's compensation continues its significant change. While
facilitating recovery for injured employees is laudable, a limitations law "which places upon any industry a burden so crushing
that it makes that industry's existence impossible or . . .economically undesirable 8 1 7 may well play a role in the decline of Pennsylvania as an economically viable state." '

816.
817.
818.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 460-61, 7 A.2d 302, 308 (1939).
Cf. generally Note, Workmen's Compensation-Statute of Limita-

tions-Timeliness of Claims and Appeals, 22 DuQ. L. REV. 809, 821-22 (1984). Commenting

on the West Virginia Supreme Court's abolition of strict workmen's compensation claim and
appeal time limitations in Bailey v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 296 S.E.2d 901 (W.
Va. 1982), the writer of the cited article posits the following:
The rule adopted in Bailey ... can only increase the costs to employers in the state,
as they now must defend otherwise untimely claims and the appeals generated by
claimants whose requests for waiver of the limitation period [due to alleged "good
cause"] are denied. Other decisions by the West Virginia Supreme Court . . .have
already seriously eroded the position of employers in that state ....

How ... can

West Virginia, with the highest rate of unemployment in the nation, expect to [support the increased cost of a judicially liberalized workmen's compensation act?].
Note, supra, at 821-22 (footnotes omitted). Cf. also Solomons, Hazardous Wastes and
Workmen's Compensation:Some Evolving Concerns, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 104-06 (1985)
(noting crisis in insurance coverage and practices in light of new, emerging work-related
ailments "not contemplated at the time premiums were collected for the risk ....").

